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THE

HISTORY

OF

THE POLITICKS

OF

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,

FROM

THE TIME OF THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ,
TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST
GREAT BRITAIN,

WITH

AN APPENDIX,

CONTAINING A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE.

To which is now added,

A POSTSCRIPT,

Containing an Examination of the Conduct of the British Ministry,
relative to the late Proposal of BUONAPARTE.

THE TANJORE MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASWATI MAHAL.

IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. I.

BY HERBERT MARSH,
FELLOW OF SAINT JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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THE TANJORE MAHARAJA SERFOGI'S SARASWATI MAHAL.
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PREFACE.

THE present war between Great Britain and France has been condemned by one claſs of writers as unneceſſary and unjuſt, while another claſs has defended it on grounds of expediency and juſtice. Writers, however, of the latter, as well as thoſe of the former deſcription, ſet out in general with the ſuppoſition, that the choice of war or peace reſted with the Britiſh Government; and they endeavour to juſtify the ſuppoſed determination of the Cabinet in favour of hoſtilities, by arguing, that the circumſtances under which the war was begun, rendered it an evil of ſtill leſs magnitude to Great Britain than peace itſelf would have been; a poſition which their adverſaries

deny. Now, though it is certainly adviſeable of two evils to chooſe the leſs, yet, as it muſt be previouſly aſcertained which of the two really *is* the leſs; and as the calamities which may happen to aſſociate themſelves with a continuance of peace, muſt be very complicated before they can even balance the calamities which are inſeparable from war, it is not extraordinary that a defence grounded on a poſition, which, though true in the abſtract, may be doubtful in its application, ſhould not have produced univerſal conviction.

Let us ſet aſide, therefore, the queſtion of expediency, on which perhaps an unanimity of opinion will never prevail: let us try the merits of the cauſe on another ground, and examine whether the Britiſh Government really had it in its *power* to prevent a rupture with France. If *this* queſtion be decided in the negative, no further vindication can

can be neceſſary. Not only in a political, but likewiſe in a moral light, the war, on our part, will then be juſtified ; for, whatever doubts may be entertained of the lawfulneſs of commencing hoſtilities through mere motives of policy or expediency, no rational man will deny, that it is lawful to repel an unjuſt aggreſſion. It is not indeed the bare circumſtance, that the public declaration of war proceeded from the part of France, which will warrant us to ſay that France was the aggreſſor. In the year 1756, the great King of Pruſſia declared war on Auſtria ; yet he was properly not the aggreſſor, becauſe he had received certain information that within a few months he himſelf would be attacked by Auſtria, in conjunction with Ruſſia and France. Since then, the very ſame excuſe may, before the ſubject has been fully inveſtigated, be thought applicable likewiſe to the French National Convention, in reſpect to its de-

claration of war againſt Great Britain on the 1ſt of February 1793, the queſtion of *real* aggreſſion muſt be determined by the relative conduct of the two Governments, antecedent to that declaration. With this view the following hiſtory has been written. It commences with the celebrated conference at Pillnitz, in Auguſt 1791, becauſe at that time the firſt coalition againſt France was in agitation: and as it is continued to the declaration of war, it compriſes an important period of eighteen months, the events of which muſt finally decide the queſtion, "Who were the aggreſſors?"

The plan on which the following work has been conducted, may perhaps expoſe the author to the charge of prolixity: but at a time when falſehood is ſo blended with truth, when random reports are adopted as indubitable facts, and hiſtory itſelf has

been

been almoſt converted into fable, the plan appeared abſolutely neceſſary, in order to enforce conviction. I have made it a rule, therefore, throughout the whole work, to advance not a ſingle fact, without ſupporting it by unanſwerable authority: and I have not only grounded this hiſtory on authentic documents, but have every where preſented thoſe documents to the view of the reader. Further, to preſerve diplomatic accuracy as much as poſſible, I have in general quoted French documents in their original language. The whole, therefore, is an official report, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe.

As the Moniteur was the official French paper during the period which this hiſtory compriſes, and the French themſelves, therefore, cannot appeal from it, the firſt ſtep which I took was, to examine every number of it, from Auguſt 1791 to February 1793, and to tranſcribe all thoſe articles in

which French politicks had any reference, direct or indirect, to Great Britain. I then had recourse to the most celebrated publications of the French republicans. Brissot, Louvet, Chaussard, Dumouriez, &c. and especially the two collections which contain the private correspondence of Dumouriez with the War Minister Pache and General Miranda, a correspondence which, though not generally known, throws great light on our present subject. I have likewise consulted the Memoirs of the Marquis de Bouillé, Lally Tolendal's Defence of the Emigrants, the Memoirs of Bertrand de Molleville, and the collection of pieces published in defence of Louis XVI, not with the view of copying *opinions*, but of extracting *facts*, which the authors were competent to attest. The Authentic Correspondence of Mr. Miles with the French Minister Le Brun, and others, has afforded very material assistance in investigating the motives by

by which the French rulers were actuated in their conduct towards Great Britain : and it has furnished, likewise, much valuable information in regard to the real sentiments entertained by the British Government on the subject of a war with France. These sentiments have been further developed, not only from his Majesty's speeches and the parliamentary debates, but from the *measures* which were adopted by Ministers, and which stand recorded either in official notes or authentic journals. The diplomatic papers which are quoted in this history, are taken partly from the Moniteur, and partly from the two Annual Registers ; treaties, whether of peace, commerce, or alliance, are quoted from the accurate collection of professor Martens at Gottingen. Various other works have been occasionally consulted, as the reader will find in the course of the history.

To

To the pains which I have taken in the ſearch of materials, I have endeavoured to add a fair and candid uſe of them. I have ſuppreſſed no document, and no fact, which had come within my knowledge (and I believe I have overlooked nothing of importance), whether favourable or unfavourable to either party; and that what I have aſſerted, is indiſputably true, the reader himſelf will every where perceive, from the authority quoted in favour of each aſſertion. Whether I have been guilty of errors of judgment, and have drawn falſe concluſions from true facts, is a matter which the reader will likewiſe eaſily determine, as he is put in poſſeſſion of all thoſe premiſes which will enable him to judge for himſelf, and is therefore in leſs danger of receiving a falſe bias, even if the author has one. Indeed, it is impoſſible to write a hiſtory of two living parties, without attaching one's ſelf to either; or, if it is poſſible, he who poſſeſſes

ſuch

ſuch indifference, muſt be deſtitute of that energy, and of that ſpirit of perſeverance, which are requiſite in the collecting and the arranging of the materials for an hiſtory. With regard to myſelf, I honeſtly confeſs, that I am ſincerely attached to the preſent Adminiſtration, and that I take a decided part with it on the ſubject of the following hiſtory, not on account of any perſonal connections, for I have not the honour of being acquainted with any one of the members of it, but becauſe a full inveſtigation of the ſubject, to which the following hiſtory relates, has convinced me, that not the Britiſh Miniſtry, but the French rulers alone, were the authors of the war. Shall *the taking a decided part*, then, after an examination of the whole evidence on both ſides, be termed *partiality?* If this be admitted, the deciſion of every court of juſtice muſt be partial. But an hiſtorian muſt have already collected his materials, before he *begins* to

compoſe

compoſe his hiſtory ; he muſt already, therefore, have formed a decided opinion on the reſult of thoſe materials. Conſequently, even if throughout the whole of his work he appears more attached to one party than to another, yet, if he ſuſpended his judgment till his collection of data was as complete as he could make it, that ſubſequent attachment can never deſerve the appellation of prejudice or partiality. His judgment, indeed, may be erroneous, but ſo may the judgment of a man who is poſſeſſed of a ſtoical apathy, or an abſolute indifference.

That hiſtorian alone can properly be called partial who *ſets out* with the determination to juſtify, *at all events*, a particular party ; who knowingly ſuppreſſes facts and documents which are unfavourable to it, and thus, by preſenting his readers with a mutilated picture, deprives them of the

power

power of forming a true judgment of the whole. This method has been very ſucceſsfully practiſed during the preſent war, both at home and abroad: for, as moſt men want either the leiſure, or the inclination, or the opportunity, to collect for themſelves all thoſe facts and documents which are neceſſary for the forming of a right judgment on a controverted point of hiſtory, they are ſeldom aware of the defectiveneſs of that information which an author thinks proper to lay before them; they fancy themſelves in poſſeſſion of every thing requiſite for the illuſtration of the ſubject, and deduce, therefore, an inference diametrically oppoſite to that which they would have deduced, had they been enabled, by a complete repreſentation of the whole picture, to make a due eſtimate of the reſpective parts. Whether the following hiſtory be likewiſe chargeable in this reſpect, the public will eaſily deter-

mine,

mine, becauſe every thing which appears in the leaſt unfavourable to the Britiſh Government, has been already collected with great diligence; has been induſtriouſly propagated, and is generally known. Indeed, had I been reſolved, at all events, to juſtify the preſent Adminiſtration in regard to the origin of the war, I ſhould no where have been even tempted to ſuppreſs a ſingle circumſtance, which, when viewed alone, appears to be unfavourable to it. For in every inſtance a bare compariſon with the actions of the French rulers is ſufficient to vindicate the meaſures of the Britiſh Government; and the only reaſon why theſe meaſures have been thought exceptionable by ſo many well-meaning men, has been the want of an hiſtorical parallel between the conduct of the French Government on the one hand, and that of the Britiſh Government on the other, repreſenting in what manner the

former neceſſarily occaſioned, and fully juſtified, the latter.

The hiſtory, now preſented to the Britiſh public, I wrote originally in German,* a language, which a long reſidence in the Univerſity of Leipzig, has rendered as familiar to me as my own. A deſire of reſcuing my native country from the calumnies of ſome German journaliſts, had induced me at the beginning of the year 1798, when the attention of all Europe was engaged with the threatened invaſion of Great Britain, to draw up a ſhort Eſſay, in the form of an Epiſtle, to a literary friend at Weimar, in which I endeavoured to ſhew, that whatever might be the iſſue of the important, and then doubtful conflict, the blame

* It was publiſhed at Leipzig, in February 1799, under the title Hiſtoriſche Ueberſicht der Politik Englands und Frankreichs.

of

of its origin attached only to the rulers of France. This Eſſay was printed in the German Mercury * for March, 1798; and, as the period of the publication was very unfavourable to the author, the expectations of thoſe who were attached to the French cauſe being at that time very high, it was not to be expected, that thoſe journaliſts, who had aſſerted, that the coalition againſt France in 1791, was formed by the intrigues of the Britiſh Cabinet, that the French rulers were ſolicitous for peace, but that the Miniſters of Great Britain, through mere hatred of the new republic, had reſolved, at all events, to commence hoſtilities, and had ſo confidently repeated theſe aſſertions during ſeveral years, till at length they were received in almoſt every part of Germany, and

* Der neue Teutſche Merkur. It is publiſhed monthly at Weimar: and the editor is the celebrated Wieland.

in

in the adjacent countries, as indiſputable truths,* it was not to be expected, that ſuch men, under ſuch circumſtances, would ſilently permit the oracular authority, which they had ſo long enjoyed, to be queſtioned by a writer, who had given no proofs of experience in political hiſtory. The oppoſition, which was made, eſpecially by one of them,† determined me, therefore, to bring

* An intimate friend in Leipzig, a man, in other reſpects extremely well informed, and moreover well-affected toward Great Britain, ſaid to me a few months before the preſent hiſtory (in German) left the preſs: "I heartily wiſh you ſucceſs, but I fear you have undertaken a deſperate cauſe." But he is *now* of opinion that the cauſe is perfectly good.

† Mr. Archenholz, formerly an enthuſiaſtic panegyriſt of Great Britain, and who, even in 1794, expreſsly ſaid, in his Annals of the Britiſh Hiſtory, "that "the Britiſh Miniſters did *not* wiſh for war." What has ſince induced him ſo vehemently to aſſert the contrary, is beſt known to himſelf.

the queſtion at once to an iſſue, by laying before the public all the facts and documents, arranged in hiſtorical order, which concerned the relative Politicks of Great Britain and France, from the time of the coalition in 1791, to the declaration of war againſt Great Britain in February 1793. The deciſion was ſoon made: for my work had not long appeared, when the firſt literary reviews in Germany, though the contrary opinion had, till that time, very generally prevailed, pronounced that the Britiſh Government was completely reſcued from the charges which had been laid to it, and that the origin, as well as the continuance of the war, muſt be wholly and ſolely aſcribed to the mad ambition of the French rulers.* Even the journaliſt, who had ſo vi-

* See the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, for May 1799, No. 162; the Göttingen Review (Göttingiſche Anzeigne), 6th July, 1799, No. 106; and the analyſis which

rulently attacked the Eſſay inſerted in the German Mercury, has ſince thought proper to aſſume a very different tone: he has not ventured any longer to direct his invectives againſt the Britiſh Government, but has turned them againſt the French Directory: and, though a candid acknowledgment of his errors was not to be expected from a man of his deſcription, yet he has virtually acknowledged his inability to write a confutation.*

which Mr. Genz, the moſt eminent political writer now in Germany, has given of it in his Hiſtorical Journal (Hiſtoriſches Journal), for May 1799. The merits of this valuable Journal are already known in England, from the extracts which have been given of it in the Mercure Britannique.

* In one of his journals, which appeared ſoon after my German work, he ſaid, "that to write a confutation would require more time and labour than he was able to beſtow." This ſhuffling excuſe, though it has not the merit of a candid confeſſion, yet, after the

The work now presented to the British public, may, in one sense, be called a translation, as it was originally written in German: but as it proceeds from the author himself, it has an equal claim to the title of an original. In fact, it contains not a literal translation, but only the same narrative drawn up in another language, and supported by the same documents. In various places new matter has been added, and several alterations have been made in the arrangement of the materials. On the other hand, all allusions to German writers, with some other passages, which would have been uninteresting, if not unintelligible, to a British reader, have been omitted.

The Appendix, containing a short statement of the attempts made by the British

the violent attack with which he had commenced hostilities, could proceed only from the consciousness of his inability to continue them.

Government

Government to reſtore peace, is for the very reaſon, that it is a mere appendix, neceſſarily leſs diffuſe: but, though the facts are compreſſed into a ſmall compaſs, enough is given to enable the reader to form a juſt opinion on the ſubject. Authentic documents are here, likewiſe, invariably adduced in ſupport of each fact.

With great deference I ſubmit the whole to the judgment of my fellow-countrymen; and if they who have hitherto believed, either that the war might have been avoided, or that peace might have been reſtored, ſhould be convinced by it of the contrary, that unanimity of opinion, which is ſo neceſſary to carry us triumphantly through the preſent conflict, will be the reſult of it. Few perſons indeed, ſince the negotiation at Liſle, in 1797, have aſcribed the *continuance* of the war to the Britiſh Miniſtry;

but there are thouſands, who ſtill aſcribe to them its *commencement*, and conſequently conſider them as the original authors of every evil, which it has occaſioned. If, then, the following hiſtory ſhould convince thoſe who ſtill entertain this notion, that it is founded in error, the diſtruſt, which throws a ſhackle on national energy, will be removed, the public burdens will be borne with patience, from the conſideration, that it was not in the power of Government to prevent the cauſe of them; domeſtic animoſity will ceaſe, and the efforts of every individual, who has not loſt all affection for his country, will be directed againſt the French rulers, as the ſole authors, as well as protractors, of the preſent war.

HERBERT MARSH.

Auguſt 4, 1799.

P. S.

P. S. Since the firſt edition of this work was printed off, a propoſal of peace has at length been made by the French Government, on which ſome obſervations are made in the Poſtſcript to the Appendix, inſerted in the preſent edition.

March 30, 1800.

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HISTORY

HISTORY
OF
THE POLITICKS
OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,

FROM THE

TIME OF THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN.

CHAP. I.

Conference at Pillnitz: and Conduct of Great Britain in reſpect to the Coalition againſt France, in 1791.

ON the 27th of Auguſt, 1791, the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia ſigned a Declaration (1) at Pillnitz, by which they agreed to take certain meaſures in reſpect to France, provided other powers, whoſe

(1) The following is the authentic Declaration, contained in the Mémoires ſur la Révolution Françaiſe par

aſſiſtance had been already ſolicited, conſented to ſupport them. The powers which had been invited to take part with the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, were Spain, Ruſſia, England, and the principal ſtates of

le Marquis de Bouillé, tom. ii. p. 133, and Marten's Recueil des principaux Traités, tom. v. p. 35.

" Leurs Majeſtés l'Empereur et le Roi de Pruſſe, " ayant entendu les déſirs et les repréſentations de " Monſieur Frere du Roi de France et de S. A. le " Comte d'Artois, déclarent conjointement qu'elles " regardent la ſituation où ſe trouve actuellement le " Roi de France comme un objet d'un intérêt com- " mun à tous les ſouverains de l'Europe. Ils eſperent " que cet intérêt ne peut manquer d'être réconnu par " les puiſſances, *dont les ſecours ſont réclamés*, et qu'en " conſéquence elles ne refuſeront pas d'employer con- " jointement avec leurs dites Majeſtés les moyens les " plus efficaces relativement à leurs forces, pour met- " tre le Roi de France en état d'affermir, dans la plus " parfaite liberté, les baſes d'un gouvernement mo- " narchique également convenable aux droits des ſou- " verains, et au bien-être de la nation Françaiſe. " *Alors et dans ce cas*, leurs dites Majeſtés l'Empereur " et le Roi de Pruſſe ſont réſolus d'agir promptement, " d'un mutuel accord, avec les forces néceſſaires pour " obtenir le but propoſé en commun. En attendant

" elles

Italy: but their anſwers did not arrive till after the Conference at Pillnitz was ended, and the Emperor was returned to Vienna. On the 12th of September, therefore, the Emperor ſent for the Marquis de Bouillé, and addreſſed him in the following terms. "It was not in my power to converſe with "you ſooner on the ſubject, for which I "had requeſted your attendance, becauſe I "had not received the anſwers of the Courts "of Ruſſia, Spain, England, and the prin-

"elles donneront à leur troupes les ordres convena-"bles pour qu'elles ſoient à portée de ſe mettre en "activité.

"Donné à Pillnitz le 27 Août, 1791.

"Signé, LEOPOLD.

FREDERIC GUILLAUME."

It appears from this authentic document, that the report of a *partition* treaty at Pillnitz has no hiſtorical foundation. Even the ſix ſecret articles, of which, however, the authenticity is very uncertain, contain nothing of a partition, either of France or of any other country. See Martens, tom. v. p. 36.

"cipal sovereigns of Italy. At present they "are arrived, and correspond to my wishes "and expectations: for I am assured of the "co-operation of all these powers, *with ex-"ception to England, which is resolved to "preserve the most strict neutrality.*"(2)

Here we have a testimony, which places the conduct of the British Cabinet in the clearest point of view. The mere circumstance, that its answer was not received by Leopold before the beginning of September, sufficiently proves, that the British Cabinet took no part in the Conference at Pillnitz:(3)

(2) The Emperor's own words were: "Je suis assuré de la co-opération, de toutes ces puissances, *à l'exception de l'Angleterre, qui est déterminée à observer la plus stricte neutralité.*" Mémoires de Bouillé, tom. ii. p. 139.

(3) Another proof, and one too of the highest authority, is Lord Grenville's Dispatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated 20th June, 1797, and printed among the Papers relative to the Negotiation at Lisle. In this dispatch

and as the reply to the Emperor's propoſal was decidedly in the negative, we have abſolute proof that Great Britain had no concern in the coalition then forming againſt France. No one can object in this inſtance, that the real views of a cabinet are often at

diſpatch Lord Grenville ſaid: "Your Lordſhip ſhould "take this opportunity to explain in the moſt diſtinct "and unequivocal terms, that if any ſecret treaty was "in fact concluded at the interview at Pillnitz, be-"tween the late Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, "which is, to ſay the leaſt, very doubtful in point of "fact, this at leaſt is certain, that his Majeſty was "no party to ſuch treaty; and not only was not then "included in it, but has never ſince adhered to it, "nor even been apprized of its contents. The public "*Declaration*, which was made at that interview, "ſhews on the face of it, that his Majeſty was no "party to it; and it is indeed notorious, that it ap-"plied to circumſtances, which were done away "long before the war broke out between Auſtria "and France, and that the ſubſequent negotia-"tions for the maintenance of peace between thoſe "two powers, turned on points wholly diſtinct from "thoſe ſuppoſed to have been referred to in the pre "tended *Treaty* of Pillnitz."

 variance

variance with its proteſtations, ſince the anſwer was given to a queſtion propoſed, not by the Court of France, but by the Court of Auſtria. It is true, that if the Britiſh Government had been reſolved on a war with France, it would have been conſiſtent with its own intereſt, to conceal its intentions from its future adverſary: in like manner, as the French Government, at the beginning of the American war, continued to give the Britiſh Ambaſſador the moſt friendly aſſurances, even after war was reſolved on at Verſailles. But the Britiſh Government could have no intereſt in deceiving the Emperor: on the contrary, it would have been prejudicial to its own intereſt, to aſſure the leader of the coaleſced powers, that its poſitive determination was to preſerve a ſtrict neutrality, had it really intended to join the coalition. However, ſhould any one ſtill doubt, whether the diſpoſitions of the Britiſh Cabinet were friendly toward France

or

or not, the anſwer given to the Emperor proves at leaſt thus much, that Great Britain *at that period* took no part in a coalition againſt France.

Another very ſtrong proof of this poſition is contained in a letter written by the King of Sweden, dated 2d of September, 1791, to the Marquis de Bouillé. (4) It appears from this letter that the King of Sweden at that time intended to embark troops, which were to be landed on the coaſt of Flanders: but he was ſo far from expecting aſſiſtance, that he apprehended even oppoſition on the part of England, and ſaid, *it would be a grand point gained, if England remained neutral.* (5) Hence it is evident that England no more

(4) This letter is printed in the Mémoires de Bouillé, tom. ii. p. 142—145.

(5) His own words were: Ce ſerait un grand point que la neutralité d'Angleterre, dont vous me parlez. Ib. p. 144.

made

made a common cauſe with the King of Sweden, than with the Emperor. In fact, the Britiſh Government not only refuſed to join the coalition againſt France, (6) but

(6) If further proof were neceſſary, we might quote the authority of the French themſelves. The Miniſter of the war department, in a report delivered to the National Aſſembly on the 11th of October, 1791, which in the Moniteur of the 13th of October occupies four whole columns, deſcribed very circumſtantially the danger which at that time threatened France from various powers of Europe, and mentioned them by name, but did not ſay a ſyllable of England. And Briſſot, in his ſpeech of the 20th of October, 1791, was ſo far from repreſenting the Engliſh miniſters as *encouraging* the Princes of Europe to a confederacy againſt France, as ſome late writers have done without the leaſt foundation, that on the contrary he ſpoke of them as mediators, and ſaid, "l'Angleterre était "occupée à *calmer* les eſprits de Ratiſbonne." Moniteur, 22d October, 1791. But Briſſot, it is ſaid, was a friend of the Engliſh miniſtry! Now it muſt be obſerved, that this abſurd report was firſt propagated in the ſpring of the year 1793, at the time that the power of the Girondiſts was on the decline; when Cambon, a principal member in the oppoſite party,

in

acted toward that country with the greateſt friendſhip, as will appear from the following chapter.

in order to accelerate the fall of Briſſot, ſuggeſted that he was in ſecret alliance with the Engliſh Miniſtry. The thought was ſo valuable to the Anarchiſts, who were then coming into power, that it was ſeized with great avidity; and as this party, at the head of which was Robeſpierre, maintained their authority a conſiderable time, it was brought by degrees into general circulation, without any one's knowing, or even aſking, whence it came. Briſſot (à ſes Commettans, p. 98. Paris, 1793) ſays: "Cambon, craint-il la lu-"miere? Le mien (c'eſt-à-dire, bilan) eſt prêt; il eſt, "dans un mot—*Rien*; et c'eſt la ſeule réponſe que je "fais à l'épithète qu'il m'a donnée, Allié de Pitt." In fact, it would have been a very extraordinary alliance, ſince Pitt's adverſaries have claimed Briſſot as *their* friend; and a noble Peer, at the head of the Oppoſition called him, in his ſpeech of 1ſt Feb. 1793 (to uſe the words of the Moniteur 10th Feb. 1793) "un homme auſſi vertueux, qu'éclairé, *de l'amitié duquel il s'honore.*" Briſſot's virulent abuſe of the Engliſh Miniſtry a ſhort time before the declaration of war, as well as on the day on which it was declared, is likewiſe not very reconcileable with his ſuppoſed friendſhip for them. But that was mere diſſimulation, it is

ſaid.

said. Now if that was mere dissimulation, the Director Barras is likewise attached to the English ministry, and all his invectives are nothing more than a mask, to cover his real friendship. In fact, if another 18th of Fructidor should take place, and the same fate should befall Barras, which he prepared for his colleagues, Barthelemy and Carnot, it would be nothing extraordinary to hear Barras decried as an agent of the British Minister: for it has been the fate of the French rulers, from the beginning of the revolution, to be adored, while in power, and to be calumniated, when fallen.—Lastly in the catalogue of grievances, with which the National Convention on the 1st of February, 1793, accompanied the declaration of war against Great Britain, no charge whatsoever was laid to the British Government, prior to the 10th of August, 1792. See Moniteur 3d Feb. 1793. We may be assured, therefore, that the National Convention itself was conscious of the British Government's having no concern in a coalition against France in 1791.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Insurrection of the Negroes in the Island of St. Domingo. Friendly Conduct of Great Britain toward France on this Occasion: and Ingratitude of the French National Assembly to the British Government.

TOWARD the close of the summer of 1791, an insurrection broke out among the negroes of St. Domingo, which was so dreadful in its effects that the French inhabitants of the island were reduced to a state of despair. The town of Cape Français was surrounded by a formidable army of the insurgents; and the inhabitants had neither a sufficient quantity of arms and ammunition to enable them to defend themselves, nor provisions sufficient to support a long

a long blockade. Without ſpeedy relief, therefore, the French colony of St. Domingo muſt have been for ever loſt to France: but from France itſelf, on account of its diſtance, ſpeedy relief was not to be obtained. In this diſtreſſed ſituation, the Governor of St. Domingo ſent deputies to Lord Effingham, the Governor of Jamaica, to requeſt both proviſions and ammunition: and Lord Effingham, with the conſent of Admiral Affleck, ſent immediately two frigates, the Daphne and the Blonde, provided with all neceſſaries, to Cape François, and a third, the Centurion, to Port au Prince. The Daphne and the Blonde arrived at the Cape on the 26th of September. On board the former was Mr. Bryan Edwards, who, in the preface to his Hiſtorical Survey of St. Domingo, has circumſtantially deſcribed the manner in which the aſſiſtance afforded to the diſtreſſed coloniſts was received. "The "inhabitants of the town," ſays Mr. Edwards,

wards, (1) "being aſſembled on the beach, "directed all their attention towards us, "and we landed amidſt a croud of ſpecta- "tors, who with uplifted hands and ſtream- "ing eyes gave welcome to their deliverers, "for ſuch they conſidered us, and acclama- "tions of '*Vivent les Anglais!*' reſounded "from every quarter. The Governor of St. "Domingo was at that time the unfor- "tunate General Blanchelande, who has "ſince periſhed on the ſcaffold. He did "us the honour to receive us on the quay. "A Committee of the Colonial Aſſembly, "accompanied by the Governor's only ſon, "an amiable and accompliſhed youth, had "before attended us on board the Blonde, "and we were immediately conducted to "the place of their meeting. The ſcene "was ſtriking and ſolemn. The hall was "ſplendidly illuminated, and all the mem-

(1) Page 5.

"bers

"bers appeared in mourning. Chairs were "placed for us within the bar, and the Go-"vernor having taken his ſeat at the right "hand of the Preſident, the latter addreſſed "us in an eloquent and affecting oration, of "which the following is as literal a tranſla-"tion as the idiom of the two languages will "admit."

"We were not miſtaken, Gentlemen, "when we placed our confidence in your "generoſity; but we could hardly enter-"tain the hope, that, beſide ſending us ſuc-"cours, you would come in perſon to give "us conſolation. Generous iſlanders! hu-"manity has operated powerfully on your "hearts; you have yielded to the firſt emo-"tion of your generoſity, in the hopes of "ſnatching us from death, for it is already "too late to ſave us from miſery. What a "contraſt between *your* conduct and that of "other

" other nations! (2) We will avail ourſelves " of your benevolence; but the days you " preſerve to us will not be ſufficient to ma- " nifeſt our gratitude: our children ſhall " keep it in remembrance. Regenerated " France, unapprized that ſuch calamities " might befall us, has taken no meaſures " to protect us againſt their effects. With

(2) What a contraſt, likewiſe, between the conduct of the Engliſh and that of their own countrymen! While the northern diſtrict of St. Domingo was in the utmoſt want of proviſions, a French ſhip arrived laden with meal, from Bourdeaux, but the captain refuſed to diſpoſe of his cargo, becauſe the coloniſts were unable to pay him ready money. On this ſubject a complaint was afterwards made in the National Aſſembly, in which the following letter from St. Domingo was read, on the 11th of January, 1792. " Les " paroiſſes du Nord, manquaient de ſubſiſtences. " Mr. Fournier, commandant le Triton de Bour- " deaux, refuſait de fournir de la farine aux habitans " de Bongres, parceque ceux-ci épuisés en ce mo- " ment ne pouvaient lui payer comptant. En vain " lui avaient-ils rémontré, que ſon refus de fournir des " farines allait les expoſer aux plus affreux beſoins." Moniteur, 12th Jan. 1792.

" what

" what admiration will she learn, *that with-*
" *out your assistance we should no longer exist*
" *as a dependency to any nation!*"

This address of the President of the Colonial Assembly is an unanswerable proof, that the French were at that time indebted to the friendship of the English for the preservation of their valuable colony of St. Domingo. They were under obligations likewise to the British *Government*: for the Governor of Jamaica would not have ventured to supply the French colonists with arms and ammunition, unless he had been assured, that the dispositions of his cabinet had been friendly toward France. And to remove all doubts on this subject, the British Ambassador at Paris was ordered to notify to the Court of France, that his Majesty approved of Lord Effingham's conduct. (3)

(3) The following is the official note of the British Minister at Paris to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On the 5th of November the note of the British Ambaſſador was taken into conſideration by the National Aſſembly. (4) The perſon, however, who ſpoke firſt, propoſed neither a vote of thanks to the British Government, nor even to Lord Effingham, but directed his whole attention to the ſtate of the French colony, till Mr. Dubayet reminded him of the obligations which they owed to the generous Governor of Jamaica. (5) Another member of the Aſſem-

Affairs. "Je crois devoir vous envoyer une lettre de "Milord Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque, en "date du 7th Septembre. Je dois vous annoncer, "que le Roi mon maître a bien voulu *approuver la* "*conduite* qu'a tenu le Gouverneur, en envoyant tous "les ſecours, dont il pouvait ſe paſſer, pour ſoutenir "le gouvernement de St. Domingue." Moniteur, 6th Nov. 1791.

(4) The whole debate is contained in the Moniteur, 6th Nov. 1791.

(5) "Vous devez jetter vos regards ſur la conduite "de M. Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque, digne "d'une grande nation, qui rivaliſe avec nous pour la "liberté. Je demande qu'il lui ſoit voté des remerci-"mens."

bly, but a perſon of ſo little importance that his name was unknown even to the editor of the Moniteur, (6) then propoſed a vote of thanks to the Britiſh Government: but the motion was ſeconded by no one in the whole Aſſembly. Upon this, Mr. Goujon moved, that the thanks of the Aſſembly ſhould be voted neither to the Britiſh Government, nor to the Governor of Jamaica, but to the Britiſh *Nation* (7): and this motion paſſed, with only the following amendment: that Lord Effingham, as a member of the Britiſh Nation, was named in particular. (8)

(6) This appears from the circumſtance, that after Mr. a mere line is placed, inſtead of a name.

(7) Je demande qu'il ſoit voté des remercimens, non pas au Gouverneur, non pas au Gouvernement Anglais, mais à la *Nation* Anglaiſe.

(8) Mr. le Préſident. La motion eſt faite, à voter des remercimens à la nation Anglaiſe, et en particulier à Mr. Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque.

La propoſition énoncée par M. le Préſident eſt adoptée.

This

This ſtrange behaviour of the National Aſſembly was by no means calculated to promote that friendſhip with the Britiſh Government, of which they had juſt received ſo ſtriking a proof. It was not only abſurd to thank a whole nation for an act, in which merely the Government, the Governor of Jamaica, and a few individuals in that iſland had taken part, but it was ungrateful and affronting to reject the thanks which were propoſed, and were really due to the Government of Great Britain The object, however, which the National Aſſembly had in view, admits of no doubt; and we may ſafely conclude, that the ſyſtem which the French rulers have ſince followed with ſo much ſucceſs, was at that time already adopted. (9)

(9) This ſyſtem conſiſts in ſeparating the governed from their governors, in exciting the one againſt the other, that both of them may at laſt fall a prey to French avarice and ambition. Briſſot ſaid: "Que

 "penſaient

The conduct of the National Aſſembly was likewiſe in another reſpect highly ungrateful; for if the British Miniſtry had

" penſaient les hommes éclairés, républicains avant le " 10. Août, les hommes qui voulaient la liberté non " ſeulement pour leur pays, mais pour toute l'Europe? " Ils croyaient qu'on pouvait l'établir par-tout, *en ſou-* " *levant les adminiſtrés contre les adminiſtrans*, en fai- " ſant voir aux peuples la facilité et les avantages de " ces ſoulevemens." Briſſot à ſes Commettans (Paris, May 1793) p. 81. And that this ſyſtem was already adopted at the end of the year 1791, appears from Iſnard's ſpeech in the National Aſſembly on the 5th Jan. 1792. In this ſpeech ſaid Iſnard: " Voici l'inſtant " qui peut-être doit décider à jamais des deſpotes et " des nations: c'eſt vous que le ciel réſervait à ces " grands événemens: élevez-vous au niveau de vos " deſtinées." And a few lines after; " Eſt-il bien " vrai qu'un langage national ne ſerait entendu dans " aucune contrée? Ah ſans doute les Anglais feraient " un peuple digne de l'entendre." Moniteur, 6th Jan. 1792. This laſt paſſage ſhews likewiſe that the leaders of the National Aſſembly even at that time directed their attention to the people of England, who, in conſequence of their political liberty, were conſidered as fitter ſubjects for French intrigue than the inhabitants of any other country.

thought

thought proper to act on the ſame political principles on which the French Government acted at the commencement of the American war, or to retaliate its unjuſt aggreſſion, they might, without the leaſt difficulty, have gained poſſeſſion of the capital of St. Domingo. The French marine was then in ſuch a ſituation, that it could not have made the leaſt reſiſtance. Ever ſince the year 1789 the French ſailors had been in a continual ſtate of inſurrection: (10) almoſt all the naval officers were diſſatiſfied, (11) the greateſt part of them had ac-

(10) All the documents relative to this ſubject are contained in the Mémoires Secrets, pour ſervir à l'hiſtoire de la derniere année du regne de Louis XVI. Par A. F. Bertrand de Molleville, Miniſtre d'Etat à cette époque, (Londres 1797, tom. iii. 8.) tom. ii. p. 315—335.

(11) Bertrand de Molleville (tom. i. p. 291) ſays: "Un eſprit d'inſubordination et de révolte s'était ma-" nifeſté de lui-même dans les principaux ports de "mer, et à bord de pluſieurs vaiſſeaux de guerre de-" puis l'année 1789. Pluſieurs officiers avaient été out-

 "ragés

tually quitted the ſervice, and many had already emigrated. Even thoſe who were appointed in their ſtead returned, almoſt to a man, their commiſſions, as ſoon as they received them; (12) and Bertrand de Molleville, at that time Miniſter of the Marine, has himſelf acknowledged, that he ſhould have found it difficult at the end of 1791 to have found an officer, who would have accepted the command of a ſhip of war. (13)

" ragés et inſultés par les matelots: auſſi tous les officiers en général étaient dégoûtés du ſervice, et je crus fermement que le Duc d'Orléans et le Comte d'Eſtaing feraient les ſeuls d'un rang diſtingué qui conſentiraient à ſervir, tant que la marine ſerait ſoumiſe aux nouveaux réglemens."

(12) " La déſobéiſſance et la révolte étaient non ſeulement tolérées, mais encouragées et regardées comme les marques diſtinctives du patriotiſme: auſſi, *preſque tous les officiers m'envoyèrent leurs démiſſions dès qu'ils eurent reçu la lettre, par laquelle je leur annonçais leur promotion*," Ib. tom. i. p. 278.

(13) Tom. i. p. 263, he relates the following converſation, which took place at that period between himſelf and M. de Narbonne, the War Miniſter. " Le jour

" où

But even if the French marine had been in the best possible condition, there would have been no necessity for using force, in order to accomplish the end; for the inhabitants of St. Domingo were so exasperated against the National Assembly, to whose proceedings they imputed their disasters, (14)

" où je parlai au conseil de ce refus des officiers, M. " de Narbonne m'entreprit en ces termes.

" Quoi! *tous les officiers refusent?* c'est donc à dire, " que si nous avions quelqu' inquiétude relativement " aux dispositions de l'Angleterre, et que je vous de- " mandasse une frégatte pour croiser sur nos côtes, " vous ne pourriez la fournir.

" Ce ne sont pas les frégattes, qui nous manquent, " repondis-je: mais *dans ce moment je serais fort em-* " *barrassé pour trouver un officier, qui voulut se charger* " *d'en commander une.*"

(14) Edwards's Historical Survey of St. Domingo, preface p. 10. They accused particularly those members of the Assembly who call themselves Amis des Noirs, and whose conduct, as well as the effects which it produced, Mr. Edwards has described in ch. vii. See also Bertrand de Molleville Mémoires Secrets,

 tom,

that all the claſſes of the whites were diſpoſed to renounce their allegiance to the mother country. "The black cockade," ſays Mr. Edwards, (15) "was univerſally ſubſtituted "in place of the tri-coloured one, and very "earneſt wiſhes were avowed in all com- "panies, without ſcruple or reſtraint, that "the Britiſh Adminiſtration would ſend an "armament to conquer the iſland, or ra- "ther to receive its voluntary ſurrender "from the inhabitants." Very earneſt application was likewiſe made to the Britiſh Miniſtry, that an armament might be ſent to take poſſeſſion of the country: but no attention was paid to the ſolicitations of the coloniſts, till the French Government had

tom. ii. p. 241—245, where an account is given of ſome papers, found in the hands of the mulatto Raimond, which contained the inſtructions communicated to the negroes of St. Domingo by the Amis des Noirs during the years 1790 and 1791, in order to excite them to rebellion.

(15) Ib. ib.

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thought proper to declare war againſt Great Britain. (16) And this generous conduct has been repaid, on the part of France, with the blackeſt ingratitude.

(16) Ib. p. 140.

CHAP.

CHAP III.

Other less important Events, relative to Great Britain and France, in the Year 1791.

ON the 28th of September, 1791, the King of France issued a proclamation, in which he formally notified his acceptance of the new constitution: and he wrote likewise circular letters to the different courts of Europe, to the same purpose. The Court of Great Britain was one of the first which sent an answer, and this answer was delivered in terms of great respect. (1) It may be said indeed, that answers of this kind are mere matters of form: yet, when we con-

(1) It is contained in the Moniteur, dated 5th Nov. 1791, and is dated Oct. 6th, 1791.

sider

ſider that ſeveral of the European Courts anſwered much later, others not at all; that the King of Spain gave for anſwer, he regarded not the acceptance as an act of free will; and that the King of Sweden returned the letter delivered to him by the French Miniſter at Stockholm, without even opening it; (2) the new Legiſlative Power of France had certainly reaſon to be ſatisfied with the early and friendly anſwer of the Court of Great Britain.

But another event took place before the cloſe of the year, which could by no means afford the Court of Great Britain reciprocal ſatisfaction. By the twenty-fourth article of the treaty of commerce (3) it had been ſtipulated, that if one of the two contract-

(2) Moniteur, 5th November 1791.

(3) The treaty of commerce between Great Britain and France is printed among the State Papers, in the Annual Regiſter for 1796: and alſo in Marten's Recueil des Principaux Traités, tom. ii. p. 680—707.

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ing powers ſhould be engaged in war with a third, all veſſels belonging to ſubjects of the other power ſhould be provided with ſea-letters and certificates, that the maſters of them, in caſe they ſhould be ſuſpected of carrying ammunition or any warlike ſtores to the enemies of the former power, which was ſtrictly prohibited by the twenty-ſecond article, might be able to clear themſelves. It had been further ſtipulated by the twenty-ſixth article, that if a ſhip of war belonging to the former power met a merchant-ſhip belonging to any ſubject of the latter, the captain of the ſhip of war ſhould have the liberty of ſending a perſon on board the merchant-ſhip to examine the ſea-letter and certificate. Agreeably to theſe ſtipulations, Sir Richard Strachan, at that time Captain of the Phœnix, meeting with ſome French merchantmen on the coaſt of Malabar, in November, 1791, determined to examine their ſea-letters and certificates; but as they

were under convoy of a French frigate, he first sent off an officer to signify his intentions to the Captain, and to request him to make the proper signal to the merchantmen under his convoy. Now, as England was then engaged in a war with Tippoo Saib, who, as well as his predecessor, had always stood in close alliance with France, and a suspicion therefore must necessarily arise that these merchantmen were carrying warlike stores to the enemies of Great Britain, especially since they were under convoy of a frigate, which, as France was then engaged in no war, appeared unnecessary for vessels which had nothing contraband on board, the captain of the French frigate was in duty bound to attend to the representations of Sir Richard Strachan, and to make a signal to the vessels under his convoy, to bring to and clear themselves. But instead of this, he made a signal to the merchantmen to croud sail and get off: and, to pre-

vent

vent Sir Richard Strachan from following them, he attacked the Phœnix, as if Great Britain and France were then at war, nor did he even wait till the English lieutenant was returned on board, to make report to his captain. It is true, that the French frigate, after a short engagement, was obliged to strike, (4) and that her captain was so severely wounded, that he paid for his temerity with the loss of his life: his conduct however, was not only a violation of the treaty of commerce, but an act of open hostility.

As soon as intelligence of this event arrived in England, Government, of course, complained of it to the Court of France; but the complaint was delivered in terms of great moderation, and it was requested

(4) Commodore, now Admiral, Cornwallis, who then commanded the English fleet at Tellichery, gave orders, however, for her immediate release.

only,

only, that orders might be given to prevent ſimilar accidents in future, which might tend to deſtroy that harmony, which the Britiſh Government ſincerely wiſhed to preſerve. But when the note of the Britiſh Ambaſſador (5) was read in the National

(5) It is contained in the Moniteur, 12th April, 1792, and is as follows:

"Milord Gower a l'honneur de communiquer à M. "Dumourier la traduction des pieces dans leſquelles "ſe trouvent les détails du combat, qui a eu lieu entre "le Phœnix, et la frégatte Françaiſe la Réſolue. La "premiere eſt une lettre écrite par M. Strachan au "Commodore Cornwallis: l'autre un récit de M. "Parker lieutenant envoyé par le Capitaine Anglais "à bord de la frégatte Françaiſe. Il eſt aiſé de ſe con-"vaincre, que la conduite du Capitaine Anglais eſt "conforme aux traités, et que cette affaire ne doit "pas porter atteinte à la bonne harmonie qui ſubſiſte "entre les deux nations. Il paraît que ſon objet était "de s'aſſurer, ſi les batimens Français ne contenaient "aucunes des proviſions militaires, qu'on eſt convenu "par le traité de regarder comme contrebande, et qu'il "eſt réciproquement défendu de fournir aux ennemis "de l'une ou l'autre des parties contractantes. C'eſt "après cette communication amicale, que le Capitaine

Français

Aſſembly, the members of it were ſo far from offering any ſatisfaction for the violation of the treaty of commerce, and the act of open hoſtility committed on the part of France, that they did not condeſcend to make even an apology for the paſt, or to promiſe ſecurity for the future.(6) On the contrary, they ſought only evaſions, to juſtify the conduct of the French Captain. At laſt, the matter was referred to a Committee, and there it ended.

" Français fit un ſignal ſur ſon bord pour que les ba-
" timens Français fiſſent voile, au lieu d'amener. Il
" fit feu, ſans attendre aucune explication ultérieure.
" La conduite de ce dernier eſt repréhenſible, ſur-tout
" en ce qu'il a fait feu, avant que le lieutenant du
" vaiſſeau Anglais fût de retour à ſon bord. Sa Ma-
" jeſté Britannique ne doute pas que le Roi ne donne
" des ordres, pour prévenir déſormais des évenemens
" ſemblables, qui pourraient troubler la paix, qu'il
" aura toujours à cœur de maintenir."

(6) See the Debates in the Moniteur, 12th April, 1792.

The

The preceding transaction, though in itself of no great importance, shews at least the spirit which animated the British Government on the one hand, and the French National Assembly on the other. It shews that the former was desirous to maintain peace, and that the latter was totally indifferent about it. (7)

(7) It shews the dispositions of the two Governments even so late as April, 1792; for though the engagement between the frigates took place in Nov. 1791, on which account I have related the whole transaction in this chapter, yet the news of the engagement arrived not in London before the beginning of April, 1792.

CHAP. IV.

Meeting of the British Parliament on the 31st of January, 1792. His Majesty's Speech. Reduction of the British Forces both by Sea and by Land. Cessation of the Treaty of Subsidy with Hesse Cassel. Abolition of Taxes to the annual Amount of two hundred thousand Pounds. Falsehood of the Assertion, that Great Britain acceded in March, 1792, to what is called the Treaty of Pavia. Measures taken at this Time in France, for an Augmentation of its Forces by Sea as well as by Land.

ON the 31st of January, 1792, the session of the British Parliament, was opened by a speech from the throne, (1) in which

(1) See Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, p. ii. State Papers, p. 187; or New Annual Register, Public papers, p. 50.

which his Majeſty, having mentioned the treaty of peace between the Emperor and the Porte, and the preliminaries already ſigned between the latter power and Ruſſia, concluded in the following terms: "The "friendly aſſurances, which I receive from "foreign powers, and the general ſtate of "affairs in Europe, appear to promiſe to "my ſubjects the continuance of their pre-"ſent tranquillity. Under theſe circum-"ſtances, I am induced to think, *that ſome "immediate reduction may be ſafely made in "our naval and military eſtabliſhments*: and "my regard for the intereſts of my ſubjects "renders me at all times deſirous of avail-"ing myſelf of any favourable opportunity "of *diminiſhing the public expences.*"

On the 9th of February, when this ſubject was taken into conſideration by the Houſe of Commons, the number of ſailors and marines to be employed for the year 1792,

was reduced to ſixteen thouſand:(2) and on the 16th of February, even the army of Great Britain, though at that time ſo inconſiderable in point of number, that no foreign power could have taken umbrage at it, likewiſe underwent a reduction.(3) Further, on the 17th of February, Mr. Pitt informed the Houſe that the Heſſian ſubſidy being now expired, "his Majeſty's Miniſters were not "of opinion, that the circumſtances of the "country required its renewal."(4) By theſe and ſimilar reductions the annual expenditure of Great Britain received a diminution of four hundred thouſand pounds: and it was reſolved, that taxes ſhould be aboliſhed

(2) Ib. p. 183. Ib. p. 145.

(3) On the 15th of February, guards and garriſons were eſtimated, from December 25, 1791, to June 24, 1792, at 17,013 men: but from June 25, to Dec. 24, 1792, at only 15,701. Ib. ib.

(4) New Annual Regiſter, 1792, Britiſh and foreign hiſtory, p. 38.

to

to the amount of one half of this ſum, and that the other half ſhould be applied to the diminution of the national debt.(5)

The preceding meaſures ſufficiently evince the peaceful diſpoſition of the Britiſh Cabinet, and its determination to take no part in a war againſt France. And as there ſeemed no reaſon to believe, at the beginning of the year 1792, that France itſelf would ſo ſoon attempt to diſturb the repoſe of Great Britain, Miniſters flattered themſelves with the pleaſing expectation, that the plans, by which they endeavoured to promote the happineſs of their country, would be continued without interruption. "Though "I am not ſo vain," ſaid Mr. Pitt, on the 21ſt of February, "as to ſuppoſe, that *all* "my preſent ſpeculations ſhould ſucceed "agreeably to my wiſhes, or that no un-"foreſeen event ſhould prevent the execu-

(5) Ib. p. 40.

" tion of any one of them: yet it is not un-
" reasonable to expect, that the peace, which
" we at present enjoy, should continue at
" least *fifteen years*, since at no period of the
" British history, whether we consider the
" internal situation of the kingdom, or its
" relation to foreign powers, has the prof-
" pect of war been further removed, than at
" present." But unfortunately for Great Britain, and unfortunately for all Europe, these expectations were annihilated, in less than a year, by events, which no human sagacity could at that time predict.

The report, that England acceded in March, 1792, to what was called the treaty of Pavia, (6) is contradicted by the facts, which have been already related in this chapter. It is even doubtful, whether the treaty itself, which is said to have been con-

(6) This treaty may be seen in Martens' Recueil des principaux Traités, tom. v. p. 5.

cluded in July, 1791, be genuine or not:(7) but even if we ſuppoſe it to be genuine, England was no party to it, for there is not only no ſignature on the part of England,(8) but England is not once mentioned in it, either directly or indirectly. Conſequently, the only queſtion to be examined is, whether the report be true, that England acceded to it in the month of March following: and that this report, in ſupport of which not a ſingle fact has ever been adduced, is devoid of foundation, appears from the general conduct of the Britiſh Government at this very period, which is wholly

(7) Martens, in the place juſt quoted, ſays, that he is " fort éloigné d'annoncer comme digne de foi une piece, que le contenu, les circonſtances qui ont précédé, la ſignature même, ſemblent déclarer apocryphe."

(8) The only names ſigned to this treaty are, Leopold, Prince of Naſſau, Count Florida Blanca, Biſchofswerder.

irreconcileable with the proſpect of a war with France. But to remove all doubts on this ſubject, it will be neceſſary to enquire into the origin of the report, which took its riſe, not at the time of the pretended acceſſion, but in the following month of November. In the Moniteur of the 18th November, 1792, the treaty of Pavia was printed: and after the ſignatures, which cloſe every treaty, was added the following note by the editor, "England *paſſively* acceded to it in March, 1792."(9) This anonymous note is the ſource from which the report in queſtion took its riſe. In the firſt place, therefore, we muſt aſk: what did the unknown author intend to expreſs by this *paſſive* acceſſion? Does the epithet apply to the act of acceſſion, as the conſtruction ſeems to indicate, or to the meaſures which England was to adopt in conſequence of the

(9) "Nota. L'Angleterre y a *paſſivement* accédé en Mars, 1792."

acceſſion?

acceſſion? Either to the one, or to the other, it muſt neceſſarily apply, if the note be not abſolutely devoid of meaning. But no government can accede to a treaty, without ſignifying its acceſſion by ſome *poſitive* act, ſuch as the ſignature of an Ambaſſador. A *paſſive* acceſſion, therefore, if regard be had to the acceſſion itſelf, is a contradiction. Nor will the explanation be more ſatisfactory, if reference be made to the meaſures, which England was to adopt in conſequence of the acceſſion: for the acceſſion to a treaty on the one hand, and a perfectly paſſive conduct on the other, are two things, which, though not in direct contradiction, are yet of ſuch a nature, that the one deſtroys the other. The note, therefore, in the Moniteur, in whatever way we interpret it, contains its own confutation. This was clearly perceived by thoſe commentators and quoters of the note, who

were

were inimical to the Britiſh Government: and for that reaſon they have omitted the inconvenient word "paſſively," which the author of the note had cautiouſly inſerted, becauſe ſix months had then already elapſed after the pretended acceſſion, and yet no viſible effect had been produced in the conduct of the Britiſh Adminiſtration.

It appears then, on a near examination, that the report in queſtion is founded, firſt on an anonymous and contradictory note in the Moniteur of the 18th November, 1792, and ſecondly on arbitrary alterations, which have been made in ſubſequent copies of it. How then is it poſſible, that any man, who has a regard for truth, can ſubſcribe to a report, which reſts on *ſuch* a foundation? Indeed I believe that every man, who has ſeriouſly enquired into it, muſt perceive its falſity. The author of the Britiſh and fo-

reign

reign hiſtory in the New Annual Regiſter, for 1793, whom no one will accuſe of partiality in favour of Miniſters, is himſelf of opinion, "that the inſinuation is merely the effect of party malevolence."(10) Nor did Briſſot believe in this idle ſtory: for in his ſpeech of the 12th of January, 1793, which was delivered nearly two months after the treaty of Pavia, and the above-mentioned note appeared in the Moniteur, he acknowledged,(11) that England had obſerved the moſt ſtrict neutrality in reſpect to France, till after the 10th of Auguſt, 1792. (12) And on the 13th of January, 1793, the Na-

(10) See p. 7.

(11) His own words are, "Le Cabinet de Saint James a pluſieurs fois proteſté d'obſerver ſcrupuleuſement la neutralité envers la France, *et en effet elle a été juſqu' à l'immortelle journée du* 10 *Août.*" Moniteur, 15th January, 1793.

(12) Whether the neutrality was violated after this period is a queſtion which will be examined in the ſequel.

tional

tional Convention itſelf admitted, (13) that the obſervation of this ſtrict neutrality toward France, on the part of England, had been continued even to the beginning of the year 1793. But the National Convention would certainly not have made this confeſſion, unleſs at leaſt a majority of its members had been perſuaded, that the report of England's acceſſion to the treaty of Pavia was ungrounded. The very ſame confeſſion contains likewiſe a direct acknowledgment on the part of the French Government, that England had no concern in any coalition againſt France, either in 1791 or 1792.

(13) The introduction to the decree of the 13th Jan. 1793, is as follows. "La Convention Nationale "informée par le miniſtre des affaires étrangeres des "préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, conſidé-"rant le changement de conduite de ce pays relative-"ment au caractere de neutralité, *qu'il avait con-"ſervée juſqu'ici, touchant les affaires de la France,* "*etc.*" Moniteur, 16th Jan. 1793.

We

We have ſeen that the Britiſh Cabinet, in the ſpring of the year 1792, by a reduction of the army and navy, by the abolition of the treaty of ſubſidy with Heſſe Caſſel, by the repeal of taxes to the amount of two hundred thouſand pounds, and by a decided reſolution to engage in no coalition againſt France, evinced a manifeſt diſpoſition to peace with that country. Yet at this very period France itſelf not only took very active meaſures for an augmentation of its army, but likewiſe, what is not generally known, and what could have reference only to England, made preparations for an augmentation of its marine. On the 18th of March, 1792, which was full ſix weeks after the Britiſh Parliament had reduced the ſailors and marines to be employed that year to *ſixteen thouſand*, Theodore Lameth, in the name of the Committee for Naval Affairs, delived a report to the National Aſſembly, in which he ſaid, " that about *eighty thouſand*

" ſailors

" sailors would be necessary, in order to man " the vessels now at the disposition of the " state, and which the honour of the na- " tion, as well as the interest of its com- " merce, *does not permit us to reduce.*" (14) The Committee further requested the National Assembly to take the speediest measures for the organisation of the navy: (15) and the proposal was made with an enthusiasm, which indicated a disposition to engage in a war by sea, (16) as well as by land.

(14) " L'armement entier des batimens, dont l'état " peut disposer aujourd'hui, et que l'honneur de la " nation, ainsi que l'intérêt de son commerce *ne per-* " *met pas de réduire*, exigerait environ 80,000 mate- " lots." Moniteur, 31 Mars, 1792.

(15) " C'est au nom de ces troupes, dont le cou- " rage soutint toujours l'état du pavillon Français, etc. " que notre comité vous supplie, *de ne pas différer* " l'organisation de l'artillerie, et des troupes de la " marine." Ib.

(16) Notre artillerie *prête à gronder sur tous les mers*, etc. Ib.

It

It is true, that theſe were only preparatory ſteps to an augmentation of the French marine: but, as they were taken at a time when England had juſt made ſo conſiderable a diminution in its own naval force, the conduct of the National Aſſembly unavoidably excited the ſuſpicion of an hoſtile diſpoſition toward England. The Engliſh Government, however, ſtill adhered to its principles of neutrality: and as the whole attention of France was ſoon after directed to a war on the Continent, the intended augmentation of the French marine was of courſe deferred to a more convenient opportunity.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Declaration of War against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Notification of it to the Court of Great Britain by the French Minister Chauvelin. Determination of the British Cabinet to persevere in the System of Neutrality: and Chauvelin's Letter on this Subject. Letter of Thanks from the King of France to the King of England. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville, in which it was requested, that all British Subjects might be forbidden to serve under any foreign Power at War with France. Punctual compliance with this request, in a Proclamation

clamation of the twenty-fifth of May. Remarks on the Conduct of the British Cabinet.

ON the 20th of April, 1792, the National Aſſembly decreed almoſt unanimouſly, (1) and amidſt the plaudits of a numerous croud of ſpectators, war againſt the King of Hungary and Bohemia. The French Miniſter in London made a formal notification of it to the Court of Great Britain: and the conduct which our Government obſerved on this occaſion, affords a new proof of its reſolution to preſerve the moſt ſtrict neutrality. Chauvelin's letter to his own court, dated 28th of April, is deciſive on this ſubject. (2)

(1) Only ſeven members voted againſt the war. See the Moniteur, 22d April, 1792.

" *Londres, le* 28 *Avril*, 1792.

(2) "J'ai communiqué au Lord Grenville toute les " pieces, que vous m'aviez addressée relativement à

Immediately on the receipt of Chauvelin's letter, the King of France wrote a letter of thanks to the King of England, (3) dated 1st of May, in which he said, "I embrace this opportunity to express to your "Majesty, how sensible I am of all the public "lic marks of affection you have given me. "*I thank you for not having become a party to*

"la déclaration de guerre. L'effet de cette nouvelle "a été de produire une baisse considérable dans les "fonds publics. M. Pitt a fait démentir dans tous "les papiers les bruits qui couraient, que des ordres "avaient été donnés pour la presse. Il a répondu "formellement à une députation de commerce, *que* "*le Gouvernement ne se mêlerait pas des affaires de la* "*France.* L'intérêt qu'il met à soutenir les fonds pu-"blics et une nouvelle garantie de sa neutralité. La "guerre n'est pas du goût de la nation; on ne fait "aucuns préparatifs, ni dans les ports, ni dans les "arsenaux. *Il est certain, que le systeme de neutralité,* "*débattu au conseil, y a été adopté.*" Moniteur, 8th May, 1792.

(3) See New Annual Register, 1792. Public Papers, p. 96: or Rivington's Annual Register, 1792. State Papers, p. 256.

"*the*

"*the concert formed by certain powers againſt*
"*France.*"

On the 15th of May the French Ambaſſador communicated a Note to Lord Grenville, (4) in which, after a long and detailed repreſentation of the motives which had induced the National Aſſembly to declare war againſt the King of Hungary and Bohemia, and after the moſt ſolemn proteſtation, firſt, that France renounced every idea of aggrandizement, and ſecondly, that

(4) In the Annual Regiſter, 1792. Public Papers, p. 99, this note is dated 15th of May; but, probably owing to an error of the preſs, it is called in the ſuperſcription, p. 97, a note preſented 12th of May. That 15th May is the true date, is certain: for not only Lord Grenville in his anſwer to this note, but likewiſe Mr. Chauvelin himſelf in his two following notes, of the 24th of May and the 18th of June, quotes it as a note dated 15th of May. This determination is not ſuperfluous, becauſe ſeveral writers, in conſequence of the above mentioned typographical error, have aſcribed to the note in queſtion a falſe date.

 France

France would never interfere in the internal concerns of other nations, (5) the following demand was made of the Court of Great Britain: " That, conformably to the treaty " of navigation and commerce, of the 26th " of September, 1786, his Britannic Ma- " jesty shall prohibit all the subjects of Great " Britain and Ireland (and publish the order " in the usual way throughout the two " kingdoms, and the islands and countries " dependent thereon) from committing any " hostilities against French ships at sea: and " that they shall not take out any patent, " commission, or letters of reprisal, from the " different Princes or States who are, or

(5) Whether the French Rulers have kept their word, in regard to this solemn protestation, which they had already made in their Manifesto to all States and Nations, on the 29th of December, 1791, is a question which no one *at present* will venture to answer in the affirmative. An appeal to it, therefore, can prove nothing more than the *hypocrisy* of those who made it.

" shall

"ſhall be at war with France, or make uſe, "in any way, of ſuch patents or commiſ- "ſions."

With this demand the Court of Great Britain punctually complied: for in ten days after the receipt of Mr. Chauvelin's note, a proclamation, (6) dated 25th of May, (7) was publiſhed, agreeably to his own preſcription, containing the following order relative to the ſubject in queſtion. "Whereas

(6) See Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1791, State Papers, p. 195; or New Annual Regiſter, 1792, Public Papers, p. 99.

(7) On the preceding day Lord Grenville ſent a Note to Mr. Chauvelin, in which, after expreſſing his concern for the hoſtilities which had broken out between France and Auſtria, he aſſured the French Ambaſſador, that the Court of Great Britain was ready "to fulfil, in the moſt exact manner, the ſtipula- "tions of the treaty of navigation and commerce, "of which his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty required the "execution." See Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1792, State Papers, p. 259.

" the most Christian King hath caused appli-
" cation to be made to his Majesty, that his
" Majesty would, conformably to the article
" of the treaty of navigation and commerce
" concluded at Versailles 26th of September,
" 1786, renew and publish, in all his do-
" minions and countries, the strict and ex-
" press prohibitions contained in the said
" article; his Majesty doth hereby strictly
" forbid all his subjects to receive any com-
" mission, for arming and acting at sea as
" privateers, or letters of reprisals, from any
" enemy of the most Christian King, or,
" by virtue or under colour of such com-
" missions or reprisals, to disturb, infest,
" or any ways damage his subjects; or to
" arm ships as privateers, or to go out to sea
" therewith, under the severest punishments
" that can be inflicted on the transgressors,
" besides being liable to make full restitu-
" tion and satisfaction to those to whom
" they have done any damage."

The

The French Government had certainly reaſon to be ſatisfied with this friendly conduct of the Britiſh Court: and in fact it was ſo, as appears from the following paragraph in Mr. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville, of the 18th of June. (8) "The "underſigned Miniſter Plenipotentiary of "his Majeſty the King of the French, has "tranſmitted to his Majeſty the official "note which Lord Grenville addreſſed to "him on the 24th of May laſt, on the "part of his Britannic Majeſty, in anſwer "to that which he had the honour to deliver to him on the 15th of the ſame "month, together with the royal proclamation publiſhed in conſequence of it. He "is directed to aſſure his Britannic Majeſty "of the due ſenſe which the King entertains

(8) The original is printed in the Moniteur, 20th July, 1792; and an Engliſh tranſlation in Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1792. State Papers, p. 263. In the New Annual Regiſter it is omitted.

" of *the friendly dispositions, and of the senti-*
" *ments of humanity, of justice and of peace,*
" *which are so clearly manifested in that an-*
" *swer.*" (9) Since then the French Government itself expressed so much satisfaction at the conduct of the British Court relative to Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 15th of May, one should suppose, that no one would venture to make this very conduct a subject of animadversion and complaint. But as the three following charges have been preferred by British writers, first, that Mr. Chauvelin was suffered to wait too long for his answer; secondly, that in Lord Grenville's answer no notice was taken of the motives which had induced the National Assembly to declare war against the King of Hungary; and thirdly, that in the inter-

(9) The words of the French original are, " Il a " reçu l'ordre de présenter à sa Majesté Britannique le " témoignage de la sensibilité du Roi aux *dispositions* " *amicales, et aux sentimens d'humanité, de justice, et de* " *paix, si bien manifestés dans cette réponse.*"

val

val was iſſued a proclamation againſt ſeditious writings in Great Britain; it is neceſſary to make a particular reply to each. With reſpect to the firſt charge, every impartial man muſt admit, that an interval of nine days, for it was really no more, (10) was by no means an exorbitant length of time for the deliberations on the demand of the French Government, and the preparation of a proclamation, which was to ſerve as a rule for all Britiſh ſubjects during the war, eſpecially as the Britiſh Government was at that time engaged with domeſtic concerns of the higheſt importance. The ſecond charge is ſtill more extraordinary: for if Lord Grenville, in his anſwer to Mr. Chauvelin's note, had taken notice of the motives which had induced the National Aſſembly to declare war againſt the King

(10) Lord Greville's anſwer was dated 24th of May, and Mr. Chauvelin's note, as I have already proved, was dated 15th of May.

of

of Hungary, he would have acted in direct opposition to the principle which the French themselves continually repeated, that no nation has a right to intermeddle in the affairs of another. And in regard to the proclamation against seditious writings, which was issued on the 21st of May, it stood in no connection with the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France: it related solely to matters of national police, and these were of too much consequence to be deferred, in order that Mr. Chauvelin might receive his answer a few days sooner. In fact, the proclamation of the 21st of May has so little reference to the present history, that it might be safely passed over in silence: but, as several writers have contended that it evinced a hostile disposition toward France, we will examine it at full length in the following chapter.

CHAP.

[MAH]ARAJA SERFOJI'S THE TANJORE MAHAL

CHAP. VI.

Proclamation of the 21st of May, 1792, against Seditious Writings; and Confutation of the Objections which have been made to it.

DURING a considerable time before the appearance of this proclamation, various political publications, which by no means contributed to promote the welfare of the British Constitution, had been circulated with great assiduity throughout Great Britain. And these publications were not works of cool and philosophical inquiry, they were not calculated to exercise the judgment of the learned, but to inflame the passions of the illiterate. They were designed

ſigned chiefly for the lower claſſes, to whoſe underſtandings they were particularly adapted: and that the pooreſt individual might be enabled to procure them, not only the cheapeſt poſſible editions were publiſhed, but even thoſe cheap editions were ſold at a price which could hardly repay the expences of printing. In theſe publications the lower claſſes were taught, that the Britiſh Conſtitution, the pride of Britons and the envy of foreigners, a conſtitution which Monteſquieu and De Lolme had made the theme of their admiration, was a ſyſtem of ſlavery. (1)

(1) This was particularly Mr. Paine's doctrine, who aſſerted in the moſt general terms, that "*all* "kings were tyrants, and their ſubjects *ſlaves*." See New Annual Regiſter, 1792, Britiſh and Foreign Hiſtory, p. 72, whence it likewiſe appears, that Paine's writings had been circulated even in public ſchools. That Paine's ſecond part of the Rights of Man was a libel on the Conſtitution, was admitted in the Houſe of Commons on the 30th of April, 1792, by an eminent leader of Oppoſition: and a celebrated writer of the ſame party has likewiſe granted, that ſeveral pub-

lications

They were taught to believe, that evils, which not even the wiſeſt Adminiſtration can remove, were merely the reſult of political inſtitutions, which diſtributed wealth and power in unequal portions, as if the ſame advantages were to be derived from indolence and ignorance, as from induſtry and talents. Even imaginary evils were repreſented as real ones; and cauſes, which had formerly produced content, were converted into motives of complaint. Before this period the lower, as well as the higher orders of ſociety, had been inſtructed in the uſeful leſſon, that, as they were privileged

lications, at that time in general circulation, "were, "according to the juſt theory of the law, unqueſtion-"ably libels." The ſame writer adds: "Theſe *irre-"gularities* and *exceſſes* were for a conſiderable length "of time wholly overlooked by Government:" and it may be further added, that, if theſe avowed exceſſes had been any longer treated with indulgence, the revolution, which ſoon after deprived the King of France of his throne, would in all probability have extended itſelf to Great Britain.

on

on the one hand to exercise the rights of free-born Britons, they were bound on the other hand to fulfil the duties of good citizens. But by the new doctrine the lower classes especially were informed, that the *Rights* of man must now occupy their whole attention, and that these rights, if properly exercised, would lead to wealth, to power and to honour. This doctrine unavoidably produced a very sensible effect: for where shall we find a man, who possesses not vanity and ambition, who would not rather be rich than be poor, who would not rather govern than be governed? The ignorant and the unwary regard only *immediate* consequences, and have not sufficient penetration to discover *ultimate* effects. They perceive not, that a system in which all men choose to govern, can no where be of long duration; that, though well calculated to destroy an existing constitution, it must cease the moment a new one is erected, whatever

shape

ſhape the new conſtitution aſſumes, or however ſplendid the title with which it is adorned. They perceive not that a ſyſtem, which leads immediately to anarchy, muſt ultimately lead to deſpotiſm, and that the ſeverity of the latter is always proportioned to the exceſſes of the former (2): nor are they aware, that they are mere inſtruments in the hands of a few ambitious demagogues, who amuſe mankind with the magic words of liberty and equality, not with a view of promoting the happineſs of their fellow citizens, or of introducing a real ſyſtem of equality, which can no where exiſt, but ſolely to exchange the old ſyſtem of inequality for one which is better adapted to gratify their private vanity and ambition. Further, the effects of the new doctrine were ſo much the more extenſive, as the writings in which it was contained were not merely

(2) The tyranny of Robeſpierre affords a ſtriking proof.

circulated in the common courſe of trade, but were induſtriouſly diſtributed by numerous ſocieties, who had correſpondents in every part of the kingdom. Laſtly, one at leaſt of theſe ſocieties, the Society for Conſtitutional Information, a ſhort time before the proclamation of the 21ſt of May, opened by its own avowal a correſpondence with the Jacobin Club in Paris, whoſe grand object was the deſtruction of monarchical government of every deſcription, in which it likewiſe ſucceeded in its own country, within ten weeks after the period in queſtion. (3)

(3.) So early as the 4th of May, 1792, the Society for Conſtitutional Information reſolved, that a committee ſhould be appointed to conſider of a correſpondence with the Jacobin Club in Paris, as appears from an advertiſement inſerted by order of the Society in the Morning Chronicle, 8th May. And about the middle of this month an addreſs was actually voted and ſent to the Jacobin Club, containing the following paſſages: "Brothers, and Fellow-citizens "of the World, the cordial and affectionate recep- "tion with which you have honoured our worthy

"country-

Under these circumstances the British Cabinet deemed it necessary to issue the following proclamation:

" countrymen Mr. Thomas Cooper and Mr. James " Watt, members of the Society at Manchester, and " united with our Society, has been communicated to " us by the correspondence of those Gentlemen." (From this passage we learn, that even before the month of May, 1792, deputies had been sent to the Jacobin Club.) " It is not among the least of the " revolutions which time is unfolding to an astonished " world, that two nations, nursed by some wretched " craft in reciprocal hatred, should so suddenly break " their common odious chain, and rush into amity. " The principle that can produce such an effect is the " offspring of no earthly *court:* and whilst it exhibits " to us the expensive iniquity of *former* politics, it en-" ables us, with bold felicity, to say, *We have done with* " *them.* In contemplating the political condition of " nations, we cannot conceive a more diabolical sys-" tem of government, than that which has hitherto " *generally* been practised over the world." Though this langage is cautiously obscure, its meaning is very easy to be discovered. That the Address was sent to the Jacobin Club at Paris at least a week before the proclamation of the 21st of May was issued, appears from the resolution entered into by the Society on the

"Whereas divers wicked and seditious "writings have been printed, published, "and industriously dispersed, tending to ex-

18th of May, (which in the Morning Chronicle of the 25th of May immediately precedes the address itself, namely, "The following Address to the Friends "of the Constitution at Paris, commonly called Ja-"cobins, and which was by the direction of this So-"ciety sent to them *last week*, was ordered for pub-"lication." The information, therefore, which Government received of this address, was probably one of the principal motives to the proclamation of the 21st of May: and every man who thinks the British Constitution worth preserving, must admit, that it was high time to put a stop to proceedings which tended to the destruction of it. The Society of the Friends of the People, at a meeting held on the 12th of May, in consequence of a letter from the Chairman of the Society for Constitutional Information, and four days after the advertisement relative to the then intended address to the Jacobin Club had appeared in the Morning Chronicle, resolved that an answer should be returned, which concluded in the following words: "We decline all intercourse with a "Society whose views and objects, as far as we can "collect them, from the various resolutions and pro-"ceedings which have been published, we cannot help

"cite tumult and diſorder, by endeavouring "to raiſe groundleſs jealouſies and diſcon-"tents in the minds of our faithful and "loving ſubjects, reſpecting the laws and "happy conſtitution of Government, civil, "and religious, eſtabliſhed in this kingdom, "and endeavouring to vilify and bring into "contempt the wiſe and wholeſome provi-"ſions made at the time of the glorious re-"volution, and ſince ſtrengthened and con-"firmed by ſubſequent laws, for the pre-"ſervation and ſecurity of the rights and "liberties of our faithful and loving ſub-"jects; and whereas divers writings have

"help regarding as *irreconcileable with thoſe real in-"tereſts* on which you profeſs to inform and enlighten "the people." See the Morning Chronicle, 14th May, 1792. Since then the Society of the Friends of the People have declared, that the proceedings of the Society for Conſtitutional Information were irreconcileable with the real intereſts of the People of Great Britain, no one of its members can repreſent the proclamation of the 21ſt of May as unneceſſary, without arraigning the proceedings of his own Society.

"also been printed, published, and industri-
"ously dispersed, recommending the said
"wicked and seditious publications to the
"attention of our faithful and loving sub-
"jects: and whereas we have also reason to
"believe that correspondencies have been
"entered into with sundry persons in fo-
"reign parts, with the view to forward the
"criminal and wicked purposes above men-
"tioned: and whereas the wealth, happi-
"ness and prosperity of this kingdom do,
"under Divine Providence, chiefly depend
"upon a due submission to the laws, a
"just confidence in the integrity and wis-
"dom of Parliament, and a continuance of
"that zealous attachment to the Govern-
"ment and Constitution of the kingdom,
"which has ever prevailed in the minds of
"the people thereof: and whereas there is
"nothing which we so earnestly desire as
"to secure the public peace and prosperity,
"and to preserve to all our loving subjects
"the

" the full enjoyment of their rights and " liberties, both religious and civil: We " therefore being resolved, as far as in us " lies, to repress the wicked and seditious " practices aforesaid, and to deter all per- " sons from following so pernicious an ex- " ample, have thought it fit, by the advice " of our Privy Council, to issue this our " Royal Proclamation, solemnly warning all " our loving subjects, as they tender their " own happiness and that of their posterity, " to guard against all such attempts, which " aim at the subversion of all regular go- " vernment within this kingdom, and which " are inconsistent with the peace and order " of society; and earnestly exhorting them " at all times, and to the utmost of their " power, to avoid and discourage all pro- " ceedings tending to produce riots and tu- " mults. And we do strictly charge and com- " mand all our magistrates in and through- " out our kingdom of Great Britain, that

" they do make diligent inquiry, in order to " discover the authors and printers of such " wicked and seditious writings as aforesaid, " and all others who shall disperse the same: " and we do further charge and command " all our sheriffs, justices of the peace, chief " magistrates in our cities, boroughs and " corporations, and all other our officers and " magistrates throughout our kingdom of " Great Britain, that they do, in their se- " veral and respective stations, take the most " immediate and effectual care to suppress " and prevent all riots, tumults, and other " disorders, which may be attempted to be " raised or made by any person or persons, " which, on whatever pretext they may be " grounded, are not only contrary to the " law, but dangerous to the most important " interests of this kingdom. And we do " further require and command all and every " our magistrates aforesaid, that they do " from time to time transmit to one of our

Principal

" Principal Secretaries of State, due and " full information of ſuch perſons as ſhall " be found offending as aforeſaid, or in any " degree aiding or abetting therein: it being " our determination, for the preſervation of " the peace and happineſs of our faithful " and loving ſubjects, to carry the laws vi- " gorouſly into execution againſt ſuch offen- " ders as aforeſaid."(4)

It is evident, that this proclamation had no relation to the Government of France: it was a mere act of national police, which no more concerned the French Government, than the meaſures taken in France relative to the emigrants concerned the Engliſh Government. France, therefore, had no right to complain of it, as an eminent oppoſition writer has himſelf acknowledged. But if

(4) Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1792, State Papers, p. 192; or New Annual Regiſter, 1792, Public Papers, p. 52.

France had no right to complain of it, what right can any man possess, to represent it as inimical to France? The period, however, it is said, at which the proclamation was issued, was very critical. This is perfectly true; but the period was critical for *England*. Why, therefore, might not Government take measures to prevent an impending evil, as well at this, as at any other time? It is further objected, that there is an expression in the proclamation, which *may* be applied to certain Frenchmen, namely, "that correspondencies have been entered into with sundry persons in foreign parts." Now, the term "sundry persons in foreign parts" is so general, that no one would apply it to himself who was not conscious of having corresponded with a political society in England.(5) Nor does the question relate to a

(5) Condorcet, in his report to the National Assembly, on the 16th of February, 1792, relative to a conspiracy against the new Constitution of France, spoke in

government, but ſimply to *individuals*: no government, therefore, and conſequently not even that of France, could be affected by it, however clear the reference might have been to certain inhabitants of that country. Even if a particular expreſſion had been uſed inſtead of a general one, if inſtead of "ſundry perſons in foreign parts, had been ſaid "ſundry Frenchmen," no objection could have been made to it, ſince the Society for Conſtitutional Information, by its own avowal, commenced a correſpondence with the Jacobin Club in Paris, before the appearance of the peſent proclamation, not to mention the numerous, but leſs dangerous, addreſſes, which had been tranſmitted to various ſocieties in France during more than two years

in much ſtronger terms of a connexion between the leaders of it and perſons in other countries. Why did not the Britiſh Government apply to itſelf the general expreſſions uſed by Condorcet? The anſwer is obvious. Becauſe it was conſcious of having no concern in a conſpiracy againſt the French Conſtitution.

paſt.

paſt.(6) In fact, it was the *Britiſh* Government, and the Britiſh Government alone, which had a right to complain on this ſubject: it had a right to demand of the French Government, if not ſatisfaction, at leaſt an explanation, and an aſſurance of its diſapprobation of the conduct of certain individuals in that country in regard to Great Britain, eſpecially as the principle, that no one had a right to intermeddle in the internal affairs of another nation, was no where ſo ſtrongly enforced as in France itſelf. It is true, that the Britiſh Government made no formal demand of any ſuch explanation: but Mr. Chauvelin himſelf was ſo convinced of the neceſſity of making one, that on the 24th of May he ſent a note to Lord Grenville,(7) in which he declared,

(6) See Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1792, part ii. p. 128—144.

(7) Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1792, State Papers. p. 260.

"If

" If certain individuals of this country have " eſtabliſhed a correſpondence abroad, tend- " ing to excite troubles therein, and if, as " the proclamation ſeems to inſinuate, cer- " tain Frenchmen have come into their " views, this is a proceeding wholly foreign " to the French Nation, to the Legiſlative " Body, to the King, and his Miniſters; it " is a proceeding, of which they are en- " tirely ignorant, which militates againſt " every principle of juſtice, and which, " whenever it became known, would be " univerſally condemned in France." Further Mr. Chauvelin was ſo deſirous of reſcuing his Court from all ſuſpicion of favouring ſedition in Great Britain, a ſuſpicion which the Britiſh Cabinet did not entertain, for no alluſion was made in the proclamation to any Government, but merely to certain individuals, that he even requeſted his note might be laid before the two Houſes of Parliament, previous to the debates on the

the proclamation, which, however, could not be granted, becaufe it was contrary to the forms of the Britifh Conftitution, as Lord Grenville informed him in a note written on the following day,(8) to which Mr. Chauvelin immediately replied,(9) "In making this "request, my Lord, I intended to obviate "the falfe interpretations, which might be "occafioned in the two Houfes by the ar-"ticle of the proclamation, which is the "fubject of it: I flattered myfelf by thefe "means to contribute toward the mainte-"nance of that harmony and of that cordi-"ality between the two ftates, of which I "with joy remarked the expreffion in the "affurance, which you gave me, that it is "no lefs defired by his Britannic Majefty, "than by the King of the French."

Since then, the proclamation of the 21ft of May, by no means difturbed the har-

(8) Ib. p. 261. (9) Ib. p. 262.

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mony which ſubſiſted between the Courts of Great Britain and France, it ſeems unneceſſary, in a hiſtory of their political conduct, to ſay any thing further on the ſubject. But an eminent writer has endeavoured to excite a ſuſpicion, that, beſide the avowed object of ſuppreſſing ſedition, the proclamation had a *ſecret* tendency, and that "at this time "the ſeeds of war were ſown, which we "have ever ſince been unfortunately reap-"ing." I requeſt, therefore, every impartial man, to re-conſider the conduct of the Britiſh Government toward France, as deſcribed in the preceding chapters of this work: I requeſt him to recollect the abſolute refuſal to join the coalition, to remember the ſtrict regard paid to the principles of neutrality, in the rejection of the advantageous offer made by the coloniſts of St. Domingo, to take a review of the general conduct of Adminiſtration, from the opening of Parliament on the 31ſt of January,

1792,

1792, to its prorogation on the 15th of June, and then ſeriouſly aſk himſelf, whether it could be the deſign of the Britiſh Government in May, 1792, to engage in a war with France. At that time Mr. Pitt's favourite object was a diminution of the national debt, the abolition of taxes, the promotion of commerce, and of general welfare throughout the kingdom, the attainment of which would neceſſarily be impeded by the expences of a foreign war. Is it poſſible that a Miniſter could, at one inſtant, ſpeak with enthuſiaſm of the advantages, which he propoſed to obtain for his country, and yet reſolve at the next inſtant to ſacrifice all theſe advantages without any reaſon? Whoever can admit this ſuppoſition muſt poſſeſs a faith, which bids defiance to all the rules of probability. Why then is it conjectured, that it was Pitt's deſign, in May, 1792, to involve England in a war with France? Becauſe a Royal Proclamation was

iſſued

iſſued on the 21ſt of this month, againſt ſe-ditious writings! It is inferred, therefore, that becauſe a Government takes meaſures to preſerve *peace at home,* it has formed a reſolution to engage in *a war abroad!* But if the inference be really valid, it operates much more forcibly againſt the other party, and proves that the National Aſſembly had, long before the period in queſtion, reſolved on a war with England: for every decree, which had been made againſt the French royaliſts, affords juſt as good a proof of an hoſtile diſpoſition toward England, as a proclamation againſt Engliſh democrats of an hoſtile diſpoſition toward France. That the Britiſh Cabinet, however, was far from entertaining any ſentiments of hoſtility toward France, when this proclamation was iſſued, is a fact, which has been admitted not only by the old, but even by the *new* Government of that country. Mr. Chauvelin, in his note of the 18th of June, which was written

nearly

nearly a month after the appearance of the proclamation, declared, that he had received orders from his Court, to thank his Britannic Majesty *for his friendly dispositions, his sentiments of humanity, of justice, and of peace*:(10) and when Lord Gower quitted Paris, after the King was dethroned, he received a note from Le Brun, in the name of the Executive Council, containing the following declaration, "The French Nation has reason to hope, that the British Cabinet will not depart, at this critical moment, from *that justice, that moderation, and that impartiality which it has hitherto displayed.*"(11) Mr. Chauvelin himself, likewise, in a letter sent to his own Government on the 17th of

(10) See the preceding chapter, note 9.

(11) "La Nation Française a lieu d'espérer que le Cabinet Britannique ne se départira point, en ce moment décisif, *de la justice, de la modération, et de l'impartialité, qu'il a montré jusqu'à présent.*" Moniteur 26th August, 1792.

July,

July, (12) bore ample teſtimony to the friendly diſpoſitions of the Britiſh Court. When the advocates of the French therefore contend, that Government endeavoured in May, 1792, to promote a war with France, they aſſert what their clients themſelves deny. In fact, there is no connexion what ſoever between the premiſes and the concluſion, unleſs certain intermediate ideas be introduced, which will hardly occur to any man, who is a real lover of his country. That they who wiſh to overturn the Britiſh Conſtitution have conſidered the cauſe of the French as their own, and have regarded, therefore, the proclamation of the 21ſt of May, which was certainly inimical to *them*, as inimical likewiſe to France, is very poſſible. But then they muſt not give too great a latitude to their concluſion: by the word

(12) This letter, which is printed in the Moniteur, 29th July, 1792, will be quoted at length in the eighth chapter.

"France" they muſt not underſtand the French Government, and ſtill leſs the French nation at large: for the Jacobins, though their influence was very great, had not brought matters ſo far in May, 1792, that they could be conſidered at that time, as conſtituting either the French Government, or the repreſentation of the whole body of the people. The utmoſt, therefore, that can be inferred, by help of this aſſociation of ideas, is, that the proclamation was inimical to a certain ſociety in Paris. Now this ſociety had either entered into the views of thoſe perſons, againſt whom the proclamation was levelled, or it had not. In the latter caſe, the general expreſſion "ſundry perſons in foreign parts," could no more affect the Jacobins, than any other ſociety in Europe. In the former caſe, they had ſtill leſs cauſe for complaint, ſince he, who makes the firſt attack, can have no reaſon to take it ill, if his adverſary defends himſelf. And in

in this latter caſe, which admits of no doubt, (13) thoſe writers who endeavour to throw the blame of the preſent war on the Britiſh Government, will defeat their own purpoſe, if they conſider the term "Jacobin Club" as ſynonymous with France at large: but if this ſynonymity be rejected, all *appearance* of foundation for the inference, that the proclamation was inimical to France, is removed.

(13) See note 3.

CHAP. VII.

Prorogation of the British Parliament on the 15th of June. Speech from the Throne. Chauvelin's Note of the 18th of June, requesting the Mediation of Great Britain. Answer of the British Cabinet. Reflections on this Subject.

ON the 15th of June, the British Parliament, after a session replete with measures, which indicated the expectation of continued peace, was prorogued with a speech from the throne, (1) in which his Majesty, after expressing his satisfaction at the steps which had been taken for the diminution

(1) Annual Register, 1792, State Papers, p. 196: or New Annual Register, Public Papers, p. 58.

minution of the public burthens, and the reduction of the national debt, proceeded as follows: " I have seen with great concern " the commencement of hostilities in dif- " ferent parts of Europe. In the present " situation of affairs, it will be my principal " care to maintain that harmony and good " understanding which subsists between me " and the several Belligerent Powers, and to " preserve to my people the uninterrupted " blessings of peace. And the assurances " which I receive from all quarters, of a " friendly disposition toward this country, " afford me the pleasing hope of succeeding " in these endeavours."

Within three days, however, after the prorogation of Parliament, a proposal was made on the part of France, which, had it been accepted, would have effectually disturbed the repose then enjoyed by Great Britain, namely: On the 18th of June,

Mr. Chauvelin communicated a Note to Lord Grenville, (2) in which the mediation of the Britiſh Cabinet was requeſted between France and the allied powers of Auſtria and Pruſſia. In this Note, after an introduction, expreſſive of the friendly conduct of Great Britain on the one hand, (3) and the danger which threatened France from the two great Continental Powers on the other, the interpoſition of the former was requeſted on the following grounds, and in the following words: "The conſequences "of ſuch a conſpiracy, formed by the con-"currence of powers who have been ſo "long rivals, will be eaſily felt by his Bri-"tannic Majeſty: the balance of Europe, "the independence of the different powers,

(2) The French original is printed in the Moniteur, 20th July, 1792, under the title Copie de la Note addressée à Milord Grenville par M. Chauvelin, du 18 Juin, 1792. An Engliſh tranſlation of it is in the Annual Regiſter, 1792, State Papers, p. 263.

(3) See above, chap. v. note 9.

"the

"the general peace, every consideration, "which at all times has fixed the attention "of the English Government, is at once "exposed and threatened. The King of the "French presents these serious and important "considerations to the solicitude and "the friendship of his Britannic Majesty. "Strongly penetrated with the marks of "interest and of affection which he has received "from him, he invites him to seek "in his wisdom, in his situation, and in his "influence, means compatible with the independence "of the French Nation, to stop, "while it is still time, the confederacy, &c." "His Majesty has thought, that in the ex-

To this proposal, which involved the interests and the tranquillity of Great Britain, was returned, on the 8th of July, after mature deliberation, the following answer. (4)

(4) The French original is printed in the Moniteur, 20th July, 1792, and an English translation in the Annual Register, immediately after M. Chauvelin's note.

" isting circumstances of the war now be-
" gun, the intervention of his councils, or
" of his good offices, cannot be of use, *un-*
" *less they should be desired by all the parties*
" *interested.*"

The refusal of the British Cabinet to interpose between France and the other Belligerent Powers, unless those powers likewise desired its mediation, was certainly the most prudent conduct which could have been adopted. Yet this prudent conduct has been the subject of severe reprehension; and Ministers have been censured, for not standing forward as the champions of France. Had France then so strong a claim on the gratitude of Great Britain, as to be entitled to expect that we should involve ourselves in a war merely on her account? For every one knows, that a mediation, unsupported by an armament, must be wholly ineffectual; and Mr. Chauvelin himself had very clearly

clearly ſuggeſted, that the requeſted mediation was to conſiſt, not in bare ſolicitations, but in effectual and deciſive meaſures. Let us aſk, then, For whom was England to take theſe effectual and deciſive meaſures? For whom was England to engage in a continental war? For whom was England to ſacrifice thoſe advantages which were then the favourite objects of Government, and which could not be preſerved without a continuance of peace? For a nation, which has never ceaſed to be our mortal enemy: for a nation, which has embraced every opportunity of humbling its neighbour, which never ſaw the Britiſh Government in diſtreſs without taking ungenerous advantage of it, and at the beginning of the very laſt war, which was concluded hardly ten years before the period in queſtion, had proved itſelf as treacherous as hoſtile! Strange, therefore, was the requeſt of France; and ſtill more ſtrange the cenſure of Britiſh ſubjects,

becauſe

becauſe it was refuſed. This cenſure ill becomes thoſe who accuſe Miniſters of being the authors of the war, which broke out in the following year, unleſs the caſe of commencing hoſtilities *in favour* of France is to be excepted from the general animadverſion. The requeſted mediation has been termed indeed an act of peace, and the non-acceptance of it has been repreſented as indicating a diſpoſition to hoſtilities. But ſince this pretended act of peace would have previouſly involved us in a war, before any effect could have been produced, we may rather conclude, that the ſame principle of neutrality, and the ſame deſire to avoid hoſtilities in general, which had induced the Britiſh Cabinet to refuſe to join the adverſaries of France, occaſioned likewiſe the reſolution to take no part againſt them. And as to the ſuppoſed hoſtile diſpoſition toward France, at the time when the anſwer of the Britiſh Cabinet was given, it is completely contradicted

contradicted by the avowal of the French themſelves, by Mr. Chauvelin's letter to his own Government, of the 17th of July, and by Le Brun's note to Lord Gower on his departure from Paris in the month of Auguſt. (5)

Suppoſe, however, that the Britiſh Government had accepted the proffered mediation, and, what muſt neceſſarily have taken place, unleſs the mediation was to conſiſt in mere words, had reſolved to join France, if the other parties refuſed to accept it, the reſolution, though highly detrimental to ourſelves, would have rendered very little ſervice to thoſe who required it. The danger which at that time threatened France, proceeded not from any maritime power, but from the two great continental powers, Auſtria and Pruſſia, in compariſon of whoſe

(5) See the latter part of the preceding chapter.

armies,

armies, that of Great Britain in the year 1792, at leaſt in point of number, was a mere nothing. A mediation therefore could have produced no effect, unleſs theſe two powers *voluntarily* conſented to it: and for this very reaſon, the anſwer of the Britiſh Cabinet was the moſt proper which could be given. The caſe would have been totally different, if France had been engaged in a war at ſea, ſince Great Britain, with its formidable fleet, would then have poſſeſſed the means of obliging the adverſaries of France to accept its mediation. But even in this caſe, it would have been imprudent to have incurred the expences of a naval armament: for the experiment had been already made, when we attempted a mediation between Ruſſia and the Porte, and had met with ſufficient oppoſition to diſſuade Miniſters from making a ſecond attempt of the ſame kind, within ſo ſhort a period after the firſt.

I have

I have hitherto argued on the ſuppoſition, that the French Government really wiſhed for the re-eſtabliſhment of peace. That the King of France himſelf ſincerely wiſhed it, may be readily granted: but on the 8th of July, when the anſwer of the Britiſh Cabinet was given, the Government of France had ceaſed to be veſted in the hands of the King. It is true, that he was not *formally* depoſed till a month after the period in queſtion: but nearly three weeks had elapſed after the celebrated 20th of June; and from this day the whole power of France, executive as well as legiſlative, was lodged in the National Aſſembly. Conſequently, it was the buſineſs of the Britiſh Cabinet, in all matters relative to the political ſituation of the two countries, to regulate its conduct by the views and motives of this Aſſembly. The queſtion therefore is, Did the National Aſſembly, or at leaſt a majority of its members, at the time of the propoſed mediation,

mediation, sincerely wish the re-establishment of peace? Or did they not, on the contrary, ardently wish for a continuance of the war? This question shall be minutely examined.

It was hardly two months before Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 18th of June was presented to the British Government, that the National Assembly had decreed the war against the King of Hungary, with an unanimity and an enthusiasm which clearly proved, that, in the opinion of almost all its members war was more advantageous to them than peace. (6) Even so early as the

(6) See the debates in the Moniteur, 22d April, 1792. In vain said Mr. Becquet, one of the seven members, who alone out of the seven hundred and fifty voted against the war, "Renonçons à une entreprise qui n'a aucun object réel; bornons-nous à "nous défendre, si quelque puissance nous attaque, "*et probablement nous n'aurons pas de guerre:*" for his speech excited in the Assembly a violent tumult.

29th of December, 1791, Briſſot had declared in the National Aſſembly, that "war "was a real benefit to the nation, and that "the only evil which they had to dread was the not having war:" (7) and a few days after Iſnard explained to the Aſſembly, in what *reſpect* a war was to be conſidered as a national benefit, namely, as being the means of completing the revolution. (8) The completion of the revolution, therefore, or, in

(7) "La guerre eſt actuellement un bienfait na-"tional, et la ſeule calamité qu'il y ait à redouter, "c'eſt de n'avoir pas la guerre." Moniteur, 31ſt December, 1791. Even two months before, in a debate of the 20th of October 1791, Briſſot had ſaid: "Il ne "faut pas ſeulement vous défendre, *il faut attaquer* "vous-même." See Lally Tolendal, Défenſe des Emigrés Français, tom. i. p. 189.

(8) "Une guerre eſt prête à s'allumer, *guerre in-"diſpenſable pour conſommer la révolution.*" Moniteur, 6th Jan. 1792. On the 4th of January, the ſame orator had already ſaid: "Que tous les Français ac-"courent au Club des Jacobins; voici le moment où "nous allons publier la guerre." See Lally Tolendal, Défenſe des Emigrés Français, tom. i. p. 198.

other

other words, the depoſition of the King and the eſtabliſhment of a republic, was to be effected by a foreign war, which ſhould divert the general attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom to the military operations on the borders. That this was the real object of the war which was declared againſt Auſtria, the chiefs of the revolution avowed openly, as ſoon as their object was attained. For on the very day after the National Convention had decreed the abolition of royalty in France, (9) Briſſot boaſted in his celebrated journal, that "without the war the revolution of the "10th of Auguſt would not have taken "place; that without the war, France "would not have become a republic:" (10)

(9) This decree, which was the firſt act of the National Convention, paſſed on the 21ſt of September, 1792. See the Moniteur, 22d September, 1792.

10) "Sans la guerre la révolution du 10 Août n'au-"rait pas eu lieu: ſans la guerre la France ne ſerait "pas république." Journal du Patriote Français, 22d Sept. 1792.

and a few weeks afterwards he declared, in the moſt poſitive and unequivocal terms, that "it was the abolition of royalty which "he had in view, when he provoked the "declaration of war." (11) Louvet alſo, in his addreſs to Robeſpierre, ſaid, "We "wiſhed for war, we genuine Jacobins, be-"cauſe peace was certainly deſtructive to "the republic:" (12) and a few lines afterwards he added, "Republicans, who were "worthy of the name, demanded the war, "they dared aſpire to the laſting renown, "to the immortal honour, of aboliſhing "royalty itſelf, of aboliſhing it for ever, at

(11) "C'était l'abolition de la royauté, que j'avais "en vue, en faiſant déclarer la guerre." Briſſot à tous les républicains de France ſur les Jacobins, (Paris, Oct. 1792) p. 8.

(12) "Nous voulions la guerre, nous purs Jacobins, "parcequ' à coup sûr la paix tuait la république." I. B. Louvet à Maximilien Robeſpierre et à ſes royaliſtes (Dec. 1792), p. 18.

"first in France, and then throughout the "world." (13)

The object, therefore, of the National Assembly in involving France in a war, lies open to public view: and in order to attain this favourite object, the principal members of it had such a thirst after hostilities, and so frequently expressed it in their public speeches and writings, that if any man should take the pains to collect the scattered

(13) "Ils appellaient la guerre les républicains "dignes de l'être: ils osaient aspirer à la gloire solide, "à l'immortel honneur de *tuer la royauté même, de la* "*tuer à jamais, d'abord en France, et puis dans l'uni-* "*vers.*" Ib. Likewise Collot d'Herbois said: "Nous "avons voulu la guerre, parceque la guerre devait "tuer la royauté." See Lally Tolendal Défense, etc. tom. i. p. 208. And Cambon, after the war had begun to take a favourable turn, made the following declaration, in the name of the three united committees of War, Finance and Diplomacy: "Ils se sont de- "mandé d'abord quel est *l'objet* de la guerre que vous "avez entreprise? C'est sans doute *l'anéantissement* "*de tous les privilèges.*" Moniteur, 18th Dec. 1792.

expressions

expreſſions on this ſubject, from the Moniteur and other political publications, he might fill with them a complete volume. Cambon even declared, that "it was neceſſary to break with *all* the courts:" (14) and Briſſot himſelf acknowledges, that the reſolution was formed "to ſet all Europe at "defiance." (15) Laſtly, as ſoon as the plan, which had been long in agitation, approached to its maturity, this ſame Briſſot went ſo far as to aſſert, "We muſt ſet fire "to the four corners of Europe, for there "lies our ſalvation." (16)

(14) "Il faut rompre avec *tous* les cabinets." Theſe words of Cambon are quoted by Briſſot in his work à ſes Commettans (Paris 1793), p. 74.

(15) "Voilà les grands idées, qu'il fallait conce-"voir, qu'il fallait exécuter, puiſque l'on *voulais bra-"ver toute l'Europe.*" Ib. p. 73.

(16) "Il faut incendier les quatre coins de l'Eu-"rope: notre ſalut eſt là." Theſe words are quoted from one of Briſſot's letters by Mallet du Pan, in his

This ſalvation was firſt ſought in a war with Auſtria: and in order to effect it, the firſt ſtep taken by the National Aſſembly was the removal of Deleſſart, Narbonne, Bertrand de Molleville, with the other French Cabinet Miniſters, who, as well as the King himſelf, were deſirous of preſerving peace, and the appointment of a new Miniſtry, which conſiſted entirely of Jacobins, and, agreeably to the wiſhes of the National Aſſembly, obliged the King to propoſe a declaration of war. (17) It cannot be here objected, that the members of the National Aſſembly demanded a declaration of war *merely* becauſe they themſelves were apprehenſive of a ſimilar declaration on the part

Conſidérations ſur la Nature de la Révolution Françaiſe, (Londres, 1793) p. 37.

(17) " Le Miniſtere fut alors complettement com-" poſé de Jacobins, qui ſous la protection du côté " gauche de l'Aſſemblée demandaient à grand cris une " déclaration de guerre." Bertrand de Molleville Mémoires Secrets, tom. ii. p. 145.

of

of Auſtria, and that they had *no other object* in view than to ſecure to themſelves the advantages ariſing from the firſt attack; for their own confeſſions prove the contrary. Nor is it by any means ſo probable, as is commonly ſuppoſed, that the Auſtrian Cabinet would have declared war againſt France, even if the National Aſſembly had not declared war againſt Auſtria. It is true, that in the year 1791 a coalition had been formed againſt France: but in April, 1792, when France declared war againſt Auſtria, the coalition, which even in 1791 had produced no effect, appeared to have been abandoned. The King of Sweden, one of the chief inſtigators to a war with France, was already murdered; (18) and after his death the ſtate of politicks in Sweden took a totally new turn. The Emperor Leopold was

(18) It was on the 18th of March, 1792, that the King of Sweden was mortally wounded by the murderer Ankerſtrom.

likewiſe dead; (19) and his ſucceſſor Francis II. gave no indications of a warlike diſpoſition. (20) The character of Leopold was likewiſe pacific; and there is reaſon to believe that it was not his deſign to commence hoſtilities againſt France, but merely to alarm the Jacobins by a junction of ſeveral powers, and to deter them from offering violence to the perſons of his brother-in-law and his own ſiſter, whoſe fate he could not regard with indifference. (21) That it

(19) The Emperor Leopold died on the 1ſt of March, 1792, and almoſt as ſuddenly as the King of Sweden.

(20) Even a month before the declaration of war, Dumouriez, then Miniſter for Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to the French Ambaſſador at Vienna, dated 18th March, 1792, in which he ſaid: "Les affaires doivent "prendre, par la mort de Léopold, une nouvelle "marche." His letter is printed in the Moniteur, 18th April, 1792.

(21) In a note to the French Ambaſſador at Vienna, which is printed in the Moniteur, 24th Dec. 1791, he expreſſed

was the wiſh neither of Leopold, nor of his Miniſters, to engage in a war with France, is atteſted by the Marquis de Bouillé, who was well acquainted with the ſentiments of the Auſtrian Cabinet. (22) And if the

expreſſed himſelf as follows: "On ne peut plus douter "de ma façon de penſer ſur les affaires de la France. "Ma derniere déclaration, et les ordres que j'ai fait "donner par mon Gouverneur à Bruxelles, l'agent des "émigrés Français, prouvent que je regarde mon beau "frere comme libre, et que mon intention n'eſt pas "de me mêler des affaires de ſon royaume, auſſi long-"tems que les Français lui laiſſeront tout ce qu'ils lui "ont aſſuré volontairement, et ce qu'il a volontaire-"ment accepté dans le nouveau contract conſtitu-"tionnel."

(22) In his Mémoires ſur la Révolution Françaiſe, tom. ii. p. 136, where he ſpeaks of his arrival in Prague, at the coronation of the Emperor, he ſays: "J'y arrivai au commencement de Septembre, et j'y "reſtai huit ou dix jours ſans recevoir le moindre ordre "de l'Empereur. J'y appris, de maniere à n'en pouvoir "plus douter, que les diſpoſitions du Cabinet de Vienne "n'étaient point du tout à la guerre; et je dois au Ma-"réchal de Laſci la juſtice de déclarer, qu'il m'a plu-"ſieurs fois répété, que les reſſources de la France

 "étaient

testimony of a friend of Louis XVI. be thought insufficient, we may produce the confession of the opposite party. On the 20th of October, 1791, nearly two months after the conference at Pillnitz, Brissot declared to the National Assembly, "I can "assure you, that there is no reason to be alarmed at the conduct of the Court of

"étaient immenses, ses frontières impénétrables, et "qu'il ne presserait jamais la déclaration d'une guerre, "qui dans son opinion pourrait avoir les suites les plus "désastreuses pour l'Empereur et pour l'empire. Telle "était aussi, je l'avouerai, l'avis de tous les Ministres "impériaux. Léopold espérait toujours terminer les "affaires de France par une négociation." This moderate conduct of the Emperor was so much the more commendable, as the King of Prussia was decidedly in favour of war: for M. de Bouillé, in relating the conference at Pillnitz (Mémoires, tom. ii. p. 134) says: "Les vues de l'Empereur étaient pacifiques. *Le "Roi de Prusse au contraire voulait absolument la "guerre.* Plusieurs circonstances de cette entrevue ne "me permettent pas de douter des dispositions dont "ces deux Souverains étaient animés. Elles m'ont "d'ailleurs été confirmées par des personnes qui jouissaient de leur confiance."

Austria.

Auſtria. Its ſovereign loves peace, and wiſhes "for peace.—All circumſtances unite to in-"duce Leopold to abſtain from diſplaying "the force of arms."(23) On the 29th of December, 1791, Briſſot ſaid again, "The "wavering meaſures of the Cabinet of Vi-"enna afford us no reaſon to apprehend a "war on the part of the Emperor. As "Prince, he wiſhes for peace, as head of "the German empire he gives himſelf the "*air* of wiſhing for war."(24) And this confeſſion was ſo much the more remarkable, as it was delivered in the very ſame ſpeech,

(23) "Je dois vous raſſurer ſur la conduite de la "Cour Autrichienne. Son chef aime la paix, veut la "paix.—Tout fait à Léopold la loi, de ne point dé-"ployer la force des armes." Moniteur, 22d Octo-ber, 1791.

(24) "Les oſcillations du Cabinet de Vienne ne "doivent pas nous faire redouter la guerre de la part "de l'Empereur. Comme Prince il veut la paix: "comme chef de l'empire Germannique il a *l'air* de "vouloir la guerre." Moniteur, 30th Dec. 1791.

in

in which Briffot recommended war, as a national benefit to France. (25) From the 29th of December, 1791, when the pacific defigns of Leopold were acknowledged in the National Affembly, till the time of his death, no circumftances occurred, which could excite a fufpicion of his having changed his political fyftem. On the contrary, all his meafures evinced a determined refolution to avoid hoftilities with France. At the requeft of the French Government, all military exercife and the affembling of troops was ftrictly forbidden to the emigrants on the borders of Germany: (26) and fo con-

(25) See Note 7.

(26) By defire of the Emperor, the Elector of Treves iffued an edict (printed in the Moniteur, 10th Jan. 1792), in which he engaged to fulfil the following articles:

1. De faire quitter l'Electorat dans huit jours d'ici, ou difperfer tous ceux qui portent la dénomination d'un corps militaire.

2. Toute efpece d'exercife militaire fera défendu itérativement, et ceux qui agiront contre l'ordonnance

feront

ciliatory was Leopold in his conduct toward the National Aſſembly, that when the Prince of Condé, with about eleven hundred emi-

ſeront tenus de quitter l'Electorat dans trois jours; et à cette fin on dénoncera les logemens.

3. Tous les recruteurs étrangers, à l'exception de ceux de ſa Majeſté l'Empereur ſeront arrêtés et condamnés, ſuivant une ordonnance emanée depuis deux mois, à la fortereſſe, et aux travaux publics pour deux ans.

In the other articles, it was ſtrictly forbidden to furniſh the emigrants with ammunition, horſes, waggons, or any thing which could aſſiſt them in military operations. And with regard to the Electorate of Mayence, the French Miniſter himſelf reſident at that Court, gave the following teſtimony in a note to his own Government, printed in the Moniteur, 2d Feb. 1792: "Que ni dans l'archévêché de Mayence, ni dans l'évêché de Worms, il ne s'était fait da raſſemblemens militaires." Further the Emperor himſelf, in his letter to the Elector of Treves (printed in the Moniteur, 24th Jan. 1792) ſaid, "He had given "orders, that in caſe, and *in that caſe only*, (dans ce "cas déterminé, et *dans aucun autre*, as expreſſed in "the Moniteur) that he ſhould be attacked by the "French without having given provocation by per- "mitting the emigrants to arm and aſſemble on his "territories,

grants, after having been ordered on the 2d of January, 1792, to depart from Worms, retreated to Ettenheim, he gave further orders to the Prince to depart likewise from that place. (27) In the Austrian Netherlands the number of troops did not exceed the usual peace establishment: and neither magazines were formed, nor any other measures taken, which indicated a preparation

" territories, (sans que nous y eussions donné lieu en " favorisant ou en tolérant des attroupemens ou des " préparatifs de guerre de la part des Français émigrés) " Austrian troops should be sent into the electorate." This order, which clearly evinced the resolution of the Emperor to act only on the defensive, was, with the usual French artifice, on the 20th of April, 1792, the day on which war was declared, converted into an act of hostility, by omitting all the words, which I have placed in parentheses, and thus metamorphosed was, for want of better reasons, alleged as one of the motives to a war with Austria. See the Moniteur, 21st April, 1791.

(27) Lally Tollendal Défense des Emigrés, tom. i. p. 196.

for

for war. (28) Yet at this very time, France itself made the most vigorous military exertions: for it appears by the official report of the War Minister to the National Assembly on the 12th of Jan. 1792, that there were already assembled on the borders, from Dunkirk to Besançon, two hundred and forty battalions, an hundred and sixty squadrons, and artillery sufficient for an army of two hundred thousand men. The War Minister further reported, that magazines, sufficient to supply two hundred and thirty thousand men, and twenty-two thousand horses, for six months, were already prepared, and that the most active measures were then taking for a further augmentation of them. (29)

(28) It is a well-known fact, that, when the French army invaded the Netherlands soon after the declaration of war against Austria, General Beaulieu, was so little prepared for their reception, that he was obliged to order post horses to expedite the transport of artillery.

(29) " Depuis Dunquerque jusqu' à Besançon l'ar-
" mée présente une masse de 240 bataillons, et 160
" escadrons

This extraordinary armament, and these vigorous preparations, could not have merely the French emigrants for their object, or be designed merely to protect the frontiers from an invasion on their part; for even if the emigrants had been permitted to form themselves into a military corps, which they really were not, still the whole number of those who had attached themselves, as well to the brothers of the King, as to the Prince of Condé, did not *at that time* exceed four thousand seven hundred.(30) Nor could the

" escadrons avec l'artillerie nécessaire pour 200 mille " hommes. Les magazins, tant en vivres qu'en fou- " rage, assurent la subsistance de 230 mille hommes. " et 22 mille chevaux, pendant six mois. On travaille " à la plus grande activité à les augmenter encore." Moniteur, 14th Jan. 1792.

(30) Lally Tollendal Défense des Emigrés, tom. i. p. 196, 197. It is true that at the latter end of July, when the Duke of Brunswick was at Coblentz, their number was thrice as great: but more than three months had then elapsed after the declaration of war.

armament

armament have been a mere *defenſive* meaſure againſt the Emperor, ſince Briſſot himſelf had acknowledged, only fourteen days before the War Miniſter made his report to the National Aſſembly, that the deſigns of Leopold were pacific. It was evidently, therefore, the intention of the National Aſſembly to act on the offenſive, which actual experience ſoon afterwards confirmed. (31)

(31) I ſhall not inveſtigate any farther the origin of the war between France and Auſtria, becauſe the preſent hiſtory is confined to the relations between France and Great Britain. Whoever wiſhes to examine the ſubject more fully, may conſult the correſpondence between the Courts of France and Auſtria, from Jan. 15th to April 7th, 1792, printed in Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1792, State Papers, p. 212—242: the counter declaration of the Auſtrian Court of the 4th of July, compared with the report delivered to the National Aſſembly on the 20th of April; Lally Tollendal, Défenſe des Emigrés Français, tom. i. p. 189—209; and the Collection des meilleurs ouvrages qui ont été publiés pour la défenſe de Lous XVI. tom. i. p. 307—313, 335—388. In this laſt place is printed a remarkable letter, written to Necker on the 8th of July,

But ſuppoſe, for the ſake of argument, that Auſtria would have attacked France, if France had not attacked Auſtria, it will ſtill remain an undeniable fact, that the National Aſſembly, or at leaſt a great majority of its members, were as deſirous of war as any Sovereign in Europe could be. The teſtimonies of its leading members, which

July, 1792, by Deleſſart, late Miniſter for Foreign Affairs, from his priſon at Orleans, in which he ſays: "Je commence à croire, que toutes les difficultés poſſible ſont épuiſées; la communication des pièces qui m'étaient néceſſaires va bientôt me mettre en état de travailler à ma défenſe. Mais je regretterai toute ma vie, qu'elle n'a pu paraître dans le moment actuelle; car elle ſera curieuſe, non pas pour ce qui ſera de moi, mais par la manifeſtation de ce qui s'eſt paſſé dans les cours étrangères; *par la démonſtration qu'on ne voulait point nous faire la guerre; par la preuve ſans réplique, que c'eſt nous, qui l'avons provoquée, qui l'avons commencée, qui avons mis l'Europe contre nous.*" This teſtimony is ſo much the more credible, as Deleſſart could have no view of deriving any advantage from it, ſince it was delivered in a private letter, to a man in a private ſtation, and then reſident out of France.

have

have been already quoted, remove the queſtion beyond all doubt. The ſame teſtimonies further prove, that the grand object of the National Aſſembly, in declaring war againſt Auſtria, was to effect the depoſition of the King, and the abolition of royalty in France. (32) But this grand object was not

(32) A ſecondary motive was the conqueſt of the Auſtrian Netherlands, where they had already a conſiderable party. It is true, that on the very day on which war was declared againſt Auſtria, they made the moſt poſitive declaration, " de n'entreprendre au- " cune guerre dans la vue de faire des conquêtes." Moniteur, 22d April, 1792. But at preſent we all know by experience, what conſtruction is to be put on French declarations. Mr. Becquet, however, ſaid very candidly, on the day on which war was declared: " Elle (l'Autriche) n'a pris, depuis que les négotia- " tions ſont entamées, que des meſures défenſives; " trois armées formidables bordaient vos frontières; " elle n'y a opposé qu'un nombre de troupes très-in- " férieur. Vous le ſavez, et ſans doute vous ne voulez " l'attaquer en ce moment, que parceque vous êtes " certains d'être plus préparés qu'elle dans vos me- " ſures." Moniteur, 22 Avril, 1792.

 yet

yet attained, when the mediation of Great Britain was requeſted: for Mr. Chauvelin's note was dated the 18th of June, and the King of France was not dethroned before the 10th of Auguſt. Conſequently, had it been in the power of the Britiſh Cabinet to have inſtantly produced a general peace, the National Aſſembly would in all probability have declared war a ſecond time: for if a general peace had taken place in June, 1792, and that peace had continued, the King of France would have preſerved both his life and his crown. But it is evident that the leaders of the National Aſſembly were reſolved to run all hazards, rather than not attain their favourite object. The danger from without gave them very little concern, provided they could continue, without interruption, their intrigues in the interior: and for this reaſon the march of the Pruſſian army made no alteration in the ſentiments which they entertained, when they declared

war

war againſt Auſtria. They knew, likewiſe, beforehand, that a declaration of war againſt Auſtria included a declaration of war againſt Pruſſia; for theſe two powers had, in February, 1792, concluded a defenſive treaty, by which it was ſtipulated, that in caſe either of the contracting parties ſhould be attacked, the other party ſhould immeditely ſend a ſuccour of fifteen thouſand infantry and five thouſand cavalry; and, if theſe ſhould be deemed inſufficient, augment their number according to the nature of the circumſtances. (33) All this was

(33) The genuine treaty, concluded between Auſtria and Pruſſia, in Feb. 1792, is printed in Martens' Recueil des Principaux Traités, tom. v. p. 77—81, and is merely defenſive, not offenſive, as ſome writers have aſſerted. The preliminaries are dated 7th of February, the ratification 19th of February: and this date proves the ſpuriouſneſs of the pretended offenſive treaty, which bears date the 18th of February, and is printed in the Moniteur, 13th April, 1792. Even the editor of the Moniteur did not venture to aſſert its authenticity, for he called it only " une pièce qui

known to the members of the National Aſſembly, before they decreed war againſt Auſtria: it cannot, therefore, be ſaid, that they were threatened in the month of June with a danger, which they did not apprehend in the month of April. And that during this interval they had not changed their ſentiments, is evident from all their ſpeeches: for whoever conſults the Moniteur,

"*paraît* authentique." And the National Aſſembly was fully perſuaded of its ſpurioufneſs, as appears from the circumſtance, that a whole week had elapſed after its appearance in the Moniteur, when the war againſt Auſtria was decreed, and yet it was not mentioned among the motives which were alledged in juſtification of the war, though the offenſive treaty, had it really exiſted, would have been the beſt vindication which the National Aſſembly could have produced. It muſt be referred, therefore, to the claſs of fabrications which the French rulers and their advocates have propagated with great induſtry and ſucceſs: and we may ſafely conclude, that it was inſerted in the Moniteur a week before the intended declaration of war, in order to prepare men's minds for the event.

teur, from the declaration of war against Austria to the proposal of a mediation, will find, that not a single expression escaped the leaders of the Assembly, which indicated a disposition to peace. The augmentation of the force with which they had to contend, diminished not in the least their ardour for hostilities: on the contrary, as Brissot himself said, "vast ideas, grand designs, and an "object sublime and difficult, were necessary to form men, and a great nation."(34) It was, in fact, their *own* desire "to break "with *all* the courts:" it was their own resolution "to set all Europe at defiance:" it was their own determination "to set the "four corners of Europe on fire." (35)

(34) "Pour former des hommes, une grande nation, il faut de vastes idées, de grands objets, un "but sublime et difficile." Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 76.

(35) See the 14th, 15th and 16th notes to this chapter.

These are the men for whom Great Britain was requested to procure the blessings of *peace*: these are the men, for whose sakes the British Government has been so severely reprehended for not attempting to confer a favour which the former were as unwilling to accept, (36) as the latter was unable to bestow. The advocates, therefore, of the

(36) Beside the motives already alledged, another reason would have induced the National Assembly, in the summer of 1792, to reject all offers of peace, namely, fear for their own personal safety. For Roland, the French Minister of the Interior, said at that time to a friend of Mr. Miles in France: "Peace is "out of the question: we have 300,000 men in arms; "we must make them march as far as their legs will "carry them, or they will return and cut our throats." See the Authentic Correspondence with Mr. Le Brun the French Minister, and others, to February, 1793, inclusive. London, 1796-8, p. 144, 2d. edition. The same reason, independent of schemes of ambition, prevents, likewise, the Directory from making a general peace: for the moment the French armies cease to be occupied with the plunder of foreign countries, they will demand, with arms in their hands, the promised thousand millions, and, as it will be impossible to

French, who represent them as "solicitous for peace," defend them on grounds which were openly and avowedly discarded by their clients themselves: and if Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 18th of June, be regarded as a request from the National Assembly, it will become a proof of the blackest hypocrisy.—Consequently, in whatever light we view the answer of the British Cabinet of the 8th of July, it is in every respect unexceptionable.

to pay them, will overturn the present Government. Unhappy Constitution, which requires for its support the wretchedness of all Europe!

CHAP. VIII.

Sensation produced in France by the sailing of five Ships of the Line and a few Frigates, from Portsmouth, to perform naval Evolutions in the Channel. Proposal made in the National Assembly of an immediate Armament of thirty Ships of the Line. Chauvelin's Letter to his own Government, containing positive Assurances, that the British Cabinet had no Views of Hostility. Resolution of the National Assembly, that Chauvelin's Letter was satisfactory, and that a naval Armament was unnecessary.

ON the 11th of July, 1792, a small fleet sailed from Portsmouth, under the command of Admiral Lord Hood, to perform naval evolutions in the channel.

The

The whole fleet conſiſted only of five ſhips of the line, beſide frigates and ſloops: it had only a fortnight's proviſion on board, and had manifeſtly no other deſtination, than a ſea-review, (1) which, being nothing new in England, ought no more to have excited alarm, than a land-review at Potſdam or Berlin. The matter, however, was ſo magnified in France, and was repreſented in ſo falſe a light, that on the 26th of July, an immediate armament of thirty ſhips of the line was propoſed in the National Aſſembly, and the Marine Committee was ordered to draw up a report on the ſubject, and preſent it within a few days. (2)

In the mean time, the following letter from Mr. Chauvelin to Mr. Chambonas,

(1) All theſe circumſtances are confirmed by Chauvelin's letter.

(2) See the Moniteur, 28th July, 1792.

dated

dated London, 17th July, 1792, was published: (3)

"You may have ſeen, Sir, from the pub-
"lic papers of this country, that a fleet,

(3) It was printed in the Moniteur, 29th July, 1792, and in the original is as follows:

"Londres, le 17 Juillet, 1792.

"Monſieur, vous avez pu voir, dans les papiers "publics de ce pays-ci, que depuis aſſez long-tems il "a été queſtion de l'eſcadre qui vient de ſortir du port "de Portſmouth. D'après tous les renſeignemens, "que je me ſuis empreſſé de prendre dès le premier "moment que j'en ai eu connaiſſance, j'ai partagé à "ce ſujet, et je partage encore la ſécurité de tous les "Anglais même les plus jaloux des opérations du Gou- "vernement. Tous ont penſé et penſent encore, que "cet armement n'a d'autre objet que de faire faire "quelques évolutions aux matelots Anglais, et de pré- "parer pour la Famille Royale, pour le mois prochain, "le ſpectacle d'une revue, qu'on peut regarder com- "me le pendant de celle du camp de Bagſhot. Auſſi, "Monſieur, le ſilence que j'ai gardé à cet égard, au- "ra-t-il ſans doute été pour vous une preuve du peu "d'importance qu'on doit attacher à cet armement, "et je n'aurais pas rompu ce ſilence ſans les alarmes "que m'ont témoignées quelques Français, qui re-

"cemment

"which has lately failed from Portfmouth,
"has been for fome time the topic of con-
"verfation. From all the information which
"I have endeavoured to procure, from the
"moment I had knowledge of it, I have par-
"taken, and ftill partake, on this fubject, of
"the fecurity of the Englifh, even of thofe
"who are the moft jealous of the opera-
"tions of Government. They have all been,

"cemment arrivés du Continent paraiffent avoir con-
"fervé *certaines fauffes idées fur les difpofitions du Gou-*
"*vernement Anglais.* Ce n'eft donc que pour raffurer
"ceux qui en France pourraient penfer comme eux,
"d'autant plus que dans de pareils cas les objets vus
"de loin groffiffent plutôt qu'ils ne diminuent, que
"je me fuis déterminé de vous rendre compte, Mon-
"fieur, de cet armement dont je vous envoie la lifte,
"et à vous affurer, que toutes les données que j'ai pu
"recueillir fe réuniffent à me convaincre, qu'il n'eft
"en aucune maniere relatif aux affaires, foit de la
"France en particulier, foit du Continent en général.

"Le Miniftre Plénipotentiaire de France.

"Signé, CHAUVELIN.

"Lifte des vaiffeaux fortis le 11 Juillet au matin du
"port

"and are ſtill of opinion, that the arma-
"ment has no other object, than to exerciſe
"the Engliſh ſailors in certain evolutions,
"and to prepare for the Royal Family, in the
"following month, the ſpectacle of a ſea-
"review, which may be conſidered as the
"counterpart of the camp at Bagſhot. The
"ſilence, therefore, which I have obſerved,
"Sir, on this ſubject, muſt prove to you
"my conviction, that the armament is of

"port de Portſmouth, pour croiſer dans la Manche,
"ſous le commandement de Lord Hood.

"Vaiſſeaux		Canons.
1.	Le Duc -	90
2.	L'Alfred - -	74
3.	Le Brunſwick	74
4.	L'Orion -	74
5.	L'Annibal	74
"Frégattes		
6.	L'Iphigénie -	32
etc.	etc.	etc.

"En commiſſion dans le port de Plymouth: 1 vaiſ-
"ſeau de 74, 1 de 24, 2 cutters de 16, 1 yacht de 10.

"L'eſcadre n'a des vivres à ſon bord que pour quinze
"jours."

"no

"no importance: and I ſhould not have "broken ſilence even now, without the "alarms ſignified to me by ſome French-"men lately arrived from the Continent, "who ſeem ſtill to entertain *certain falſe* "*notions on the diſpoſitions of the Engliſh Go-*"*vernment.* With a view, therefore, of re-"moving the apprehenſions of thoſe who "may be of the ſame opinion in France, eſ-"pecially as in ſimilar caſes objects ſeen at "a diſtance are magnified rather than dimi-"niſhed, I have determined, Sir, to give "you an account of the armament, of which "I ſend you a liſt, and to aſſure you, that "all the intelligence which I have been "able to collect, unites in convincing me, "that the armament has no relation what-"ſoever either to France in particular, or to "the Continent in general."

The Miniſter Plenipotentiary of France.

Signed, CHAUVELIN.

On

On the 4th of August, the day on which the Marine Committee had been ordered to make its report, Mr. Forfaix, the chairman of the Committee, read Mr. Chauvelin's letter before the National Assembly: and it was considered as so satisfactory, in regard to the sentiments of the British Cabinet, that the proposed armament was declared unnecessary. (4) We have the testimony, therefore, of the National Assembly itself, that the British Cabinet, as far as August, 1792, had no hostile views toward France.

(4) See Moniteur, 6th August, 1792.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Recall of the British Ambassador from Paris, after the King of France was dethroned. Examination of the Question, whether this Recall was a Breach of Neutrality toward France.

IT is well known, that on the 10th of August, 1792, the palace of the King of France was attacked by an armed populace, that his guards were murdered, and he himself obliged to seek refuge in the National Assembly, where he was at last doomed to hear the decree, by which he was deposed and sent prisoner to the Temple. Now, as according to the Constitution of 1791, which placed the legislative power in the

the National Aſſembly, but the executive in the hands of the King, the credentials of the Britiſh Ambaſſador in Paris ceaſed after this event to be valid, his further reſidence in that city was deemed unneceſſary. On the 17th of Auguſt, therefore, a letter of recall (1) was diſpatched by the Britiſh Government to Lord Gower, who communicated a tranſlation of it to Le Brun, the French Miniſter for Foreign Affairs, and member of the Council, to which the executive power was entruſted after the depoſition of the King. To this

(1) It is printed in Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1792, State Papers, p. 326. In this letter the following inſtructions were given to Lord Gower: "In all the "converſations, which you may have occaſion to hold "before your departure, you will take care to expreſs "yourſelf in a manner conformable to the ſentiments "herein communicated to you: and you will take "eſpecial care not to neglect any opportunity of de- "claring, that at the ſame time *his Majeſty means to* "*obſerve the principles of neutrality in every thing which* "*regards the arrangement of the internal Government* "*of France.*"

this letter the French Minifter returned an anfwer, in the name of the new republican Government of France, (2) expreffing the greateft fatisfaction at the friendly conduct of the Britifh Cabinet, and containing af-

(2) Le Brun's note to Lord Gower is printed in the Moniteur, 26th Auguft, 1792; and as it is a document of fome importance, it is neceffary to produce it at length in the original.

" Le fouffigné, Miniftre des affaires étrangères, s'eft " empreffé à communiquer, au Confeil Exécutif pro- " vifoire, la lettre dont fon excellence M. le Comte " de Gower, Ambaffadeur extraordinaire de S. M. " Britannique lui a fait part.

" Le Confeil a vu avec regret, que le Cabinet Bri- " tannique fe decidât à rappeler fon Ambaffadeur, dont " la préfence atteftait les difpofitions favorables d'une " nation libre et généreufe, et qui n'avait jamais été " l'organe que de paroles amicales, et de fentimens " de bienveillance. S'il eft quelque chofe qui puiffe " diminuer ce regret, c'eft le renouvellement de l'af- " furance de neutralité donnée par l'Angleterre à la " nation Françaife.

" Cette affurance paraît être le réfultat de l'intention " fagement refléchie et formellement exprimée par S. " M. Britannique, de ne point fe mêler de l'arrange-

surances, that the same justice and impartiality would be observed by the French Executive Council.

"ment intérieur des affaires de France. Une pareille "déclaration ne peut surprendre de la part d'un peuple "éclairé et fier, qui le premier a reconnu et établi le "principe de la souveraineté nationale; qui substituant l'empire de la loi, expression de la volonté de "tous, aux caprices arbitraires des volontés particulieres, le premier a donné l'exemple de soumettre les "rois eux-mêmes à ce joug salutaire, qui enfin n'a "pas cru acheter trop cher, par de longues convulsions et de violens orages, la liberté à laquelle il a "dû tant de gloire et de prospérité.

"Ce principe de souveraineté inalienable du peuple "va se manifester d'une maniere éclatante dans la "Convention Nationale, dont le corps législatif a décrété la convocation, et qui fixera sans doute tous "les partis et tous les intérêts. La nation Française "a lieu d'espérer, que le Cabinet Britannique, ne se "départira point, en ce moment décisif, *de la justice,* "*de la modération, et de l'impartialité, qu'il a montré* "*jusqu'à présent.*

"Dans cette confiance intime *fondée sur les faits,* "le soussigné renouvelle à son excellence M. le Comte "de Gower, au nom du Conseil Exécutif provisoire, "l'assurance qu'il a eu l'honneur de lui donner de vive

"voix,

But as the recall of Lord Gower has been ſince repreſented as a violation of that neutrality, which by the acknowledgment of Le Brun himſelf in the above mentioned anſwer, and afterwards by the acknowledgment even of the National Convention, (3) had been at leaſt till that time obſerved by the Britiſh Government, hiſtorical accuracy requires a full inveſtigation of the ſubject. To determine this queſtion, there is no ne-

" voix, que les relations de commerce entre les deux " nations, et toute les affaires en général ſeront ſuivies " de la part du Gouvernement Français avec la même " juſtice, et la même loyauté. Le Conſeil ſe flatte, " que la réciprocité ſera entiere de la part du Gou- " vernement Britannique, et qu'ainſi rien n'altérera " la bonne intelligence, qui régne entre les deux " peuples.

" Le Miniſtre des Affaires Etrangeres,

" LE BRUN."

(3) In the liſt of grievances alledged againſt the Britiſh Government, at the time of the declaration of war, there is none prior to the recall of Lord Gower. See Moniteur, 3d Feb. 1793.

 ceſſit

cessity for previously inquiring, whether the mere *Legislative* Assembly of France had a right to annihilate the Constitution of 1791, in which a decree of the Constituent Assembly had forbidden the Legislative Assembly to make the least alteration, which had been accepted by the King as well as by the people, and to which the Legislative Assembly itself had thrice sworn allegiance, first at its meeting on the 3d of October, 1791; secondly, on the 7th of July, 1792, in its public hall; and lastly, before the altar of freedom, on the 14th of July, only three weeks before the resolution was formed to overturn it. There is no necessity for inquiring, whether, after the disapprobation expressed by seventy-one out of the eighty-three departments at the events of the 20th of June, (4) the Legislative Assembly had a

(4) Les réclamations contre la journée du 20 Juin " furent générales dans tout l'empire; sur 83 départe- " ments soixante et onze écrivirent à la Législature, " pour

right to deprive the King of his authority, though he committed none of the three miſdemeanors, (5) which alone, by the conſtitution of 1791, warranted his depoſition. Theſe are queſtions which belong to other courts of inquiry, and we have at preſent only to conſider the reſult of the fact itſelf, whether the injuſtice which occaſioned it be admitted or not. (6)

"pour demander la punition des ſéditieux, qui avaient "offensé la loi ſi ſcandaleuſement." Coll. de meilleurs ouvrages pour la défenſe de Louis XVI. tom. i. p. 208. Likewiſe Briſſot ſays: "Les révolutions répondait-on, "ne ſe font qu'avec les minorités. *C'eſt la minorité qui* "*a fait la révolution Françaiſe.*" A ſes Commettans, p. 87.

(5) Namely, the refuſal to take the oath required by the conſtitution, the placing himſelf at the head of a foreign army deſtined to act againſt France, or his quitting the kingdom. See ch. ii. ſect. 1. art. 5, 6, 7, of the conſtitution of 1791.

(6) However, I cannot avoid quoting a remarkable confeſſion made by the celebrated legiſlator Condorcet, who, in his ſpeech of the 20th of April, 1792, ſaid:

An immediate and unavoidable conſequence of the revolution of the 10th of Auguſt, was a ſuſpenſion of the diplomatic relations between the Britiſh Ambaſſador in Paris and the French Government; for, ſince his letters of credence had been made out to Louis XVI. as to the perſon inveſted with the executive power of France, they of courſe ceaſed to be of any value, after the King was depoſed, and his authority tranſferred to a proviſional Executive Council. (7)

ſaid: "La Nation Françaiſe a une Conſtitution; cette "Conſtitution a été reconnue, adoptée par la généra- "lité des citoyens: *elle ne peut être changée que par le* "*vœu du peuple, et ſuivant les formes* qu'elle-même a "preſcrites." Moniteur, 22 Avril, 1792.

(7) This was mentioned in the letter to Lord Gower, of which a tranſlation was communicated to the French Miniſter, for it is there ſaid: "As it ap- "pears, that in the preſent ſtate of affairs the exerciſe "of the executive power has been withdrawn from his "Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, the credentials which have "hitherto been made uſe of by your Excellency can "no longer be valid."

There

There were only three poſſible modes, therefore, which could be adopted by the Britiſh Government: either to let Lord Gower continue in Paris in a private capacity, or to renew his diplomatic relations by freſh letters of credence, or to recall him. But it would have rendered no ſervice either to France in general, or to the National Aſſembly in particular, to have ſuffered a perſon who, by the revolution of the 10th of Auguſt, was reduced to a private ſtation, to continue his reſidence in that country. On the contrary, it would in all probability have produced rather diſcontent than ſatisfaction: for, though he was become a private perſon, and muſt remain as ſuch till he had received new credentials, yet his former diplomatic relations would not have been forgotten, and his preſence would have ſo frequently reminded the new executive power of the difference between his former and his preſent character, that it would have gradually be-

come a subject of complaint. With regard to the second mode, there were likewise very weighty reasons which dissuaded the British Government from adopting it. For had new letters of credence been sent to Lord Gower, he must have been accredited either to the Executive Council or to the National Assembly. But the very title of the Executive Council, Conseil Exécutif *provisoire*, (8) clearly indicated, that its institution was merely temporary. Consequently letters of credence, addressed to the Executive Council, could likewise have been only temporary; and it might be expected, that in a very short time fresh credentials would be required for some other council or committee. Still less could a British Am-

(8) Le Brun himself, in his note to Lord Gower, used this title. Likewise, in the 4th article of the decree which passed in the night of the 10th of August, was said: "Les Ministres actuellement en activité "continueront *provisoirement* l'exercise de leurs fonc-"tions" Moniteur, 12th August, 1792.

bassador

baſſador be accredited to the National Aſſembly; for this very Aſſembly had, in the night of the 10th of Auguſt, pronounced its own diſſolution, and ordered the election of a National Convention. (9) Further, it was declared in the ſame decree, that the King was only *proviſionally* ſuſpended from his functions. (10) All authorities, therefore, in France were at that time merely tranſient; and, conſequently, the moſt prudent part which England could take, was to wait at leaſt till the new conſtitution had been determined by the National Convention, for

(9) The firſt article of the decree of the 10th of Auguſt is: "Le peuple Français eſt invité à former "une Convention Nationale." Ib.

(10) The ſecond article is: "Le chef du Pouvoir "Exécutif eſt *proviſoirement* ſuſpendu de ſes fonc- "tions, juſqu' à ce que la Convention Nationale ait "prononcé ſur les meſures, qu'elle croira devoir adop- "ter pour aſſurer la ſouveraineté du peuple, et le "régne de la liberté et de l'égalité."

which

which purpoſe it was ordered to aſſemble. This was certainly no breach of neutrality, eſpecially as in the letter by which the Britiſh Ambaſſador was recalled, the moſt ſolemn declaration was made, that it was not the intention of the Britiſh Government to interfere in the arrangement of the internal affairs of France. Beſides, when it is the intention of a Court to abandon its ſyſtem of neutrality, its Ambaſſador uſually quits the country againſt which hoſtilities are intended, without taking leave of the Government. But this did not happen in the preſent inſtance, for Lord Gower communicated his letter of recall even to the *new* Government of France: nor did Le Brun, in his anſwer, expreſs the leaſt ſuſpicion, that it was the deſign of the Britiſh Cabinet to violate the neutrality toward France. On the contrary, he declared, not only that the French Nation confided in " the juſtice, the moderation, and the impartiality of the Britiſh

tiſh Cabinet," but likewiſe, that "this con-"fidence was *founded on facts*:" (11) and in his report on the ſituation of France in reſpect to the different powers of Europe, delivered to the National Aſſembly on the 23d of Auguſt, he aſſerted, that on the ſubject of neutrality the Britiſh Ambaſſador "had left *a ſatisfactory teſtimony of the ſentiments of his Court.*" (12) Indeed the whole conduct of the Britiſh Government afforded ample proof, that it was not its intention to ſeek a quarrel with France: for had it really entertained any ſuch deſign, it would not have neglected the moſt favourable oppor-

(11) Dans cette confiance intime *fondée ſur les faits*, etc. See Note 2.

(12) "Il reſte à parler de l'Angleterre et de la "Hollande: ces deux puiſſances annoncent toujours "le déſir de reſter dans les termes de ſtricte neutralité. "L'Ambaſſadeur Britannique, en s'éloignant momen-"tanément de la France, nous laiſſe à cet égard *un* "*témoignage ſatisfaiſant des ſentimens de ſa Cour.*" Moniteur, 25 Août, 1792.

tunity that ever offered of humbling its rival, the month of August, 1792. A glorious peace with Tippoo Saib, which was already known in Europe, afforded full scope to the operation of the British arms: France stood unsupported by a single ally, like England at the commencement of the American war: yet, though France had taken ungenerous advantage of the one period, England refused even to retaliate at the other, notwithstanding the repeated solicitations of the Confederate Powers. (13) Nay, so favourable was the conduct of Great Britain toward France, that the free ex-

(13) We have already seen that the British Government was solicited, in 1791, to join a coalition against France, and that the proposal was rejected. That it was again invited by various powers in the summer of 1792, and with the same success, appears from the speech of Mr. Dundas in the House of Commons, on the 14th of December, 1792. See likewise Mr. Miles's Letter to Le Brun, the French Minister, dated 18th December, 1792, in the Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 75.

portation

portation of arms and provisions was still permitted, and ceased not till the decree of the 19th of November, with its concomitant circumstances, had placed beyond a doubt the hostile disposition of France.

How then can any man with justice assert, that the British Government was guilty of a breach of neutrality toward France in August, 1792? The mere recall of an ambassador from a foreign court, if attended with no indications of hostility, cannot possibly be construed into a breach of peace. Almost all the other ambassadors left Paris about the same time with Lord Gower: even the Danish Ambassador, Baron Blohm, received letters of recall; and the only reason why he did not leave Paris was, that he was too ill at that time to undertake a long journey. No one has ever reproached the Danish Court with having violated, by the

command

command ſent to the Daniſh Ambaſſador, its neutrality toward France. Why then ſhall the Engliſh Government be accuſed for ſending a ſimilar command? An appeal has indeed been made to the ſecond article of the treaty of commerce between France and England: but the proof which has been founded on this article reſts on a falſe interpretation of it. For by this article was ſtipulated, not that the mere recall of an Ambaſſador, either from Paris or from London, ſhould be regarded as a breach of peace, but ſimply, that in caſe the two powers ſhould happen to be at variance, and a rupture ſhould be likely to enſue, hoſtilities ſhould not be conſidered as actually commenced, till the Ambaſſadors of both powers were either recalled or diſmiſſed. (14) Now the

(14) "Si quelque jour il ſurvient quelque mauvaiſe "intelligence, interruption d'amitié ou rupture entre "les couronnes de leurs Majeſtés, ce qu' à Dieu ne "plaiſe,

caſe aſſumed in this article did not take place in Auguſt 1792, and conſequently the article itſelf is not applicable to the recall of Lord Gower. Beſides, the French Miniſter in London was ſtill permitted to remain there; for he continued in England not leſs than five months after the period in queſtion, and even communicated with the Britiſh Miniſtry, though his communications, for obvious reaſons, could not be conſidered as ſtrictly official. (15)

" plaiſe, (laquelle rupture ne ſera censée exiſter que lors " du rappel ou du renvoi des ambaſſadeurs et miniſtres " reſpectifs), etc." Martens' Recueil des Principaux Traités, tom. ii. p. 681.

(15) It is likewiſe to be obſerved, that the whole of the Britiſh embaſſy did not leave Paris with Lord Gower: for Mr. Lindſay, the Secretary of Legation, ſtaid behind, and would probably have continued his reſidence there, if the murder of two Britiſh ſubjects, under the pretext of their being ariſtocrats, and the butcheries of the 2d of September, had not excited apprehenſions for his perſonal ſafety.

But

But it is ſaid, if the French nation thought proper to eſtabliſh a republic, what neceſſity had the Britiſh Government to trouble itſelf about the forms of a letter of credence? An Ambaſſador might have been accredited to the nation at large, without regard to the perſons who, in Auguſt 1792, conducted its affairs!—But in the firſt place we muſt aſk what is meant by an Ambaſſador's being accredited to the nation at large. No Ambaſſador can negotiate with the whole body of the people; his conferences muſt be confined to the perſons who are in actual poſſeſſion of the executive authority. Theſe perſons may indeed aſſert that they act in the name of the whole nation: and in a republic, in which order and durability of government is to be found, the actual rulers may aſſert it without contradiction. But in 1792 and 1793 the adminiſtration of public affairs in France was highly defective, as well in order as in durability: one party rapidly ſucceeded

ceeded another, and each party pretended, while in power, to act in the name of the nation, but was branded, when fallen, with the appellation of a faction. By what criterion then was the British Government to determine, to which of the parties the honourable title of nation, and to which the disgraceful name of faction was due? Had the Girondists been asked, they would have answered, *we* represent the nation: and the very same answer would have been given by the Anarchists, who considered *themselves* as the nation, and the Girondists as a faction. (16) In this situation the British Govern-

(16) The public administration of affairs at that time is represented by Brissot in his work, à ses Commettans, in very striking colours: The following passages may serve as examples:—P. 2. Des loix sans exécution, des autorités constituées, sans force et avilies, le crime impuni, les propriétés attaquées, la sureté des individus violée, la morale du peuple corrompue, *ni constitution, ni gouvernement, ni justice*—P. 33. Maintenant je le demande à tout homme de bonne foi: où donc est maintenant la puissance suprême?

ment could not treat with the party which was in power, and which called itſelf the

Eſt-ce dans la Convention, ou dans le Tribunal révolutionnaire? Eſt-ce dans ce Tribunal, ou dans Marat? Eſt-ce dans Marat, ou dans les factieux, qui le protègent?—P. 37. Ce n'eſt pas encore dans la commune de Paris que réſide l'exercice de la ſouveraineté nationale, c'eſt dans un club, ou plutôt dans une vingtaine de brigands, qui dirigent ce club, qui font courber devant eux toutes les autorités conſtituées par la nation.—P. 39. Je le demande à tout homme, qui a étudié les baſes des républiques, peut-il exiſter à côté d'un foyer auſſi actif de conſpirations, qui communique à ceux de la municipalité, des ſections et des autres clubs de l'empire; peut-il exiſter une convention libre et indépendante, un gouvernement, une juſtice?—P. 41. Tous les pouvoirs ſont néceſſairement au club; voilà le corps légiſlatif, ou plutôt voilà le corps au deſſus de la loi, au deſſus de toutes les autorités conſtituées, voilà le ſouverain de la France entiere. J'ai fait voir que le club des Anarchiſtes était le ſouverain de la Convention; il eſt encore des Miniſtres *depuis le* 10 *Août*.—P. 46. Je reviens aux Miniſtres qui, puiſqu'il faut enfin trancher le mot, *ont été et ſont plutôt les miniſtres des Jacobins de Paris, que ceux de la nation.* It is true that the deſcription which Briſſot here gives of France applies immediately to the ſpring of 1793: but

nation, without incurring the danger of being accufed by the fucceeding ruling party of having treated with factionifts. The new party might have even afferted that Great Britain intermeddled in the internal affairs of France: (17) and, according to the doctrine of the National Affembly itfelf, this was one of the greateft offences which one nation could commit toward another.

Befides, all diplomatic connexions with fo fluctuating an adminiftration appeared to be ufelefs: a treaty made with one party might

but it is equally applicable to the latter h lf of 1792, and one paffage in particular is exprefsly dated from the 10th of Auguft.

(17) For this reafon, in the Letter to Lord Gower, immediately after the paffage quoted above in Note 7, was added: "His Majefty is therefore of opinion "that you ought not to remain any longer in Paris, as "well on this account, as, becaufe, this ftep appears "to him the moft comformable to the principles of "neutrality, which he has hitherto obferved."

 have

have been regarded as not valid by the other: and therefore Great Britain could not expect, under such circumstances, that any convention with France would have a lasting effect. (18) Nor was it certain, in August 1792, that the King of France would not be re-instated: for no one expected, after the celebrated declaration at Coblentz, of the 25th of July, that the close of the Prussian campaign would so ill correspond to the commencement of it. And if Louis XVI. had been restored to his former authority, the British Government, by a connexion with either of the republican parties in France,

(18) Brissot, in the above quoted work, p. 103, says: "Les puissances étrangères, qui voudraient "traiter avec nous, dans l'état où nous sommes, pour-"raient-elles concevoir un espoir semblable? Non, "elles se disent: la France est divisée par des fac-"tions; l'une triomphe aujourd'hui, demain ce sera "l'autre. Traitez avec l'une, l'autre casse le traité. "Rien n'est stable; attendons cette stabilité, et nous "traiterons." And p. 112, he says, "*On ne traite "point avec l'anarchie.*"

would

would have materially injured its own interests in regard both to the King and to the allied powers, which no one had a right to expect, ſince there is a duty which we owe to ourſelves as well as to our neighbours. But even if this duty be ſet aſide, and even if no attention was due to the poſſibility of a revolution in favour of the depoſed King, at leaſt regard was to be had to another revolution, which was expected by the republicans themſelves: for Briſſot, in his Addreſs to the republicans of France, which is dated October, 1792, declared, that as the firſt revolution deſtroyed deſpotiſm, and the ſecond overturned royalty, a third was neceſſary to put an end to anarchy. (19) Conſequently the moſt prudent conduct which Great Britain could obſerve was to continue

(19) His own words are: "J'ai toujours penſé "qu'il nous fallait trois révolutions: la premiere a "renverſé le deſpotiſme, la ſeconde la royauté, la troiſieme détruira l'anarchie."

 neutral

neutral toward all parties, (20) and not to renew the diplomatic connexions with France, which the revolution of the 10th of Auguſt had interrupted, till a ſtable government, or a ſettled conſtitution, whether monarchical or republican, was fully eſtabliſhed. But the new conſtitution, which it was the buſineſs of the National Convention to determine, and then preſent to the Primary Aſſemblies for their approbation, was not even drawn up before February, (21)

(20) See Note 17.

(21) It was firſt preſented to the Convention on the 15th of February, 1793, by Condorcet, in the name of the Conſtitutional Committee. See the Moniteur, 17th and 18th Feb. 1793. But though preſented, it was not adopted by the Convention: for that which is called the conſtitution of 1793, and was really adopted, was drawn up much later in that year. And even this conſtitution was not only ſuſpended within a ſhort time after its adoption, but is conſidered by the preſent rulers of France as ſo defective, that on the 16th of April, 1796, a law was made, which condemned to *death* all perſons who, by their *writings* or *ſpeeches*, ſhould

1793: and after that period, the residence of a British Ambassador in Paris was no longer a question, since, on the first of that month, the Convention had already declared war against Great Britain.

Lastly, the personal safety of the British Ambassador in Paris was not unworthy of consideration. But in a city, in which the

should attempt to re-establish it: for on that day the following law, proposed by Treillard, was unanimously decreed by the Council of Five Hundred, and immediately ratified by the Council of Elders: "Sont coupables de crime contre la fureté intérieure de la république et contre la fureté individuelle des citoyens, et feront punis de la *peine de mort*, conformément à l'article 612 du code des délits et des peines, tous ceux qui par *leurs discours, ou par leurs écrits, soit imprimés soit distribués, soit affichés,* provoquent la dissolution de la représentation nationale ou celle du directoire exécutif, ou le meurtre de tous ou aucuns des members qui le composent, ou le rétablissement de la royauté, *ou celui de la constitution de* 1793, &c." Moniteur, 20 Avril, 1796.

licentiousness of a blood-thirsty populace either was not, or could not be restrained within due bounds, in a city where the most horrid murders were committed without regard either to age or character, and where even British subjects had fallen a prey to the fury of a Parisian mob, no British Ambassador could have remained with safety. On *this* ground, therefore, as well as on the preceding, his departure from Paris was the most adviseable step which, under those circumstances, could have been taken.

From the present period to the middle of November, no events took place which belong to an history of the relations between Great Britain and France. During this interval, which comprised about three months, the former remained a quiet spectator of all that passed on the Continent: and the latter was too much engaged with Austria and

Pruſſia to pay much attention to Great Britain. (22) But in the middle of November the ſcene changed, and at that time, as will appear from the following chapter, was laid the foundation of the war, which ſtill ſubſiſts between the two countries.

(22) I deſignedly ſay "*much* attention," becauſe even before the end of September, France began the augmentation of its marine.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

French Conquests in Germany, the Netherlands, and Savoy. A French Fleet in the Mediterranean harasses the Coasts of several Italian States. Other naval Armaments in France. Opening of the Scheldt. Decree of the 19th of November, by which Assistance was promised to all Nations, that were willing to take up Arms against their Governments. Deputies from certain British Societies appear at the Bar of the French National Convention, and signify their Intention of establishing a National Convention in Great Britain. Encouragement thereto on

on the Part of the French Convention. Measures taken in Consequence, and Commotions in Great Britain.

TOWARD the middle of November, 1792, the arms of France were victorious in every quarter. The decifive battle of Gemappe, which was fought on the 6th of this month, had rendered the French abfolute mafters of the Auftrian Netherlands: and General Cuftine was not only in poffeffion of Mentz and Francfort, (1) but was making vigorous preparations to penetrate ftill further into Germany. (2) The dutchy of Savoy had been already conquered, and, before the expiration of the month,

(1) It was not before the 2d of December, that Francfort was re-captured.

(2) All thefe facts are fo well known, that it would be fuperfluous to quote authority for them.

it was formally incorporated into France. (3) At the same time the Toulon fleet, under the orders of Admiral Truguet harassed both the coast of Piedmont, and that of other Italian states. Nor was this fleet, which consisted of fifteen sail of the line, (4) the only naval armament, which France had fitted out at this period: for it appears from the report delivered to the National Convention by the Marine Minister, Monge, on the

(3) " Gregoire lit un projet de décret sur l'incorpo-" ration de la Savoie. La question est mise aux voix " par assis et levé. *Un seul membre se leve contre.*" Moniteur, 28 Novembre, 1792. The circumstance that there was only one dissenting voice on this question, is so much the more remarkable, as the incorporation of Savoy was in direct contradiction to the solemn pledge, repeatedly given by the French rulers, " that they renounced all conquest and aggrandize-" ment."

(4) Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 42. N. B. Whenever I quote this Work, I mean the original Paris edition.

23d of September, 1792, that even then not leſs than *twenty-one ſhips of the line, thirty frigates, ten ſhips armed en flute, and forty-two ſmaller ſhips of war* were actually at ſea. (5) It appears further from the ſame report, that, *thirty-four ſhips of the line*, in addition to the preceding, were in a ſtate to be inſtantly commiſſioned, that nineteen more were capable of being refitted, that ſeven were building, of which three were ready to be launched, and that out of one and forty frigates, twenty-three were in ſuch a ſtate of forwardneſs, that they were capable of being put in immediate commiſſion, beſide ſix

(5) Séance du 28 Septembre " M. Monge fait un rapport ſur le département de la marine. Il en réſulte que la république *fait flotter ſur mer* 102 pavillons tricolors; ſavoir 21 gros vaiſſeaux, 30 frégattes, 18 corvettes, 24 aviſos, 10 fluttes ou gabarres; que 34 autres vaiſſeaux de ligne ſont prêts à être armés, 19 ſuſceptible de radoubement, 7 ſont en conſtruction, dont 3 prêts à être mis en mer, que ſur 41 frégattes, 23 ſont en état d'être armés ſur le champ, outre 6 qui ſont ſur les chantiers." Moniteur, 25 Septembre, 1792.

which were on the ſtocks. Such was the naval armament, and ſuch were the preparations, which were made in France, for a ſtill further augmentation of it, at a time when Great Britain had only ſixteen thouſand ſailors and marines in pay, which were hardly ſufficient to man even twelve ſhips of the line, with the proportionate number of frigates, ſloops, and cutters.

The rapid progreſs of the French arms, and the vigorous preparations which were making for new conqueſts, unavoidably excited the attention of the Britiſh Government. The plan of ſubjugation and aggrandizement, which had hitherto lain concealed in embryo, began now to unfold itſelf; and the ſyſtem which the French rulers have ſince followed with ſo much ſucceſs, became viſible to the eye of the ſagacious obſerver. By the incorporation of Savoy they had trodden under foot the principle

ciple on which, they had ſolemnly pledged themſelves to found the new fabric of French politicks: and it was now become evident, that the promiſed renunciation of conqueſt and aggrandizement was nothing more than a maſk, under which they endeavoured to cover their real deſigns. In the Netherlands, however, they thought it prudent not to lay aſide the maſk at once, as they did in Savoy: they declared the Belgians a free and independent people, and expreſſed only a deſire of affording them the protection of a friendly neighbour. But the Belgians poſſeſſed too ſmall and too open a country to be able, in the neighbourhood of France, to form a perfectly independent ſtate: and it was certain that their new protectors would at the ſame time, exerciſe the power of governors. In reſpect to England, therefore, it was a matter of indifference, whether Belgia bore the title of an independent ſtate, or that of a French department, ſince in the

former,

former, as well as in the latter case, the coast of Flanders, like the coast of France itself, must necessarily become an hostile coast to England. The declaration, however, of Belgia's independence, was nothing more than a prelude to its union with France, and the only reason why its incorporation did not immediately follow that of Savoy, was the necessity of deceiving the *people*, though not the Government of Great Britain: for the war against Great Britain had been declared only two days, when the Commissioners of the French Convention assembled at Brussels, decided that Belgia should be incorporated with France. (6)

(6) The documents relative to this subject are printed in Chauffard Mémoires Historiques et Politiques sur la Révolution de la Belgique et du pays de Liege. (Paris, 1793. 8. p. 78—85) Chauffard's own vote was delivered in the following words: "Je vote la réunion de "la Belgique à la France.—On m'oppose le vœu du "peuple; *le vœu d'un peuple enfant ou imbecille serait* "*nul*, parceque qu'il stipulerait contre lui-même." The

vote

Ten days after the battle of Gemappe had put the Auſtrian Netherlands in the poſ-ſeſſion of the French, the Executive Coun-

vote of Chepy is likewiſe worthy of notice: "Je vote "pour que la réunion de la Belgique à la république "Françaiſe ſoit operée par la puiſſance de la raiſon, "par les touchantes inſinuations de la philanthropie, "de la fraternité, et *par tous les moyens* de tactique "révolutionnaire; et au cas que nos efforts ſoient in-"fructueux, et que l'on continue à nous oppoſer le "ſyſtême déſeſpérant de la force d'inertie, j'eſtime "que *le droit de conquête, devenu pour la premiere fois* "*utile au monde et juſte*, doit faire l'éducation poli-"tique du peuple Belge et le préparer à de brillantes "et heureuſes deſtinées." Further, that notwith-ſtanding the all-promiſing manifeſto, with which the entry of the French army into Belgia was accompa-nied, it was by no means the intention of the French Government to eſtabliſh an independent republic there, appears from the following confeſſion of Ge-neral Dumouriez: "L'intention *ſecréte* à Paris n'était "point que le peuple Liegois, et encore moins celui "de la Belgique ſe réunit en corps de nation pour ſe "donner une conſtitution et des loix; on craignait "qu'une fois aſſemblés, ces deux peuples ne connuſ-"ſent leurs forces et ne fondaſſent une république "indépendante." Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 348.

cil refolved, that the Scheldt, in which the Dutch, by virtue of various treaties, poffeffed the exclufive right of entering with fhips of a certain burden, and efpecially fhips of war, fhould be opened. (7) It would be ufelefs to examine whether thefe treaties, as the Executive Council afferted, were contrary to the law of nature or not. (8) It is

((7) This refolution was made by the Executive Council on the 16th of November, 1792, and on the 21ft was prefented to the National Convention, which received it with great applaufe. See Moniteur, 22d November, 1792.

(8) The Executive Council adopted, as the bafis of the refolution, the following principle: "that rivers "are the common and inalienable property of *all* thofe "nations, through whofe territories they flow." Now, the Scheldt, from only a league below Fort Lillo, to the mouth of it, flowed through Dutch territory, for on the north fide lay the province of Zealand, and on the fouth fide Dutch Flanders: and every nation confiders itfelf as poffeffing the right to exercife fovereignty over a river as far as its own territory extends. The French themfelves, at leaft, would certainly not fuffer

ſufficient that ſuch treaties exiſted: France itſelf had guaranteed them, (9) in conjunction with other powers; and they could not be violated without deſtroying that law of nations, which, from the time of the general treaty of Weſtphalia, had united the European ſtates into a kind of great republic.

In declaring that the Dutch ſhould no longer exerciſe their accuſtomed ſovereignty

ſuffer any nation to deprive them of this right in regard to their *own* rivers: and if, in the year 1792, the inhabitants of Geneva, or of the country of Valais had applied to the Rhone the principle, which the Executive Council applied to the Scheldt, and had ſaid: "the Rhone flows through our territory, conſe-" quently we have as good a right as you to the free "navigation of it from Lyons to the Mediterranean," the inference would certainly have been rejected as devoid of foundation.

(9) See the ſecond article of the treaty of 1785, between France and Holland, in Martens' Recueil des Principaux Traités, tom. ii. p. 614.

over the Scheldt, the French Government had two objects in view, an immediate and a distant one. The immediate object was to send French ships of war into the Scheldt, to bombard the citadel of Antwerp; and this object was very soon attained: for, on the first of December, 1792, a French frigate, a brig, two gun-vessels, and three other armed vessels from Dunkirk, entered the Scheldt, in defiance of the solemn protestation of the States General. (10) The dis-

(10) In a note delivered by the States General to the Imperial Ambassador at the Hague, was contained the following passage: "Que L. H. P. ont prié S. A. "le Prince d'Orange, etc. d'ordonner à l'officier qui "commande le vaisseau de garde, stationné a l'em-"bouchure de l'Escaut, de ne pas accorder le passage, "mais d'informer le commandant Français, qu'en "vertu de traités la riviere d'Escaut est close pour les "vaisseaux de guerre." Moniteur, 16 Dec. 1792. And immediately in the same article is added: "On "apprend que, ce nonobstant, une frégatte Française, "l'Ariel, un bricq, deux chaloupes cannonieres, et "trois

tant, but main object, was to convert the mouth of the Scheldt into a ſtation for French ſhips of war, in order to acquire a naval advantage in the North Sea, which France had hitherto not poſſeſſed. This deſign did not eſcape the notice of the Britiſh Miniſters: and it could not be a matter of indifference to them, whether France, which at that time had no harbour on the northern coaſt in which ſhips of the line could enter, acquired this advantage or not, becauſe it expoſed not only the Britiſh commerce, but the eaſtern coaſt of Britain itſelf to a new and very material danger.

By another reſolution of the Executive Council, likewiſe of the 16th of November, the Commander in Chief of the French army in the Netherlands was ordered to attack the Auſtrians, even on the Dutch territory, in

" trois barques de pêcheur Dunquerquoiſes armées, " ont remonté l'Eſcaut le 1er. de ce mois."

case they retreated thither. (11) It is unnecessary at present to examine, whether, according to the usual practice of war, it is allowable in any instance to attack an enemy on neutral ground: for whether it be allowable or not, the haste with which this resolution was made shews, that the Executive Council regarded the neutrality of Holland as a matter of absolute indifference. They would otherwise have made previous representations to the States General, they would

(11) "Extrait du Registre des Délibérations du Conseil Exécutif Provisoire. Du 16 Novembre, 1792, l'an premier de la République.

"Le Conseil Exécutif Provisoire, délibérant sur l'état actuel de la guerre, notamment dans la Belgique—arrête, qu'en conséquence de la délibération du 24 Octobre dernier, il sera donné ordre au Général commandant en chef l'expédition de la Belgique, de continuer *à* poursuivre les ennemis *même sur le territoire Hollandois*, dans le cas où ils s'y seraient rétirés."

Correspondance du Général Dumouriez avec Pache. (Paris, 1793-8.) p. 71.

have

have waited till the Auſtrian army had been permitted to take refuge on the Dutch territory, and they would not have made the reſolution at a time when the Auſtrians were retreating to Liege, and every movement indicated that it was not their deſign to enter Holland.

But all the meaſures which the French Government had hitherto taken, though they neceſſarily excited uneaſineſs in the Britiſh Cabinet, were trifles, in compariſon of other meaſures, which were adopted in the ſame month; for at this very time was formed the determination to overturn the Britiſh Government and the Britiſh Conſtitution. By the correſpondence of the Jacobin Club with various ſocieties, the ſeeds of diſcord and ſedition had been already ſown in great abundance: and the principle adopted by the French rulers, "that the

governed must be excited to rebel against their governors," (12) had been already applied in England with great industry and success. For, in the first place, on account of the political liberty which existed in England, it was easier to set the people in commotion, than the people of any other state in Europe: (13) and in the next place, no

(12) " Que pensaient les hommes éclairés, républicains avant le 10 Août, les hommes qui voulaient " la liberté, non seulement pour leur pays, mais pour " toute l'Europe ? Ils croyaient qu'on pouvait l'établir " par-tout *en soulevant les administrés contre les administrans, en faisans voir aux peuples la facilité et les " avantages de ces soulevemens.*" Brissot à se Commettans, p. 81.

(13) So early as the 5th of January, 1792, Isnard had said: " Voici l'instant qui peut-être doit décider " à jamais des despotes et des nations ; c'est vous que " le ciel reservait à ces grands évenemens : élevez-" vous au niveau de vos destinées :" and a few lines after, " Est-il bien vrai qu'un langage national ne se-" rait entendu dans aucune contrée ? Ah ! sans doute

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object appeared ſo deſirable to the French as the utter deſtruction of their ancient and formidable rival, which the excitement of a civil war afforded both the eaſieſt and the ſureſt means of attaining. During a conſiderable time their operations were carried on in the dark : but as ſoon as they became all-potent conquerors, and the National Convention had acquired ſufficient power to act an open part, it was no longer thought neceſſary to make a ſecret of their deſigns. The deciſive battle of Gemappe, and the conqueſt of the Auſtrian Netherlands, preſented the moſt favourable opportunity for a public declaration : and accordingly, on the 19th of November, 1792, the National Convention announced by a formal decree, which was tranſlated into all the European languages, *that France was ready*

"les Anglais feraient un peuple digne de l'entendre." Moniteur, 6 Jan. 1792.

to

to assist every nation which was willing to rebel against its own government. (14)

"Séance du Lundi, 19 Novembre.

(14) Lépaux propose, et la Convention adopte, la "rédaction suivante. La Convention Nationale déclare, au nom de la nation Française, qu'elle accordera fraternité et secours à tous les peuples qui "*voudront* recouvrer leur liberté; et charge le pouvoir exécutif de donner aux généraux les ordres nécessaires pour porter secours à ces peuples, et défendre les citoyens qui auraient été vexés, ou qui pourraient l'être pour la cause de la liberté.

"Sergent. Je demand que ce décret soit traduit et "imprimé dans *toutes les langues*.

"Cette proposition est décrétée." Moniteur, 20 Nov. 1792. Brissot, though he made no objection to this decree at the time when it was proposed, for it passed with enthusiasm, (le décret passa d'enthousiasme) as he himself says, called it afterwards, on mature reflection, "l'absurde et impolitique décret du 19 Novembre, qui a *justement* excité les inquiétudes des cabinets étrangers." A ses Commettans, page 68. It is remarkable, that the person who proposed this decree was elected one of the first five Directors, though in other respects he is by no means a distinguished character.

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The meaſures adopted by the National Convention even previous to this decree, but more particularly the decree itſelf, produced in England the deſired effect, and ſet various ſocieties, who were already diſaffected to Government, in agitation. So early as the 7th of November (15) an addreſs, voted by five thouſand perſons, members of the united ſocieties of London, Mancheſter and other places, (16) was delivered to the National Convention, containing the following paſſages: "They are of opinion (namely, "they who voted the addreſs), that it is the "duty of true Britons to ſupport and aſſiſt

(15) Even on the 14th of Auguſt ſeveral Engliſhmen appeared at the bar of the National Aſſembly, and congratulated the French on the energy which they had diſplayed on the 10th of Auguſt (de l'energie qu'ils ont montrée dans la journée du 10 Août). Moniteur, 17 Août. 1792.

(16) Cette adreſſe a été votée par 5,000 Anglais réunis dans les ſociétés de Londres, Mancheſter, etc." Moniteur, du 8 Nov. 1792.

"to

"to the utmost of their power the defenders "of the Rights of Man, the propagators of "human felicity, and to swear inviolable "friendship to a nation which proceeds *on* "*the plan which you have adopted*"—(It is to be observed, that this plan was the abolition of royalty).—"What is liberty? "What are our rights? Frenchmen, you "are already free, *and Britons are preparing* "*to become so.* A triple alliance, *not of crowns*, "but of the *people* of America, of France, "and of *Great Britain*, &c." (17) This

(17) "Ils croient qu'il est du devoir des vrais Bre- "tons, de soutenir et assister de tous leurs moyens les "défenseurs des droits de l'homme, des propagateurs "du bonheur, de l'humanité, et de jurer à une nation, "qui procede *d'après le plan que vous avez adopté*, "une amitié inviolable. Qu'est-ce que la liberté? "Quels sont nos droits? Français, vous êtes déjà "libres; *mais les Bretons se préparent à le devenir.* "La triple alliance, *non de couronnes*, mais des peuples "de l'Amerique, de la France, et *de la Grande Bre-* "*tagne*, etc." Moniteur, 8 Nov. 1792. The address is signed, Maurice Margarot, President; Thomas Hardy, Secretary; and contains several other passages equally

language was very intelligible: but no ſooner was the decree of the 19th of November generally known,* than a more open and daring language was adopted; for within nine days after the publication of this decree, deputies from certain Britiſh ſocieties appeared at the bar of the National Convention, and ſignified their intention of adopting the form of Government introduced in France, and of eſtabliſhing *a National Convention in Great Britain.* "We hope," ſaid the orator of the firſt deputation, "that "the troops of liberty will never lay down "their arms as long as tyrants and ſlaves ſhall "continue to exiſt.(18) Our wiſhes, Citi-

equally expreſſive of a determination to aboliſh royalty in England. They who have not acceſs to the Moniteur, will find the whole addreſs, in Engliſh, in Rivington's Annual Regiſter, 1792, State Papers, p. 344.

(18) Every rational man muſt deplore the exiſtence both of tyrants and of ſlaves; but *theſe* gentlemen by the word "tyrant" underſtood every king, however mild his government, or however limited his autho-

rity;

" zen-Legiſlators, render us impatient to ſee " the moment of this *grand change*. Nor " are we alone animated by theſe ſenti- " ments: we doubt not that they would " be equally conſpicuous in the great ma- " jority of our fellow countrymen, if the " public opinion were conſulted there, *as* " *it ought to be*, in a NATIONAL CON- " VENTION." (19) To this addreſs the

rity; and by the word "ſlave" they underſtood every inhabitant of a country where kingſy government was eſtabliſhed. Thus do men become the dupes of mere *names*, as if the word "king" neceſſarily involved the idea of ſlavery, or the word "director" the idea of liberty. It is not the title, but the power annexed to it, which is to be taken into conſideration: the Sovereign of Great Britain is called King, the Sovereigns of France are called Directors: yet Great Britain is ſtill the land of liberty, and France is now the land of abject ſlavery.

(19) " Nous eſpérons que les troupes de la liberté " ne les (i. e. les armes) poſeront, que lorſqu'ils n'y " aura plus de tyrans ni d'éſclaves. Nos vœux, Citoy- " ens Legiſlateurs, nous rendent impatiens de voir le " moment heureux de grand changement. Nous ne " ſommes

President made the following reply, in the name of the French Convention: "Citi-"zens of the world, etc. Principles are "waging war against tyranny, which will "fall under the blows of philosophy. *Roy-"alty in Europe is either destroyed, or on the "point of perishing* on the ruins of feodality: "and the declaration of rights, placed by

"sommes pas les seuls animés de ces sentimens, nous "ne doutons pas, qu'ils ne se manifestassent égale-"ment chez la grande majorité de nos compatriotes, "si l'opinion publique y était consultée, *comme elle "devait l'être*, dans une Convention Nationale." Séance 28 Novembre: Moniteur, 29 Nov. 1792.

Le Président à la députation,

"Citoyens du monde, etc. Les principes font la "guerre à la tyrannie, qui tombera sous les coups de "la philosophie. La royauté est en Europe ou dé-"truite ou agonissante sur les décombres féodaux: et "la déclaration des droits placé à côté des trônes est "un feu dévorant, qui va les consumer. (Applau-"dissemens). *Estimables républicains,* félicitez vous "en pensant, que la fête que vous avez célébrée en "l'honneur de la révolution Française, *est le prélude de "la fête des nations.*" Ib.

"the

"the ſide of thrones, is a devouring fire, "which will conſume them. *Worthy re-* "*publicans,* congratulate yourſelves on think- "ing, that the feſtival which you have ce- "lebrated in honour of the French revolu- "tion, is *the prelude to the feſtival of nations.*"

But the language held on the ſame day by the Deputies of the Society for Conſtitutional Information, (20) as well as the language of the Preſident, in his reply to *them,* was ſtill more expreſſive. "Citizens of "France," ſaid the orator of the deputation, "we are ſent by a patriotic ſociety "in London to congratulate you, in their "name, on the triumphs of liberty.—Af- "ter the example which France has lately "given, *revolutions will be rendered eaſy:*

(20) The ſame Society in its addreſs to the Jacobin club, which was ſent a few days before the royal proclamation of the 21ſt of May was iſſued, diſplayed ſimilar principles, though not ſo openly, as after the decree of the 19th of November.

"and

"and it will not be extraordinary if, in a *short* "*space of time*, addreſſes of congratulation "be ſent to a NATIONAL CONVEN-"TION OF ENGLAND."(21) At theſe words the French Convention applauded. The addreſs itſelf was then read by one of the ſecretaries, which, after much abuſe of the Engliſh, and much panegyric on the French Government, concluded with a ſentence containing the following words: "others will *ſoon* march in *your* footſteps, in this career of *uſeful changes.*"(22) And

(21) "Citoyens de France, nous ſommes deputés "par une ſociété patriotique de Londres, pour vous "féliciter en ſon nom des triomphes de la liberté.— "D'après l'exemple que vient de donner la France, *les* "*révolutions vont devenir faciles*: il ne ferait pas ex-"traordinaire, *que dans un court eſpace de tems il arri-*"*vât auſſi des félicitations à une* Convention Nation-"ale d'Angleterre." (Applaudiſſemens). Moniteur 29 Nov. 1792.

(22) "D'autres marcheront *bientôt* ſur vos traces "dans cette carriere *d'utiles changemens.*" Ib. The addreſs is ſigned, Sempill, Préſident; D. Adams, Se-

these *useful changes*, according to the interpretation of the deputies themselves, were to consist in the establishment of a National Convention, and consequently in the *total* abolition of the British Constitution. (23)

cretary. In the Moniteur, it is signed likewise by Joel Barlow and John Frost, the deputies who delivered it to the French Convention.

(23) It is extraordinary that, notwithstanding the public acts of this and other similar societies which are recorded in the Moniteur, and lie open to the whole world, both eminent orators and eminent writers should so long have persisted in the assertion, that nothing more was intended than a parliamentary reform. In like manner it has been asserted, even till the breaking out of the Irish rebellion, that the United Irishmen had no other object in view than a reform in the Commons House of Parliament. But at present we all know, from the report of the Secret Committees of the two Houses of the Irish Parliament, published in August 1798, and founded on the evidence of Arthur O'Connor, Emmet, Macnevin, and other chieftains of the rebellion, that a parliamentary reform was nothing more than a mask, under which the United Irishmen endeavoured to cover their real designs, that they were in fact closely allied with the

enemies

As ſoon as the ſpeech of the deputies was ended, and the addreſs itſelf had been read,

enemies of Great Britain, and that, in the ſummer of 1796, Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor went to Francfort as deputies from the Iriſh Union, to ſettle with General Hoche the plan of the landing in Ireland, which was then in agitation, and which was attempted, though unſucceſsfully, before the cloſe of the year. And ſtill more extraordinary is it, that members of the Britiſh Senate, hardly two months before Arthur O'Connor himſelf made theſe acknowledgments, could venture to declare in a Court of Juſtice, that they were acquainted with the political character of this man, and that they believed him to be ſincerely attached to the principles which placed the preſent family on the throne. The impoſitions which have been practiſed ſince the French revolution, by the term "Parliamentary Reform," appear further from a memoir delivered in 1797 by Lewines, the ambaſſador of the United Iriſhmen, to the French Miniſter for Foreign Affairs at Paris, in which was the following paſſage: "The *deluſions* of Reform and Emancipation are beginning to fail from the delay, &c." See the report of the Secret Committee of the Iriſh Houſe of Commons, in Auguſt 1798, an extract from which is printed in the Times, of the 27th of Auguſt. Thus have the common people in Ireland,

the Prefident of the French Convention returned an anfwer, which contained the following paffages: "The defenders of *our* "liberty will one day become the defenders "of *your own*!—The fhades of Pym, of "Hampden, and of Sydney, hover over your "heads; and without doubt *the moment is* "*approaching*, when the people of France "will come to offer their congratulations to "THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF "GREAT BRITAIN." (24)

who, as Oliver Bond acknowledged, cared very little about a parliamentary reform, been rendered the dupes of thofe who, as the fame perfon added, "thought for them," or, in plain terms, wifhed to facrifice their country to gratify their private ambition. The fame *delufions of reform* were attempted to be practifed in England, when the above-quoted addreffes were prefented to the French Convention in November, 1792: but, *fortunately* for Great Britain, they produced not the intended effect.

(24) "Les défenfeurs de *notre* liberté le feront un "jour de *la votre*.—Les ombres de Pym, de Hampden, de Sydney, planent fur vos têtes; *et fans doute* "*il*

Such anſwers to *ſuch* ſocieties, (25) united

" *il approche le moment, où les Français iront féliciter*
" la Convention Nationale de la Grande Bretagne."
Moniteur, 29 Nov. 1792. The Convention then decreed, that the addreſſes, with the anſwers of the Preſident, ſhould be tranſlated into all languages. Ib.

(25) On the 29th of November another addreſs was preſented to the Convention from a ſociety at Rocheſter, in which, after much declamation againſt the Britiſh Government, mention was made, in very intelligible, though general expreſſions, of people, "who wiſhed to receive from the French Nation the benefit of liberty" (qui aſpirent à recevoir de lui la bienfait de la liberté). Moniteur, 30 Nov. 1792. Another paſſage in this addreſs, " réſolu que le préſident de la ſo-
" ciété invitera tous les amis de l'égalité, *toutes les ſo-*
" *ciétés correſpondantes en France*, à employer leur zèle,
" leurs efforts, leurs ſollicitations auprès *du Conſeil*
" *Exécutif*," etc. affords an additional proof, not only that ſocieties in England correſponded with ſocieties in France, but likewiſe that theſe ſocieties ſtood in immediate connexion with the French Executive Council.—Beſide this addreſs and the three others abovementioned, ſeveral more were ſent to France about this time: for Lord Grenville, in his ſpeech of the 13th of December, 1792, ſaid: "he held in his hand no leſs
" than *ten* addreſſes preſented to the National Con-

with the decree of the 19th November, (26) were equivalent to a formal declaration of hostilities against the British Government; and the general promise of assistance, which had been given to revolutionists of all nations, was, by the conduct of the National Convention, on the 28th of November, confirmed, and applied to Great Britain in particular. This was the reward of all the benefits which had been conferred on France: this was the return, which was made for the refusal to join the coalition, for the salvation of the French colony of St. Domingo, for the permission to import from England bread

" vention of France by subjects of this country." See the New Annual Register, 1793; British and Foreign History, p. 22. See also Rivington's Annual Register, 1792; State Papers, p. 344—352.

(26) The explanation of this decree, which was afterwards given by the French Executive Council, will be examined in a subsequent chapter, where it will appear that the explanation was founded on the blackest hypocrisy.

and arms, and for the preservation of neutrality, even at a time when France might have been attacked with the utmost advantage. But what gratitude could be expected from men, who convert religion and morality into subjects of ridicule? They acted only, at that time, as they have acted ever since; for their whole conduct affords one continued proof, that from the moment they acquire the means of conquest, neither neutrality, nor justice, nor gratitude, prevent them from the execution of their designs.

It is true, that the National Convention pretended an especial friendship for the *people* of Great Britain. But what right did they possess to interfere in the internal affairs of a neutral country, and to separate the people from the government? According to their own maxims, this was the greatest offence of which one nation could be guilty toward another. The British Government had not

acted in this manner toward France; for so late as the end of August Le Brun himself acknowledged, that "it had conducted itself to that very period, with justice, with moderation, and impartiality."(27) But let us ask, what they meant by friendship for the people, and enmity to the Government of Britain; and how they could attack the latter, yet leave the former unmolested? It is not the members of a Government which usually take the field when a country is invaded, but the soldiers and the other inhabitants, who fight under the orders of government; the very persons, therefore, for whom the French pretended a particular friendship, were those who were immediately exposed to the effects of their enmity. Who, therefore, can be so blind, as not to see, that

(27) Le Brun's own words were, "la justice, la modération, et l'impartialité, qu'il a montrée jusqu' à présent." See his note to Lord Gower, quoted Ch. ix: Note 2.

such

ſuch declarations were nothing more than attempts to delude the unwary, and to convert them into inſtruments of French ambition? If we further aſk, in what the amity of the French rulers for the *people* of foreign countries really conſiſts, the anſwer is obvious. Agreeably to their pretended doctrine, they declared war only on the Stadtholder of Holland, and yet reduced the once wealthy inhabitants of that country to beggary: they declared war, as they aſſerted, only on the oligarchs of Bern, and then ſubjected even the democratic cantons of Switzerland to ſlavery: they declared war on the Senate of Venice, and ſold the *people* to a foreign maſter. Such is the friendſhip of theſe promoters of the rights of man, and ſuch is their regard for what they call the ſovereignty of the people. It was ſurely, therefore, the duty of the Britiſh Government to reſcue the natives of our free and

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happy island from the influence of *such* friendship. (28)

In fact, the means which have been adopted by the republican Governors of France

(28) It is true, that the number of those, who have suffered themselves to be deceived by the specious professions of the French rulers has been very considerable even in Great Britain; but at present, after an experience of seven years has enabled us to compare promises with the performance of them, I believe that every man, who *chooses* to see, *must* see the error. On this subject I can quote so high an authority as that of Mr. Sheridan himself, who, in the admirable speech which he delivered in the House of Commons on the 20th of April, 1798, said: "If then they attempt to invade us, they will no doubt come furnished with flaming manifestoes. The Directory may instruct their Generals to make the fairest professions of how their army is to act, *but of these professions surely not one can be believed.*" And a few lines after, he added with great energy: "*Can there be supposed an Englishman so stupid, so besotted, so befooled, as to give a moment's credit to such ridiculous professions?*" See the Morning Chronicle, 21 April, 1798.

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to gratify their ambition and extend their conquests, are the most detestable, which human ingenuity can invent. The Monarchs of France, especially Louis XIV, had indeed likewise attempted to subjugate the neighbouring states: but they went more openly to work, and deluded not the inhabitants of the countries which they invaded, by promises of felicity, which they were determined not to fulfil. They made no ostentation of propagating the rights of man: yet they oppressed them infinitely less than the modern despots of republican France. They intrigued, as well as the Convention and the Directory; but their intrigues were less injurious to mankind, for the intrigues of the former were confined chiefly to the great, or to the courts of Princes, whereas the intrigues of the latter operate on whole nations. The republican Governors of France set the vilest of the human passions in commotion, they work on the illiterate multitude, who

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are not aware, that they are mere engines in the hands of their employers, and that they themſelves, as well as thoſe againſt whom they are employed, will at laſt become the miſerable ſlaves of their pretended deliverers. The National Convention, toward the cloſe of the year 1792, had its ſecret agents in almoſt every quarter, who endeavoured by all the arts of ſyſtematic deception, to ſeduce eſpecially the lower orders of ſociety. Chauſſard, who was well acquainted with the principles of the new French Government, and was himſelf one of the agents in the Auſtrian Netherlands, ſpeaking of the revolution profeſſors, (29) as he calls them, ſays, "it is not at the tables of the great, but under the thatch of the cottager, that the toaſts of liberty muſt be given." (30) He has deſcribed, likewiſe, the

(29) "Profeſſeurs de révolution."

(30) "Ce n'était point aux banquets des adminiſtrateurs, qu'il fallait porter les *toaſts* de la liberté; "c'était

means which were adopted to bring the people of foreign countries into the views of the French Convention: and these means consisted in promises of unlimited freedom, and an absolute exemption from all taxes. (31) By such insidious and delusive professions, by assurances of wealth and liberty, have the

"c'était sous la chaume du pauvre." *Chauffard* Mémoires Historiques, etc. p. 53.

(31) Ib. To set the populace more effectually in commotion, a procession of butts of beer, ornamented with branches, and bearing the inscription, "free and exempt from duties," was held at Brussels for this very purpose. Chauffard's own words in the place just quoted are: "Ces tonneaux chargés de palmes promenés en pompe, portant pour inscription: *Libres et affranchis de droits*, escortés d'une cour plus pompeuse, que celle des monarques, c'était celle du peuple; ces acclamations de joie et de franchise, ces flots de la liqueur nationale écumeux et ruisselans, tout présentait une leçon en action, tout cela parlait plus haut et plus éloquemment encore que la philosophie." See likewise the first article of the decree of 15th Dec. 1792, where the same delusive promises are given.

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modern Governors of France reduced those, who have been weak enough to believe in them, to the lowest indigence and the meanest servitude. (32)

The engines, which they set to work with so much success in the Netherlands, they endeavoured likewise to employ in England: for at the end of November and the beginning of December, 1792, London abounded with revolution professors, as Chauffard called them, or missionaries, as they were termed by Gregoire, (33) who

(32) Dumouriez himself says: "C'est le 15 Décembre que fut donné le fameux décret qui prouvait aux Belges et à tous les peuples, qui avaient appellé les Français ou qui les avaient reçu, *que la Convention n'envoyait les armées chez eux que pour les spolier et les tyranniser.*—On disait aux Belges dans le préambule, qu'ils étaient libres; on les traitait en esclaves." Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 373, 374.

(33) In a report which Gregoire delivered to the National Convention on the 27th of November, 1792,

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were amply ſupplied with money, for the purpoſe of bribing and ſeducing the lower orders of the people. Various circumſtances attending this infamous plot are well known: but as no one ſeems to have been more intimately acquainted with it, than the author of a tract publiſhed in the Collection of the Works which have been written in defence of Louis the Sixteenth, (34) it will not be

he ſaid: "Veut-on nous dire, que les peuples ayant "des conſtitutions différentes les fonderont toutes ſur "les principes de l'égalité, de la liberté, et ſe chériront en frères? C'eſt le cas d'appliquer le conſeil "d'un miniſtre à l'Abbé St. Pierre. *Envoyez préalablement des miſſionnaires pour convertir le globe.* "Pluſieurs contrées de l'Europe et de l'Amerique agrandiront bientôt le domaine de la liberté." Moniteur, 28 Novembre, 1792. But Camille Jourdan has given theſe miſſionaries their true name, and called them *apoſtles of rebellion.* "Continuant à profeſſer "toutes les maximes révolutionnaires *et inondant tous "les pays de leurs apôtres de rebellion*, etc." Camille Jourdan à ſes Commettans ſur la révolution du 18 Fructidor, p. 90.

(34) Collection des Meilleurs Ouvrages qui ont été publiés

ſuperfluous to quote the following paſſage. (35) "The King of England," ſays the author of this tract, "knew the leaders, "the agents, the ſocieties, the correſpond"ences, the emiſſaries, the periods of their "meeting, their journies, and their reſolu"lutions. He knew that the plan was laid "to ſeize the Tower, to plunder the arſe"nal, to break open the priſons, to pillage "the public buildings and the houſes of the "rich, and to cut off at one ſtroke the ſe"veral branches of the conſtitution. His "Majeſty knew that the execution of the "plan was fixed for Saturday the firſt, or "Monday the third of December: he ſaw "likewiſe a model of the daggers with "which the inſurgents were to be armed, "and this model was found in the hands of

ubliés pour la défenſe de Louis XVI. Paris, 1793. om. ii. p. 8. This tract is printed in tom ii. p. 251 -286.

(35) P. 272, 273.

"a French-

"a Frenchman. He knew where twenty "thousand pounds of iron lay, in such a "state of readiness, that in the space of six "and thirty hours the whole could be forged "into pikes. He knew what member of "the National Convention complained, that "the plot was not conducted with sufficient "vigour; who wrote to one of the agents, "that he did not work as he ought, and "that he did not earn the money of the re- "public. His Majesty knew what other "members of the French Convention form- "ed a plan for the insurrection and the arm- "ing of the negroes, to ruin the English "colonies, and to annihilate, whatever it "might cost, the power of England. He "knew what emissary, after remaining only "four and twenty hours in London, set "off for the Hague, with orders to revolu- "tionize Holland. He knew what other "emissary wrote to France in the middle

"of November, with assurances that the "insurrection should soon break out, but "wrote again in the middle of December, "that all hopes of an insurrection were lost. "His Majesty knew which of the emissaries "warned his agents to take care, as the first "attempt had failed, how they engaged in "a second. He knew the number and the "names of the French cannoniers, who be-"ing no longer of use in England, after the "plot had failed, were ordered to embark "for Ireland on Monday, the 17th of De-"cember: he knew which of the leaders re-"called this order, and sent them to France, "whither he repaired also himself."

Here we have a minute description of several remarkable circumstances relative to the plot, which was laid to excite an insurrection in London, toward the close of the year 1792, a plot, of which the existence

ence (36) may be proved from the actions, ſpeeches, and confeſſions of the French rulers themſelves. For that the avowed principles, "the governed muſt be excited to rebel againſt their governors," "miſſionaries and revolution-profeſſors muſt be ſent out to convert the globe," "every nation which chooſes to rebel againſt its government ſhall receive aſſiſtance from France," were particularly applied to England, appears from the above-deſcribed conduct of the National Convention on the 28th of November. (37) The application of theſe prin-

(36) As the bare *exiſtence* of the plot is ſufficient for the preſent hiſtory, it is immaterial whether credit be given to the above mentioned *circumſtances* or not: nor do I quote them as abſolutely certain, becauſe they are not taken from an official document.

(37) From the documents on this ſubject, which are recorded in the Moniteur, there lies no appeal: and theſe documents alone are a ſufficient proof that the National Convention co-operated in the plan to overturn the Britiſh Conſtitution.

ciples to England and Ireland, appears further from the confeſſion of Briſſot himſelf: for in his Addreſs to his Conſtituents he ſaid, "it was neceſſary to encourage the movements of liberty in Ireland," (38) "we could ſet England in alarm *by exciting a fermentation in its own boſom.*" (39) And that the French emiſſaries in London were ſupplied with conſiderable ſums by the National Convention, to enable them to operate with the utmoſt vigour, appears likewiſe from the ſame work. For Briſſot ſays: "Theſe republicans have never ceaſed to

(38) "L'Irlande dont il fallait *encourager les mouvemens de la liberté.*" Briſſot à ſes Commettans, p. 73.

(39) "Nous pouvions inquiéter l'Angleterre *en excitant la fermentation dans ſons ſein.*" Ib. 78. That attempts were made to excite an inſurrection in England, long *before* the declaration of hoſtilities (which is very different from aſſiſting a diſaffected party when two nations are *already* at open war), appears likewiſe from the circular letter of the Marine Miniſter Monge, dated 31ſt December, 1792, which will be quoted in a following chapter.

"aſſert,

" assert, that, if we expect to succeed we " must have *money for secret expences*, partly " for the purpose of dividing the Cabinets, " and partly for the purpose of *exciting the* " *people* against their tyrants. We want " it for the North, we want it for the " South, we want it for *the Indies.*" (40) This passage undoubtedly applies to England. And a few lines after, Brissot adds: " It was Cambon and Barrere who caus-" ed the decree to be made, by which " the Executive Council was authorised to " take, under the head of army extraordi-" naries, *unlimited sums for these secret opera-* " *tions.*" (41) Lastly, Brissot acknowledges,

(40) " Ces républicains ne cessaient de dire: Si " l'on veut réussir, il faut de secret, il faut de l'argent " pour les *dépenses secrètes*, soit pour diviser les cabi-" nets, soit pour *exciter les peuples* contre leurs tyrans. " Il en faut pour le Nord, il en faut pour le Midi, il " en faut pour les Indes." A ses Commettans, p. 74.

(41) " C'est Cambon avec Barrere, qui a fait rendre " un décret pour autoriser le Conseil Exécutif à prendre

hat before the declaration of war not lefs han *twenty-five millions of livres* had been ent to England from the national treafury, nd that Cambon, the Prefident of the Committee of Finance, had kept their deftination a fecret." (42).

That a plot, therefore, to overturn the Englifh Government and Conftitution, toward the clofe of the year 1792, not only exifted, but that the National Convention took a very active part in it, admits of no

" des *fommes illimités* fur l'extraordinaire des guerres, " pour ces *opérations fecrètes*." Ib.

(42) " A cette époque (lors de la déclaration de " guerre) la tréforerie dirigée par Cambon, avait pour " 25 millions de numéraire achetés en Angleterre, et " qui furent exposé à être pris. Que font-ils de-" venus? On l'ignore." Ib. 97. Immediately before this paffage, he had faid that five other millions had been depofited in the houfe of Bourdieu and Chollet in London, and that after the war broke out they fell into the hands of the Englifh Government.

doubt.

doubt (43). The members of the National Convention in general, and of the Executive

(43) Another unanswerable proof of the part which the French Government took in this plot, is contained in the two following passages of a letter written by Mr. Miles to Le Brun, on the 2d of January, 1793 : " Rapellez donc *tous vos émissaires ; que le pro-* " *pagande finisse*, et ne cherchez plus à troubler la " tranquillité publique dans ce pays.—Au nom de " Dieu, si vous voulez éviter un embrasement univer- " sel, ne vous mêlez pas de notre gouvernement ; si " nous sommes moins libres que vous, même si nous " étions dans l'ésclavage le plus affreux, laissez nous " nos fers, et puisqu'ils ne nous gênent pas, pourquoi " vous inquiétent-ils ? Je m'étends d'autant plus sur " cet article, que je n'ignore pas les espérances mal- " fondées que vous avez conçues d'une révolte géné- " rale, et pendant que *vous encouragez de tels projets*, " il me sera impossible de vous aider, et même d'en- " tretenir aucune corréspondance ni avec vous, ni " avec le Conseil Exécutif." See p. 96, of the appendix to the work intitled, Authentic Correspondence with M. Le Brun, the French Minister, and others, to February, 1793, inclusive ; published as an appendix to other matter, not less important, with a preface and explanatory notes. By W. Miles. London, 1796-8. Mr. Miles further observes (Appendix, p. 59), that persons were employed to propose, in

Council in particular, believed likewise that nothing was more easy at that time than the excitement of a rebellion, as well in England as in Ireland: for they considered the numerous addresses, delivered to them in November, 1792, as expressive of the sentiments of the people at large, in which opinion they were undoubtedly mistaken, the great majority of the nation being even at that period well affected to the ancient constitution. Mr. Miles, who, during the time that he was intrusted with a mission to the Prince Bishop of Liege, had contracted an intimacy with Le Brun, afterwards French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who continued his correspondence with Le Brun and other men of consequence in France, till the National Convention thought proper to break with England; who had frequent intercourse in

the debating societies in London, such questions as were suitable to the views of the National Convention.

the

the latter part of the year 1792, with French agents in London, and even acted as mediator between them and the British Ministry; who may be supposed, therefore, to have been well acquainted with the views of the French Government, and who is certainly not, as appears from his present writings, unjustly partial to the present Administration, says expressly in a passage, where he speaks of the month of November: "It is "worthy of observation, that the Executive "Council had made up their minds *at this* "*time* on the part they had resolved to "take." (44) And then observing, that "the Executive Council looked upon a re-"volt as inevitable," he proceeds to give account of a note which he committed to writing in November, 1792, in the presence of a French agent, and says: "I have print-"the note exactly as it was taken in the "presence of the person with whom I con-

(44) Authentic Correspondence, p. 88.

"versed,

" versed, omitting nothing but some wild " assertions (45) respecting these societies, " (46) which he, as well as the rest of his " countrymen, considered as means in the " last resort, to force the British Cabinet to " chuse between dishonourable concession " and a war, which they considered would " place the Minister so completely between " two fires, that Government, assailed at the " same time by civil insurrection and foreign " hostility, would inevitably fall, and this " country, incapable of mischief, would fall " into impotency and ruin by its own dis-" tractions. *Such I aver on the faith of an " honest man, were the delusive hopes enter-*

(45) Mr. Miles probably omitted them out of respect to this person, whom he calls (p. 87) his friend. But though they are omitted in the note (which is printed in the Appendix, p. 57-60) it is very easy to collect their meaning from what Mr. Miles himself relates, p. 88-89, in the passage which I here quote.

(46) Certain English societies, which Mr. Miles, however, has not mentioned by name.

" *tained*

"*tained by Le Brun, and many others*, who, "unfortunately for both nations, had more "power and influence at that moment than "ſenſe and diſcretion."(47) In vain did

(47) The aſſertions and ſpeeches of the French rulers themſelves clearly prove, that Mr. Miles was not miſtaken. Kerſaint, one of the principal orators of the National Convention, delivered a ſpeech on the 1ſt of January, 1793, in which the following paſſages occurred: "Les inquiétudes du premier Miniſtre, "Pitt, maître abſolu de l'Angleterre, depuis huit ans, "et que *les orages d'une révolution, ou ceux d'une* "*guerre menacent également de ſa chute, &c.*—L'Irlan- "dais ſemble tourner ſes regards vers nous, et nous "dire: *Venez, montrez vous, et nous ſommes libres.*— "Le ſentiment des vérités, que je viens de développer "eſt répandu dans une foule de bons eſprits en Angle- "terre: *le gouvernement doit en redouter l'exploſion, et* "*les événemens de la guerre doivent la hater.*—C'eſt ſur "la ruine de la Tour de Londres, que vous devez "ſigner, avec *le peuple Anglais détrompé*, le traité qui "réglera les deſtins des nations, et fondera la liberté "du monde." Moniteur, 3 Jan. 1793. Even in November 1792, a French agent ſaid to Mr. Miles, that "Such was the actual ſtate of Great Britain, that we "did not dare to call out the militia." (Authentic Correſpondence, p. 96): and in Condorcet's Journal, though

Mr Miles attempt to undeceive Le Brun, and to convince him that his expectations of

though I do not recollect the particular number, it was asserted in positive terms, that the English Nation was on the eve of abolishing royalty, and of establishing a National Convention. In the reports both of Brissot and of Le Brun, in Dec. 1792, and Jan. 1793, to the French Convention, and even in Chauvelin's note to Lord Grenville, of the 27th of December, may be found expressions which indicate the same expectation. And this expectation had necessarily very great influence on the system of fraternisation, which was particularly calculated for England. See what Mr. Miles says on this subject, Appendix, p. 115. Lastly, as soon as war was declared, and the leaders of the French Convention had no longer need to conceal the motives of their actions, they openly avowed, not only that the expected rebellion was the grand inducement to their declaration of war, but that they believed the deluded English would be kind enough to become the instruments and the dupes of French ambition. For no sooner was the hostile decree pronounced, on the 1st of February, 1793, than Barbaroux said, in positive terms, "J'ai voté la guerre contre le Cabinet de Saint James, *parceque* j'ai l'espérance de voir le *peuple Anglais* sortir enfin de la stupeur, où l'a plongé la longue habitude de son esclavage con-

a general infurrection in England were ungrounded: in vain did he attempt to convince the French Minifter of the abfurdity of declaring war againft a powerful nation, which, with exception to a few democratic focieties, was fincerely attached to the exifting conftitution, and ready to facrifice the laft drop of blood in its defence. (48) Le

conftitutionnel, et nous venger *lui-même* d'une Cour, etc." Monit. 3 Fev. 1793.

(48) On the 19th of December, Mr. Miles wrote a letter to Le Brun, which ended with the following paffage: " Mr. Maret vous donnera fans doute des " éclairciffemens fur bien des chofes que vous ne pou- " vez favoir que par lui. Il ne vous diffimulera pas " l'attachement du peuple pour la conftitution, et fa " loyauté pour le Roi et fon Gouvernement. Il vous " dira que, loin d'adopter les rêveries bizarres, qui " font à la mode actuellement en France, il eft déter- " miné, coûte qu'il coûte, de laiffer chofes comme elles " font, et de ne permettre, qu'on porte à la conftitu- " tion aucune atteinte fous prétexte de réforme; par " conféquent, on vous a cruellement trompé en vous " affurant " *que le peuple Anglais mécontent et opprimé*

" *n'attend*

Brun, in defiance of all representations, persisted in the error into which both himself and his colleagues had fallen: the resolution, which had been taken in consequence, remained unaltered, and a war with England was irrevocably decided in the French Cabinet. (49)

"*n'attend que le signal pour se révolter* *; au contraire, "il est content, heureux, et attaché au Roi, aux loix, "et à sa patrie, et prêt à les défendre jusqu'à la dernière goutte de son sang. Voilà le vrai état des "choses. *Jugez d'après cela, s'il vous convient de déclarer la guerre à une nation unanime et si puissante?* "J'attends votre réponse avec empressement." Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 65. Whether Le Brun sent an answer to this letter, Mr. Miles has not mentioned: but, if he did, it must have been a very unsatisfactory one, as Mr. Miles judged it necessary to write to him again on 2d. Jan. 1793, and to say to him what has been already quoted in Note 43.

(49) Dumouriez himself says: "Le Brun pria "même le général, Dumouriez, *d'écarter tout ce qui "concernait les négociations avec l'Angleterre et la Hollande*: il n'en fut pas du tout question.". Mém. de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 108. 2d. edit.

* "Report of Le Brun to the Convention." *Note of Mr. Miles.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Official Communications between the Governments of Great Britain and Holland, on the Progress of the French Arms in the Austrian Netherlands. Uneasiness produced by the Resolution to open the Scheldt. Further Alarm in Great Britain, occasioned by the Decree of the 19*th of November, and the concomitant Measures taken by the National Convention, in Conjunction with certain British Societies. Proclamation of the First of December, for calling out the Militia: and another of the same Date, for the Meeting of Parliament. Spirited Declaration of the Bankers, Merchants, and other Inhabitants of*

of the City of London, in Favour of the Constitution. Meeting of Parliament, and Speech from the Throne. Means adopted for the external as well as internal Defence of Great Britain. Reflexions on this Subject.

TOWARD the close of the year 1792, Great Britain and Holland were nearly in the same political situation, and the interests of the two countries were so interwoven with each other, that an attack on the one might be justly considered as an attack on the other. In both countries there was a considerable French party, though in Holland it was not only more numerous, but possessed the power of impeding the operations of the Dutch Government, by means which were inapplicable in Great Britain. The protection of the two countries against the machinations of the French Convention made

made one common cauſe: for it was eaſy to foreſee that the ruin of Britain would inevitably draw after it the ruin of Holland, and that the conqueſt of Holland would place its ally at leaſt in a very dangerous ſituation. Further, they were cloſely cemented by the treaty of 1788, by which they had engaged, in caſe of an attack from any European power, to protect each other by ſea as well as by land, and reciprocally to guarantee all the countries, places, and privileges, which the contracting parties hitherto poſſeſſed. (1) In conſequence of this intimate union, and reciprocal obligation, the Britiſh Ambaſſador at the Hague, ſeven days after the battle of Gemappe, when the army of Dumouriez was advancing toward the Dutch frontiers, delivered, by order of his government, the following note to the States General. (2)

(1) See the ſecond article of this treaty in Martens' Recueil des Principaux Traités, tom. iii. p. 128.

(2) The French original is printed in the Moniteur,

"The underſigned Ambaſſador extraor-"dinary, and Miniſter Plenipotentiary of "his Britannic Majeſty, has received the "King's order to inform their High Mighti-"neſſes the States General of the United "Provinces, that his Majeſty, ſeeing the "theatre of war brought ſo near to the fron-"tiers of the republic by the recent events "which have happened, and being ſenſible "of the uneaſineſs which may naturally re-"ſult from ſuch a ſituation, thinks it due "to the connexion, which ſubſiſts between "him and the republic, that he ſhould re-"new to their High Mightineſſes, on this "occaſion, the aſſurances of his inviolable

teur, 27th November, 1792. It is dated there, November 16: but 16 appears to be an error for 13, not only becauſe the anſwer of the States General is dated November 16, and it is not probable that the anſwer was given on the ſame day, but becauſe Lord Auckland himſelf, in his note of the 25th January, 1793, mentions it as dated 13th November. Mr. Dundas, likewiſe, in his ſpeech of 14th December, quoted it by the ſame date.

"friendſhip,

" friendship, and of his determination to ex-
" ecute, at all times, with the utmost good
" faith, all the different stipulations of the
" treaty of alliance so happily concluded, in
" 1788, between his Majesty and their High
" Mightinesses. In making to their High
" Mightinesses this declaration, the King is
" very far from supposing the probability of
" any intention, on the part of any of the
" belligerent parties, to violate the territory
" of the republic, or to interfere in the in-
" ternal concerns of its government.. The
" King is persuaded, that the conduct which,
" in concert with his Majesty, their High
" Mightinesses have hitherto observed, and
" the respect to which the situation of his
" Majesty and the republic justly entitles
" them, are sufficient to remove any ground
" of such apprehension. His Majesty, there-
" fore, confidently expects, that no events of
" the war will lead to any circumstance from
" without, which may be injurious to the

" rights of their High Mightinesses; and he " strongly recommends to them to employ, " in concert with his Majesty, an unremitted " attention and firmness to repress any at- " tempts which may be made to disturb the " internal tranquillity of the provinces. His " Majesty has directed this communication " to be made to their High Mightinesses, in " the full persuasion, that nothing can more " effectually conduce to the interests and " happiness of both countries, than the con- " tinuance of that intimate union, which " has been established between them for the " maintenance of their own rights and se- " curity, and with a view to contribute to " the general welfare and tranquillity of " Europe."

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

This note was nothing more than a measure of precaution, which the existing circumstances required; it contains nothing which

which could give offence to the French Government, not even a ſuppoſition of hoſtile deſigns,(3) and diſplays a moderation which forms a ſtriking contraſt with the language adopted at this time in the National Convention relative to the Britiſh Government. On the 16th of November the States General returned the following anſwer. (4)

"Their High Mightineſſes are moſt ſtrong-
"ly impreſſed by the renewal of the aſſur-
"ances, which his Britannic Majeſty has

(3) The two orders of the French Executive Council, the one to open the Scheldt, the other to attack the Auſtrians on the Dutch territory, if they retreated thither, were not given, as appears from the preceding Chapter, before the 16th. Conſequently, on the 13th there exiſted no public document, which *officially* proved a diſpoſition on the part of the Convention to violate the neutrality in reſpect to Holland; and therefore prudence required, that the Britiſh Government ſhould rather imply the contrary, as was really done.

(4) The original is printed in the Moniteur, 30th November, 1792.

" now been pleaſed to make, of his inviolable " friendſhip for this republic, and his deter- " mination to execute at all times, with the " moſt ſcrupulous good faith, all the diffe- " rent ſtipulations of the treaty of alliance, " ſo happily concluded in 1788, between " his Majeſty and their High Mightineſſes. " The States General, have never doubted " theſe generous ſentiments on the part of " his Britannic Majeſty; but the declaration " which his Majeſty is pleaſed to make of " them at the preſent moment, cannot but " be extremely agreeable to their High Migh- " tineſſes, and inſpire them with the live- " lieſt gratitude and the moſt devoted at- " tachment to his Britannic Majeſty. The " States General, moreover, perfectly agree " with his Majeſty in the perſuaſion, that " there is not the leaſt reaſon to attribute " to any of the belligerent powers, hoſtile " intentions againſt the republic; and in- " deed their High Mightineſſes are equally

" perſuaded

" persuaded with the King, that the con-
" duct and the strict neutrality, which, in
" concert with his Majesty, they have hi-
" therto so carefully observed, and the re-
" spect to which the situation of his Ma-
" jesty and the republic justly entitle them,
" are sufficient to remove any ground of such
" apprehension. With respect to the inter-
" nal tranquillity of the republic, their High
" Mightinesses are perfectly sensible of the
" necessity of continuing to secure to its in-
" habitants so invaluable an enjoyment, and
" they are not negligent of any means, for
" the attainment of that salutary end. The
" States General, in concert with the pro-
" vinces of the union, have already taken,
" and continue to take, the necessary mea-
" sures for preventing any interruption of
" this tranquillity in the present circum-
" stances. They have the satisfaction of
" being able to assure his Majesty, that their
" efforts have so far been crowned with the

 " desired

"desired success; and they have reason to "flatter themselves, that, with the blessing "of Providence, those efforts will be equally "fortunate in future. Finally, their High "Mightinesses do not hesitate to declare, "that they agree with his Britannic Ma-"jesty in the persuasion, *that nothing can "more effectually conduce to the happiness and "mutual interests of the two nations, than the "continuance of that intimate union which has "been established between them, and which "their High Mightinesses, on their part, will "neglect no opportunity of cementing and "strengthening, for the maintenance of the "mutual rights and interests of the two coun-"tries, and for the security of the general wel-"fare and tranquillity of Europe.*"(5)

(Signed) W. H. WASSENAER.

(Countersigned) H. FAGEL.

(5) This last sentence proves, what some persons have called in question, that the Dutch Government, from the very commencement of the communications between

But on the very day on which the States General expressed their expectation, that the neutrality, which they themselves had preserved, would not be violated by other nations, it was grossly violated on the part of France: for it was on this day, as appears from the preceding chapter, that the Executive Council made the two resolutions, to attack the Austrians even on the Dutch territory, and to deprive the United Provinces of their sovereignty over the Scheldt. The first resolution, indeed, created very little uneasiness, because, when the intelligence of it arrived at the Hague, the Austrians were already retreating towards Aix la Chapelle,

between Great Britain and Holland, relative to the power and influence of France, was decidedly of opinion, that it was necessary for the two countries to make one common cause. Indeed the necessity of it was so obvious, that no one, who did not wish that the arms and intrigues of France might overturn the Dutch constitution, could have supported a contrary opinion.

and

and gave no indications of a design to retire toward Holland; but the other resolution excited a general alarm throughout the United Provinces, because it was obvious, that the execution of it would be highly detrimental, if not destructive, to the Dutch commerce, and consequently to the general welfare of the nation. "It would be difficult," says a Dutch correspondent in a letter, dated Hague, 30th November, and printed in the Moniteur, 9th December, 1792, "to form an idea in France of the "terrible commotion which this decree has "excited. At Amsterdam and Rotterdam "the principal merchants have experienced "a sudden coolness for the French cause, "which is not at all surprising. Perhaps "they propose to make a common cause "with the Stadtholder, and to prevent the "execution of the decree by force of arms. "With respect to the Government, *they* "*have instantly dispatched several couriers to*

"*England*

" *England to demand ſuccour:* and all means " are employed to make Great Britain ſen- " ſible, that its own intereſts are equally " affected with thoſe of Holland."(6) The States General proteſted, likewiſe, publickly againſt the decree, and commiſſioned the

(6) La Haie, Nov. 30. " On aura peine à ſe faire " une idée en France de la terrible commotion, que " ce décret a excité en quelques eſprits. A Amſter- " dam et à Rotterdam les principaux négotians en " ont éprouvé un refroidiſſement ſubit pour la cauſe " Françaiſe, cela n'a rien d'étonnant. Peut-être " ſongent-ils à faire cauſe commune avec le Stadthou- " der, pour arrêter par la forces des armes l'exécution " de ce décret. Quant au gouvernement, il a dé- " pêché d'abord divers couriers en Angleterre pour en " réclamer des ſecours: et tous les moyens ſont mis " en œuvre pour faire ſentir à la Grande Bretagne, " que ſon intérêt y eſt tout auſſi compromis que celui " de la Hollande." Moniteur, 9 Dec. 1792. As this letter is printed in the Moniteur, and was therefore undoubtedly written by a perſon attached to the French cauſe, no one can well object that the deſcription, in this inſtance, exceeded the reality. However, as it is not an official document, I ſhall make no further uſe of it.

Stadtholder

Stadtholder to ſend poſitive orders to the Captain of the guardſhip, which lay at the mouth of the Scheldt, to prevent all French ſhips of war from entering it, and to inform the commanders, that, by virtue of treaties, the Scheldt was ſhut to all armed veſſels. (7) Yet, notwithſtanding this pro-

(7) The following is the official note, which the States General delivered to the Imperial Ambaſſador at the Hague, at the beginning of December, 1792. "Que depuis le commencement des troubles ſurve-"nus entre le maiſon d'Autriche et la France, L. H. P. "ont obſervé la plus ſtricte neutralité, et ont taché "d'en concilier les devoirs avec l'amitié et les égards, "qu'elles ont de tout tems manifeſté pour S. M. I. "Que les Etats Généraux ſentent, que ce ſerait s'écar-"ter de cette neutralité, que de permettre à des na-"vires Français de remonter l'Eſcaut pour attaquer la "citadelle d'Anvers. Que L. H. P. n'ignorent pas non "plus combien cette démarche ſerait contraire aux "traités ſubſiſtans; et que c'eſt d'après ces principes, "*qu'elles n'ont pu accorder la demande du commandant* "*des chaloupes cannonieres Françaiſes de remonter l'Eſ-*"*caut juſqu' à Anvers*, mais qu'elles ont prié S. A. le "Prince d'Orange et de Naſſau, comme amiral-gé-"néral de cette république, d'ordonner à l'officier qui

"commande

test, several French ships of war forced a passage, on the 1st of December, in order to bombard the citadel of Antwerp.

" commande le vaisseau de garde, stationné à l'embouchure de l'Escaut, *de ne pas accorder le passage*, mais " d'informer le commandant Français, *qu'en vertu de " traités la riviere d'Escaut est close pour les vaisseaux " de guerre*." Moniteur, 16th December, 1792. Here we have a formal protest, on the part of the Dutch Government, against the opening of the Scheldt: and this *official document* is alone sufficient to confute the assertion that the States General were wholly indifferent on the subject (which even without this document would be almost incredible), and that the British Government determined to support their rights, when they themselves did not wish for any such support. It is true that a great part of the Dutch, namely, the French party in Holland, were so far from desiring assistance from England, that they would, if possible, have repelled it. But at that time the French party in Holland by no means constituted the Dutch Government, and when two nations negociate, whether they are monarchical or republican, the negociations must be conducted by their respective governments. Nor could this party in the year 1792, though numerous and formidable, be considered as the Dutch nation: for the Stadtholderian party, especially if regard be had to landed property, was at that time very considerable.

The decree for the opening of the Scheldt, and the force which was employed to put it in execution, could not be regarded with indifference by the British Government. The dangerous consequences of it to England, when France is in possession of the Low Countries, have been already represented in the preceding chapter. At this time the political situation of England was very different from that of the year 1785, when the Emperor Joseph likewise proposed to open the Scheldt. For as long as the Netherlands were possessed by the Emperor, the opening of the Scheldt could do no injury to England. Austria was not a maritime power, could not therefore convert the Scheldt into a station for ships of war; and England could at all times, with only a few frigates, have closed the Scheldt, and put an end to the imperial commerce. Further, there was reason to believe that it was not so much Joseph's intention really to open the

the Scheldt, as to frighten the Dutch, and to induce them to ward off the danger by the payment of ſome millions of florins, which they effectually did. Nor was it the duty of England, in the year 1785, to aſſiſt the Dutch againſt the Emperor: England and Holland had been lately at war; the definitive treaty of peace was not ſigned before the 20th of May, 1784; (8) and in the ſhort interval which elapſed, no treaty of alliance had been made between the two powers. But in the year 1792 England, by virtue of the treaty of 1788, was really bound to aſſiſt, in protecting not only the territory of the United Provinces, but likewiſe their franchiſes and liberties, of which that which they exerciſed over the Scheldt was one of the principal. (9) With great injuſtice,

(8) Martens' Recueil des Principaux Traités, tom. ii. p. 520.

(9) The ſecond article of the treaty is: "Dans le "cas, où une des deux parties contractantes ſerait "hoſtilement

therefore, has the British Government been accused of inconsistency, in remaining perfectly tranquil, when the Emperor attempted to open the Scheldt in the year 1785, and yet not shewing a similar indifference when the same resolution was formed by the French Government in the year 1792. The mere circumstance, that the French were become masters of the Austrian Netherlands, by whatever name the dependence of these countries on France might be decorated, could not but excite uneasiness in

"hostilement attaqués par quelque puissance Européenne, dans quelque partie du monde que ce puisse être, l'autre partie contractante s'engage de secourir son allié, tant par mer que par terre, pour se maintenir, et se garantir mutuellement dans la possession de tous les états, domaines, villes et places, *franchises et libertés*, qui leur appartenaient respectivement avant le commencement des hostilités." And in the fifth article is said: "Elle l'assistera même *de toutes ses forces*, si les circonstances l'éxigent." See Martens' Recueil des Principaux Traités, tom. iii. p. 128, 129.

the

the Britifh Miniftry: and when we confider that the Scheldt was to become a ftation for French fhips of war, they would have acted faithlefsly, as well to their own country as to the allies of England, if they had not at leaft attempted to prevent the execution of the defign. The fuperiority, likewife, which this ftation gave the French on an invafion of Holland, an invafion which was in agitation fo early as December (10)

(10) In a letter written to Dumouriez by Pache, the War Minifter, dated Paris, 6th December, 1792, occur the following expreffions: "Ainfi fi l'armée "de la Belgique *fe porte fur la Hollande*, et ne paffe "point la Meufe, etc."—"Les divers motifs ci-deffus, "Général, ont déterminé le Confeil à perfifter dans "fon ancien arrêté: il a délibéré comme mefure d'ur-"gence, *et qui devait dévancer l'expédition de la Hol-"lande*, etc." Correfpondance du Dumouriez avec Pache (Paris, 1793-8), p. 137. Thefe expreffions clearly prove, that even at that time an attack on Holland was in agitation. Chauffard likewife (Mémoires, p. 278) ufes the expreffion, "Opérations exé-"cutées dans la Flandre, *et projettées fur la Hollande.*" And Briffot, though before the declaration of war he

1792, was much too great to be disregarded by the British Government. And it was of the highest importance to England, to prevent, if possible, the French from becoming masters of Holland, as it was obvious that, with the additional advantage of the Dutch coast and the Dutch navy, they would take the earliest opportunity of attacking England with double force. (11)

denied, with his wonted hypocrisy, that the French Government had any design of invading Holland, made no scruple to complain afterwards (A ses Commettans, p. 79), *that Holland was not sooner attacked.*

(11) Brissot himself, in his speech of the 12th Jan. 1793, made the following acknowledgment, in speaking of the English nation: "Sans doute elle avait "raison, lorsque la France était sous le despotisme: "*elle avait raison à s'opposer à l'extension en Hollande* "*de l'influence de la France:* cette influence ne ten- "dait qu'à augmenter ses forces." Moniteur, 15 Janvier, 1793. He immediately added, indeed: "Mais "si jamais la République Française était appellée à "rendre la liberté à la Hollande, ce ne serait pas pour "augmenter son influence; elle n'en veut aucune sur

"les

When we further take into the account the decree of the 19th of November, with all its concomitant circumſtances, deſcribed in the preceding chapter, we muſt acknowledge, that the Britiſh Government had not a moment to loſe, and that vigorous preparations were neceſſary to reſcue Great Britain from the deſtruction with which it was threatened. On the 1ſt of December, therefore, as ſoon as intelligence arrived in London of the public encouragement which had been given by the National Convention on the 28th of November, to thoſe ſocieties who had announced their deſign of overturning the Britiſh Conſtitution, the follow-

" les états étrangers." But the ſophiſtry of this diſtinction could deceive only thoſe who either were, or choſe to be, blind: and at preſent every one knows by experience, whether republican France diſplays leſs ambition, and leſs deſire to extend its influence over foreign countries, than monarchical France formerly diſplayed.

ing proclamation was drawn up and immediately published.

"Whereas, by an act passed in the 26th
"year of our reign, intituled, an act for
"amending and reducing into one act of
"Parliament the laws relating to the mi-
"litia in that part of Great Britain called
"England, it is enacted, that if it shall be
"lawful for us, in the cases and in the man-
"ner therein mentioned, the occasion being
"first declared in Council and notified by
"proclamation, if no parliament shall be
"then sitting, to order and direct the draw-
"ing out and embodying of our militia
"forces, or any part thereof: *and whereas*
"*we have received information, that in breach*
"*of our laws, and notwithstanding our Royal*
"*proclamation of the 21st day of May last, the*
"*utmost industry is still employed by evil dis-*
"*posed persons within this kingdom, acting in*

concert

" *concert with persons in foreign parts, with a*
" *view to subvert the laws and established con-*
" *stitution of this realm, and to destroy all or-*
" *der and government therein, and that a spirit*
" *of tumult and disorder, thereby excited, has*
" *lately shewn itself in acts of riot and insur-*
" *rection:* and whereas under the present
" circumstances it is more particularly ne-
" cessary that, for the immediate suppression
" of such attempts, some addition should be
" made, as the exigency of the case may re-
" quire, to the force which may be in readi-
" ness to act for the support of the civil
" magistrate: we, therefore, being determin-
" ed to exert the powers vested in us by
" law for the protection of the persons, li-
" berties and properties of our faithful sub-
" jects, and fully relying on their zeal and
" attachment to our person and government,
" and to the happy constitution established
" in these kingdoms, have thought fit to de-
" clare in our Council our Royal intention,

 " for

" for the causes and on the occasion afore-
" said; to draw out and embody such part
" of our militia forces as may more imme-
" diately enable us to provide for the said
" important objects. And we do hereby,
" in pursuance of the said recited act, notify
" to all our loving subjects our said inten-
" tion, and the causes and occasion thereof."

On the 1st of December was issued, likewise, another proclamation, by which the meeting of Parliament was fixed for the 13th of this month. (12) But before the Parliament assembled, a very numerous meeting of the merchants, bankers and traders of the city of London, was held at Mer-

(12) It is printed in the New Annual Register, 1792; Public Papers, p. 59. It contains nothing more than usual, except the mention of a law, which enacts, that if the militia be called out when the Parliament is not sitting, and the prorogation will not expire within fourteen days, a proclamation shall be issued for its assembling within that time.

" chant-

chant-taylors' Hall, at which the following *Declaration in ſupport of the Conſtitution of Great Britain* was unanimouſly reſolved.(13)

"We the merchants, bankers, traders, "and other inhabitants of London, whoſe "names are hereunto ſubſcribed, perceiving "with the deepeſt concern, that attempts "are made to circulate opinions contrary to "the deareſt intereſts of Britons, and ſub-"verſive of thoſe principles which have pro-"duced and preſerved our moſt valuable "privileges, feel it a duty we owe to our "country, ourſelves and our poſterity, to in-"vite all our fellow-ſubjects to join with us, "in the expreſſion of a ſincere and firm at-"tachment to the conſtitution of theſe king-"doms, formed in remote, and improved "in ſucceeding ages, and under which the "glorious Revolution in the year 1688 was "effected; a conſtitution wiſely framed for

(13) Ib. p. 67.

“ the diffuſion of happineſs and true liberty, “ and which poſſeſſes the diſtinguiſhed merit, that it has on former occaſions been, “ and we truſt in future will be found, competent to correct its errors and reform its “ abuſes: our experience of the improvements in agriculture and manufactures, “ of the flouriſhing ſtate of navigation and “ commerce, and of increaſed population, “ ſtill further impels us to make this public “ declaration of our determined reſolution “ to ſupport, by every means in our power, “ the ancient and moſt excellent conſtitution of Great Britain, and a government “ by *King, Lords and Commons*, and to exert “ our beſt endeavours to impreſs on the “ minds of thoſe connected with us a reverence for, and a due ſubmiſſion to, the “ laws of their country, which have hitherto “ preſerved the liberty, protected the property, and increaſed the enjoyments of a “ free and proſperous people.”

About

About the ſame time various aſſociations were formed in ſupport of the ancient conſtitution of *King, Lords and Commons*, in oppoſition to thoſe ſocieties who, on the 28th of November, had ſolemnly announced their deſign of introducing *a National Convention*. Active meaſures were taken alſo both by Government and by the Magiſtrates of London, to counteract the effects of the projected inſurrection. The guard at the Bank was augmented, the Tower was put into a ſtate of defence, and ſeveral regiments were aſſembled in the neighbourhood of the metropolis. On the 13th of December the Parliament met, and was opened by the following ſpeech from the throne :

"My Lords and Gentlemen,

"Having judged it neceſſary to embody "a part of the militia of this kingdom, I "have, in purſuance of the proviſions of the "law, called you together, within the time

limited

" limited for that purpose, and it is, on " every account, a great satisfaction to me " to meet you in Parliament at this con- " juncture. I should have been happy, if I " could have announced to you the secure " and undisturbed continuance of all the " blessings which my subjects have derived " from a state of tranquillity: but events " have *recently* occured which require our " united vigilance and exertion, in order to " preserve the advantages which we have " hitherto enjoyed. The seditious practices " which had been in a great measure " checked by your firm and explicit decla- " ration in the last session, and by the ge- " neral concurrence of my people in the " same sentiments, *have of late been more* " *openly renewed, and with increased activity.* " A spirit of tumult and disorder, the na- " tural consequence of such practices, has " shewn itself in acts of riot and insurrec- " tion, which required the interposition of

" a military

" a military force in ſupport of the civil " magiſtrate. The induſtry employed to " excite diſcontent, on various pretexts, and " in different parts of the kingdom, has ap- " peared to proceed from a deſign to at- " tempt the deſtruction of our happy con- " ſtitution, and the ſubverſion of all or- " der and government: *and this deſign* " *has evidently been purſued in connection* " *and concert with perſons in foreign coun-* " *tries.* I have carefully obſerved a ſtrict " neutrality in the preſent war on the " Continent, and have uniformly abſtain- " ed from any interference with reſpect " to the internal affairs of France: *but it is* " *impoſſible for me to ſee, without the moſt ſe-* " *rious uneaſineſs, the ſtrong and increaſing* " *indications which have appeared there of an* " *intention to excite diſturbances in other coun-* " *tries, to diſregard the rights of neutral na-* " *tions, and to purſue views of conqueſt and* " *aggrandizement, as well as to adopt toward*

" *my*

"*my allies, the States General, who have*
"*observed the same neutrality as myself, mea-*
"*sures which are neither conformable to the*
"*law of nations, nor to the positive stipula-*
"*tions of existing treaties.* Under all these
"circumstances I have felt it my indis-
"pensable duty to have recourse to those
"means of prevention and internal defence
"with which I am entrusted by law; and
"I have also thought it right to take steps
"for making some augmentation of my
"naval and military force, being persuaded
"that these exertions are necessary in the
"present state of affairs, and are best calcu-
"lated both to maintain internal tranquil-
"lity, and to render a firm and temperate
"conduct effectual for preserving the bles-
"sings of peace. Nothing will be neglected
"on my part, that can contribute to that im-
"portant object consistently with the secu-
"rity of my kingdoms, and with the faith-
"ful performance of engagements, which

"we

" we are bound equally by intereſt and ho-
" nour to fulfil."

When we conſider the magnitude of the danger, which immediately, as well as mediately, threatened the Britiſh empire, we muſt admit that his Majeſty's ſpeech was couched in terms of great moderation: and this moderation will appear ſtill more conſpicuouſly, if it be compared with the inſulting and menacing language which had been lately held by the Preſident of the National Convention. The ſpeech contained no propoſal of a declaration of hoſtilities, but expreſſed an ardent deſire for the preſervation of peace. It is true, that an augmentation was propoſed both of the naval and military force: but this augmentation was abſolutely neceſſary for the preſervation of Britain, and preſented the only hope which now remained of ſecuring the continuance of peace with France; becauſe, when one na-

tion

tion is threatened by another, especially by a nation which displayed such ambition and thirst of conquest, it cannot possibly expect to prevent the intended attack by any other means, than by vigorous preparations of defence. If, instead of having recourse to preparations of defence, an Ambassador had been sent to Paris, to make representations to the National Convention, which had already, in the most solemn and public manner, declared itself hostile to the British Government, and consequently to the British Nation, (14) the danger would not have been

(14) Whatever theory be adopted in regard to the origin of the power exercised by a government, or to the source from which that power is derived, every one must admit, that as long as the majority of a nation does not wish for a revolution, a declaration of hostilities against its government and constitution is a declaration of hostilities against the nation at large. But there can be no doubt, that the great body of the British Nation, even in the year 1792, was sincerely attached to the present constitution: and that, though the societies, who wished to establish a National Convention,

averted, but augmented: the Convention would have regarded the meaſure as a token of fear, the pride and ambition of the French rulers would have received new nouriſhment, and the reſolution expreſſed on the 28th of November, would have been more ſtrongly confirmed. The reſult of a conference, which Mr. Pitt, a few days before the meeting of Parliament, had already had with Mr. Maret, (15) affords ample proof of this

vention, were really formidable in conſequence of their unremitted aſſiduity and their connexions with France, they were not, with all their proſelytes and advocates, to be compared, either in point of property, or even in point of number, with thoſe who wiſhed to preſerve the ancient conſtitution. For this objection, however, the French rulers had an excellent ſalvo. "Les révolutions, repondait-on, ne font qu'avec "les *minorités*: ce'ſt la minorité qui a fait la révolu-"lution Françaiſe." Briſſot à ſes Commetans, p. 87.

(15) This conference, with the reſult of it, will be related at large in the thirteenth chapter, where all the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France will be particularly examined.

aſſertion:

assertion: for Mr. Pitt's bare consent to negotiate with an agent of the Executive Council, was openly attributed in the National Convention by Le Brun, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to a supposed dread of the French power on the part of the British Ministry. Besides, what reception could an Ambassador of his Britannic Majesty have expected from the President of the French Convention, who had received with every mark of friendship, and every token of applause, the deputies of those societies, who declared their resolution of overturning the British Government and Constitution? The United States of America, against whom the present Directory of France acts the same insidious part, as the National Convention acted against England in the year 1792, have, in 1797, attempted an embassy under similar circumstances: and it has ended, as every man acquainted with the politicks and principles of the modern French

French rulers naturally expected. For the American Ambaſſadors, inſtead of obtaining ſatisfaction for paſt injuries, and ſecurity for the future, were not admitted even to an audience, and were obliged to return, after their miſſion had anſwered no other purpoſe than to increaſe the weight of the indignities which had been already offered to their government and nation. But there is no neceſſity for having recourſe to analogical arguments: for the National Convention ſolemnly declared, on the 15th of December, 1792, that they acknowledged no political inſtitution which was inconſiſtent with the ſovereignty of the people, and, conſequently, according to their own repeated explanations, no kingly government. (16) If, there-

(16) In the introduction to the decree of the 15th of December, (of which more will be ſaid in the following chapter) was declared: "La Convention Nationale, fidele aux principes de la ſouveraineté des peuples, *qui ne lui permet pas de reconnaitre aucune inſtitution qui y porte atteinte, etc.*" Moniteur, 17 Dec. 1792.—

fore, a British Ambaſſador had been ſent to Paris in December, 1792, at a time when projects of revolution and conqueſt had reduced the National Convention to a ſtate of political intoxication, he would in all probability have been received with an addreſs of the following kind. "Do you come, Sir, "from the Britiſh people, or do you come "from the King? If you come from the "people, we are ready to receive you, and to "ſhew the ſame friendſhip and fraternity, "as we ſhewed to the deputies in the month "of November. But if you are ſent by the "King," to which the Ambaſſador muſt have replied in the affirmative, "our anſwer "has been already given: we acknowledge "no other ſovereignty than that of the peo-"ple."

1792.—It is a curious circumſtance, that it was on the very day on which the National Convention virtually refuſed to acknowledge any kingly government, that Mr. Fox made his motion in the Houſe of Commons for ſending an Ambaſſador from his Britannic Majeſty to France.

"ple." Thus would the Britiſh Government, in ſending at that time an Ambaſſador to Paris, not only have failed of removing the cauſes of complaint, but would have brought on the whole nation new injuries and inſults. Beſides, when an unarmed nation negotiates with an armed nation, the latter will always preſcribe laws to the former, eſpecially if the unarmed nation takes the firſt ſtep: for it is to be obſerved, that as ſoon as a negotiation was opened by the French Miniſter in London, the Britiſh Miniſtry continued it. They did not, therefore, abſolutely refuſe to negotiate with France: and the negotiation could be conducted full as well in London as in Paris. But we ſhall ſee, in one of the following chapters, what was the reſult of it: we ſhall ſee that the declarations of the French Government were in direct contradiction to its actions, that the former were as falſe as the latter were unjuſt, and that the whole nego-

tiation had no other object than to amuſe the British Miniſtry, till the plan for the deſtruction of Great Britain was ripe for execution. An armament, therefore, by ſea as well as by land, was the only means of warding off the impending danger: and this inference was ſo obvious, that in the Houſe of Lords the addreſs to his Majeſty was voted without a diviſion, and even in the Houſe of Commons the Oppoſition was reduced to fifty members. (17) The two houſes of Parliament, or at leaſt a very great majority, ſaw further, that beſide an armament by ſea and land, other meaſures were neceſſary, in order to prevent on the one hand the breaking out of the intended inſurrection, and on the other hand, to diſarm, as much as poſſible, the French Government, and to throw impediments in the way of its already avowed hoſtile deſigns. Of the for-

(17) New Annual Regiſter, 1792; Britiſh and Foreign Hiſtory, p. 21, 23.

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mer kind was the alien bill, and the bill for preventing the circulation of French aſſignats in England: of the latter kind were the two bills, by which the exportation of corn, arms, and military ſtores to France were prohibited. But as each of theſe bills was made a ſubject of complaint, it will not be ſuperfluous to take a curſory review of them.

The alien bill was brought into the Upper Houſe, by Lord Grenville, on the 19th of December, 1792, and on the 4th of January, 1793, it finally paſſed the Commons. (18) On this bill, which equally affected ſtrangers of every country, and included royaliſts as well as democrats, no government in Europe made the leaſt complaint, except the French. It was regarded as a matter of national police, which every nation is entitled to regulate according to the exiſting circum-

(18) Ib. p. 36—43.

ſtançes: and it was acknowledged, that more than uſual precaution was requiſite to counteract the machinations of the numerous emiſſaries, with which England was at that time over-run. But the National Convention made moſt bitter complaints, which was not at all extraordinary, as the alien bill preſented a very material obſtacle to its correſpondence with the ſocieties, with which it acted in concert. As this reaſon, however, could not be openly alleged, it was neceſſary to ſeek a pretext for complaint elſewhere: and they diſcovered a moſt excellent one, as they ſuppoſed, in the fourth article of the treaty of commerce. (19) But this

(19) The article runs thus: "Il ſera libre aux ſujets et habitans des états reſpectifs des deux ſouverains d'entrer et d'aller, librement et ſûrement, *ſans permiſſion ni ſaufconduit général ou ſpecial,*" etc. Martens' Recueil des Principaux Traités, tom. ii. p. 682. To this article the French Miniſter, Le Brun, appealed in his ſpeech in the Convention of 31ſt December, 1792, and Mr. Chauvelin, in a note to Lord Grenville, of 7th January, 1793. See the Moniteur, Jan. 3, 17, 1793.

article, though it has been quoted for the ſame purpoſe, likewiſe, by Britiſh orators and Britiſh writers, was the moſt unfortunate which could have been adopted: for it had been violated, ſeven months before the period in queſtion, by a decree of the National Aſſembly, (20) which ſtill continued in force; and conſequently the article was no longer binding on Great Britain. On the 18th of May, namely, the National Aſſembly had paſſed a decree, relative to ſtrangers reſident in France, which perfectly correſponded to the alien bill propoſed in

(20) Yet Mr. Chauvelin, in his note to Lord Grenville of the 7th January, 1793, had the aſſurance to ſay: " C'eſt ainſi que le Gouvernement Britannique *le premier* voulu rompre un traité à qui l'Angleterre doit une grande partie de ſa proſpérité actuelle, onéreux pour la France, arraché par l'adreſſe et l'habilité à l'imperitie ou à la corruption des agens du gouvernement, qu'elle à détruit, *traité qu'elle n'a cependant jamais ceſſée d'obſerver réligieuſement.*" Le Brun, likewiſe, ventured to aſſert the ſame in his ſpeech of 31ſt December.

the Britiſh Parliament in the following month of December, (21) for by that decree was ordained, that every ſtranger (without any exception in favour of the Engliſh) who had arrived in Paris after 1ſt January, 1792, ſhould, within eight days after the publication of the decree, declare to the committee of the ſection, where he lodged, his name, his character, his uſual place of abode, and his abode in Paris, and likewiſe preſent his paſſport, if provided with one; and it was further enacted, that every ſtranger, who

(21) Though the decree of the 18th May, 1792, or the French alien act, had probably eſcaped the notice of thoſe members of the Britiſh Senate, who oppoſed our own alien act, yet, it could not have been forgotten by the French Miniſters; and, therefore, when *they* objected to the Engliſh alien bill on the ground of its being a violation of the fourth article of the treaty of commerce, they made the objection with the conſciouſneſs of having already broken it themſelves. This is one of the many inſtances of hypocriſy and duplicity diſplayed by the virtuous republicans of France in their dealings with England

neglected

neglected to make the required declaration, should be fined an hundred livres, and sentenced to an arrest not exceeding three months, (22) but that whoever made a false declaration, should be fined a thousand livres, and condemned to an arrest not exceeding six months. (23) Further, every

(22) In a preceding debate on the French alien bill, Carnot proposed that every stranger, who neglected to make the required declaration within twenty-four hours after his arrival in Paris, should be imprisoned to the end of the war: and this proposal, though it was modified on the 18th of May, when the decree finally passed the Assembly, was received at the time with great applause. In the words of the original, Carnot's proposal run thus: "Tout voyageur, étranger "et particulier, qui n'habite point Paris depuis le "1 Mars dernier, sera tenu dans les 24 heures de re- "mettre à la police un bulletin signé de deux citoyens "actifs, contenant l'indication de son nom, de son "état, de sa demeure, *sous peine de prison jusqu' à la* "*fin de la guerre.*" (On applaudit.) Moniteur, 17th May, 1792.

(23) The first and fifth articles of the decree of the 18th May are as follow:

1. "Toute personne venue à Paris depuis le 1 Jan- "vier,

Englishman, who travelled at that time in France, can attest, that he was not permitted to go from one place to another, till he was furnished with a passport as accurately descriptive of his person, as when a thief is advertised in a public newspaper: and it was even dangerous to deviate from the route which had been once assigned, and which was specified in the passport. (24) The

"vier, 1792, fera dans la huitaine de la publication "du présent décret, au comité de sa section, la déclaration de son nom, son état, son domicile habituel, "et son domicile à Paris; et il exhibera son passeport, "s'il en a un.

5. "Les étrangers, que ne feront pas la déclaration "exigée, seront condamnés à une amende de 100 "livres, et à une détention, qui ne pourra être de plus "de trois mois. Ceux qui font de fausses déclarations "seront condamnés à 1000 livres d'amende, et six "mois de détention." Moniteur, 19 Mai, 1792.

(24) The French passports delivered to Englishmen in the year 1792, long before our own alien bill was introduced, contained a clause not generally known, namely, an order to arrest every one who departed from

municipal officers were likewiſe ſo ſtrict in the examination of paſſports, that the Britiſh Ambaſſador himſelf, when he returned from Paris in Auguſt, 1792, was detained more than once on the road, and was obliged to ſend meſſengers to Paris, in order to remove the difficulties which were thrown in his way. (25) On theſe police regulations in France, which were a violation of the fourth article of the commercial treaty, to ſay the leaſt of them, in an equal degree with any thing contained in the alien bill afterwards introduced in England, the Eng-

from the ſpecified route (" s'il ſe détourne de la dite route, de le mettre en état d'arreſtation"). Whether *all* the French paſſports delivered to Engliſhmen at that time contained this clauſe I cannot ſay: but I myſelf know an inſtance at leaſt of one, and have no reaſon to ſuppoſe that it formed an exception to the general rule.

(25) For this aſſertion I have no other authority than the newſpapers of the day: but, as it has never been contradicted, we may conclude that it is true.

liſh

lish Government made no complaint, because it was declared in the National Assembly, that they were absolutely necessary to preserve internal tranquillity. (26) But similar regulations were at least as necessary in December, 1792, to preserve the internal tranquillity of England. Consequently, as the English Government made no objection to the ground on which the French alien bill was framed, notwithstanding the fourth

(26) On the 15th of May, 1792, when the French alien bill was proposed, the necessity of it was alledged in the following terms: "Une des causes des inquié-"tudes de cette grande cité vient de la circulation ra-"pide d'étrangers, que la curiosité, le besoin, ou leurs "affaires y attire; elle doit accueillir sans doute tous "ceux qui vienne accroître la masse de ses richesses, "*mais non recevoir les monstres, qui voudraient déchirer* "*son sein.* Les habitans de Paris n'ont pas de plus "mortels ennemis, que ceux *qui se couvrent d'un nom* "*sacré pour former les projets les plus horribles.*" Moniteur, 17 Mai, 1792. This description applies to the situation of London in December, 1792, still better than it applied to that of Paris in May, 1792.

article

article of the commercial treaty, by which it had been ſtipulated, that every Engliſhman ſhould travel without a paſſport, without detention, and as freely in France as in England, the French Government ought, likewiſe, to have admitted the validity of the reaſons in favour of the Engliſh alien bill. This, however, they thought proper to refuſe, and by ſo doing ſubſcribed their own condemnation: for their appeal to the treaty of commerce involved a tacit acknowledgment, that this very treaty had been already violated on the part of France by the decree of the 18th of May, and conſequently could no longer be enforced on Great Britain. In whatever light, therefore, the Britiſh alien bill be viewed, the National Convention had no right to complain of it: (27)

(27) Another objection, however, occurs to me, which I cannot paſs over in ſilence. It has been ſaid, that the Engliſh Miniſtry ought to have offered to the Executive Government of France ſome explanation on the alien bill. But it may be aſked in reply, Why

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and, when we further take into the account, that when the French alien act was made, which no more excepted British subjects, than the British alien act excepted French subjects, the British Government had not deviated from the strictest neutrality, (28) but

was it necessary that the Government of Great Britain should make a diplomatic communication on this subject to that of France, when the French Government, at the time its own alien bill passed, made no such communication to the Government of Great Britain? And if we further ask in what the required explanation should have consisted, they who censure the omission of it, will find it difficult to give a satisfactory answer. For the explanation must either have implied, that the National Convention acted in concert with persons who were attempting to overturn the British constitution, or it must have implied the contrary. But an explanation, which implied the former position, would certainly not have satisfied either the French or their friends: and an explanation, which implied the latter, would have contained an absolute falsehood.

(28) See Le Brun's acknowledgment, made at the end of August, 1792, and quoted at the beginning of ch. ix. It deserves likewise to be noted, that Chauvelin's

that before the British alien bill was introduced, the National Convention had publicly expressed its readiness to assist in the overthrow of the British constitution, the charge which has been laid to Britain recoils with ten-fold force on France.

While the alien bill was still under the consideration of Parliament, the assignat bill was brought in by the Attorney General on the 26th of December, and passed in a fews days, with hardly any opposition from either House. This bill, of which the object was to make both the payment and the tender of French assignats illegal, was equally necessary with the preceding: for, not to mention the immense loss which would have been finally sustained by a continued circu-

lin's letter of the 28th April, containing the most positive assurances of the pacific dispositions of the British Cabinet, was read in the National Assembly on the 7th of May, only a week before the French alien bill was proposed. See Ch. v. Note 2.

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lation of French aſſignats, (29) the National Convention, as long as its paper was taken in payment, could create at its pleaſure, even in Great Britain, whatever ſums it thought proper, and employ them as the means of effecting the intended inſurrection. Merely during the time that Cambon was at the head of the Committee of Finance, aſſignats were iſſued to the amount of three thouſand millions of livres: (30) and hence we may conclude, that the quantity which circulated in England in December, 1792, was not inconſiderable. Further, that Cambon ſent thither, immediately from the National Treaſury, at leaſt as much paper, as

(29) I have been informed, from very good authority, that the city of Hamburg loſt not leſs than four-and-twenty millions of livres, or a million of pounds ſterling, by the French aſſignats.

(30) " Son génie eſt dans un mot: émettre et toujours émettre des aſſignats. Il en a augmenté la " maſſe de plus de trois milliards en dix-huit mois." Briſſot à ſes Commettans, p. 95.

was

was neceſſary to purchaſe five-and-twenty millions of livres, appears from a paſſage quoted in the preceding chapter (31) from Briſſot's addreſs to his conſtituents: and that theſe five-and-twenty millions were purchaſed with *ſecret* views, is evident from the circumſtance, that no account, as Briſſot himſelf acknowledges, (32) was ever given of them. Laſtly, that the *ſecret* views of the French rulers, in making theſe remittances to England, was to promote the rebellion which they expected would ſoon break out, appears likewiſe from their own confeſſions. (33) Under theſe circumſtances, the intro-

(31) Note 42. The expreſſion uſed by Briſſot: "Vingt cinq millions de numéraire *achetés* en Angleterre," clearly proves that the remittance was made, not in hard caſh, but in aſſignats, or other promiſſory notes from the French treaſury.

(32) Ib.

(33) See Note 40 and 41 to the preceding Chapter. The French aſſignats were conſidered alſo as fit inſtruments for ruining the bank of England, as Chauſſard acknowledges, p. 17: and that they were likewiſe ap-

 plied

duction of the aſſignat bill was a very wiſe and a very neceſſary meaſure, as it deprived the French Government of one of the moſt powerful engines, which it intended to employ in overturning the Britiſh Conſtitution.

Before the cloſe of December, the two other bills were brought into Parliament, by which the exportation of arms and corn from Great Britain to France was prohibited. The neceſſity of this prohibition was ſo obvious, that it is extraordinary how any one could call it in queſtion: for, as ſoon as one government has reaſon to believe that another is hoſtilely inclined (and the hoſtile deſigns of the National Convention againſt the Britiſh Government and Conſtitution

plied to the purpoſe of draining Great Britain of bullion as well as of coin, appears from Chalmers' Eſtimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain, where it is ſhewn that, in the year 1792, not leſs than 2,909,000 ounces of ſilver were purchaſed with aſſignats, and ſent to France.

were

were already recorded in its own public acts), it would be the height of infatuation if the former continued to augment the ſtrength of the latter by a further ſupply of the two grand materials of war, arms and bread. On the prohibition of the exportation of arms, neither Mr. Chauvelin, nor the National Convention made the leaſt complaint, being conſcious that a complaint of this kind would be too groſs even for themſelves: but as ſome writers have really ventured to make it, and to aſſert, that the arms and ammunition bill was a violation of the treaty of commerce, it will not be ſuperfluous to note, that the National Aſſembly, thirteen months before the period in queſtion, had ſtrictly prohibited the exportation of arms and ammunition of every kind from France, (34) and conſequently that, *if* ſuch a prohibition was a violation of the treaty

(34) See the 13th Article of the decree of 8th Nov. 1791.

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of commerce, France itself had already violated the treaty, likewise, in *this* point, and hence had forfeited all pretensions to the observance of it on the part of England.

With respect to the corn bill, it must be observed, that the exportation of wheat grown in England is subject to different regulations from that of foreign wheat, which has been imported into England. To prevent scarcity in our own country, his Majesty, with the advice of his Privy Council, is empowered by an act of parliament, made long before the present war, to prohibit, by a public order, the exportation of British wheat. An order of this kind was issued on the 15th of November, 1792, and was printed in the London Gazette. It was a *general* order, and affected all other countries as well as France; and it was nothing new, because at all times, when circumstances require it, a stop is put to the exportation

portation of British wheat. The French themselves had already adopted a similar measure: for during the whole of the year 1792, no wheat of French growth was exported from France, because they wanted it for their own consumption. On the order, therefore, which was published on the 15th of November, the French Government could make no complaint; and Mr. Chauvelin himself, in his letter to Lord Grenville, of the 7th of January, (35) admitted, that it was nothing more than "the effect "of the foresight and prudence of the Eng-

(35) To prevent mistakes, it is necessary to observe, that Mr. Chauvelin sent two letters to Lord Grenville, on the 7th January, 1793. They are both of them printed in the Moniteur, 17th Jan. 1793; but the former, which related to the alien bill, and has been already quoted, is there termed, "*Note remise par le citoyen Chauvelin à Lord Grenville*:" the latter, which relates to the corn bill, and is meant in the present place, is termed "*Lettre du citoyen Chauvelin à Lord Grenville.*"

"lish Administration." (36) But the act of parliament which passed at the end of December included foreign corn, which had been imported into England, and prohibited the exportation of it in any vessel bound to France. (37) This act affected, therefore, France alone, and consequently, had the National Convention acted amicably toward Great Britain, would have been an instance of blameable partiality. But who will venture to blame this partiality, who has read the facts recorded in the preceding chapter? (38) An enemy has no right to expect

(36) His own words were "un effet de la prévoyance et de la sagesse de l'Administration Anglaise."

(37) About a week before the bill was brought into the House of Commons, Government had issued orders to stop the sailing of vessels laden with corn for France, till the Parliament should come to a decision on the subject, for which reason the bill was called "the corn indemnity bill."

(38) Mr. Chauvelin, however, whose *temperateness* of language has been highly extolled, presumed, in his

that he ſhould be treated as a friend; and as the National Convention had publicly profeſſed itſelf, a whole month before the corn-bill paſſed, an enemy to the Britiſh Government, it could not be ſuppoſed that the latter would further contribute to the ſupport of the former. Beſides, there is great reaſon to believe, that the orders given by the French Government toward the cloſe of the year 1792, for the purchaſe of corn in England had not merely the ſupplying of France for its object; for, though there was already as much wheat in France as was neceſſary for the conſumption of the country, (39) it was purchaſed in England by

his letter to Lord Grenville of the 7th of January, to term it, "un acte de *perfidie*." He muſt undoubtedly have taken for granted that the Britiſh Miniſters were wholly unacquainted, not only with the *ſecret* machinations of the French Convention, but even with the *public* declarations made on the 28th of November.

(39) This is expreſsly aſſerted in the report made by the Comité des Subſiſtances to the National Convention

the French Miniſter of the Interior, at the beginning of December, at a much higher price than it could have have been purchased elſewhere. (40) The French Government, therefore, had, without doubt, *ſecret* views: and theſe ſecret views were, to occaſion a ſcarcity of corn in England, to excite thereby a general diſcontent, and thus promote the wiſhed-for inſurrection. (41) Did

vention, on the 29th of November. See the Moniteur, 1ſt December, 1792.

(40) In the ſitting of the 6th of December, 1792, Marat brought the following complaint againſt the Miniſter of the Interior. "Un citoyen honnête, qui a été dans le commerce des grains s'eſt préſenté au Miniſtre de l'Intérieur; il lui a offert de procurer des grains à 27 livres le ſeptier, tandis que le Miniſtre les achete à 54 livres dans les ports d'Angleterre." Moniteur, 8 Dec. 1792. It is true, that Marat's word is in general of no great authority; yet he would have hardly been ſo abſurd, as to aſſert ſo ſimple a fact before the National Convention, which, had it been falſe, the Miniſter of the Interior could and would have inſtantly confuted.

(41) Briſſot himſelf ſays, (A ſes Commettans,

p. 78.)

France deserve then to be treated on the same footing with friendly nations? and is the complaint about partiality founded on justice? No one, who has a regard for truth, will venture to assert it, or to maintain that the British Government ought to have diminished its own, and have encreased the strength of its enemy. Self preservation is not only a right, but a duty*; and the preservation of the British Government and Constitution was a duty, which Ministers owed to the nation at large.

It is evident, therefore, that the four acts of Parliament, which have been the subjects of the preceding inquiry, were nothing more than measures of precaution, which the danger then impending over Great Britain required. And as to the naval armament, which was ordered at this time, it was so

p. 78,) "Ainsi nous pouvions gêner les approvisionemens de nos ennemis, en désolant leur commerce, "*et exciter des mouvemens chez eux par la disette et la* "*cherté de ces provisions.*"

very moderate, that it did not equal the number of ships which the French had already in commission. Only nine thousand seamen and marines were voted on the 20th of December, in addition to the peace establishment which was sixteen thousand: (42) and no further addition was made till ten days after the National Convention had declared war. (43) But five and twenty thousand seamen and marines were hardly sufficient to man eighteen ships of the line, with the proportionate number of frigates, sloops, and cutters: whereas the French, even three months before the present period, had not less than twenty-one ships of the line, thirty frigates, eighteen sloops, four and twenty cutters, and ten ships armed en flute, not only in commission, but actually at sea. (44)

(42) See the supplies granted by Parliament for the year 1793, in the New Annual Register; Public Papers, p. 121.

(43) Ib.

(44) See the report of the Minister of Marine, on the

The guards and garrifons in Great Britain amounted in December, 1792, to only fifteen thoufand feven hundred men: and even this fmall number was not augmented, before the declaration of war, with more than fixteen hundred. (45) Hence, in that part of his Majefty's fpeech, which was particularly addreffed to the Houfe of Commons, it was eftimated, that the preparations then making would be amply defrayed "from the excefs of the actual revenue beyond the or-

the 23d of September, 1793, quoted in the preceding chapter, Note 5. Briffot likewife (A fes Commettans p. 157) fays: "L'Angleterre, qui n'a commencé d'armer *que trois mois après nous etc.*" and p. 56: "Dès le mois d'Octobre on avait prévu la poffibilité d'entrer en guerre avec les puiffances maritimes: le Comité diplomatique et de défenfe générale en avaient prévenu Monge; *on avait mis à fa difpofition des fommes confidérables.*"

(45) Compare the army fupplies granted by Parliament in February 16th, 1793, with thofe which were voted December 26th, 1792.

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dinary expenditure."(46) But it appears from the fourth chapter of the present work, that this excess, which had been added to the sinking fund, did not, after the reduction of the taxes that had taken place in the preceding session, amount to more than two hundred thousand pounds: and with two hundred thousand pounds it was not possible to fit out a fleet, which, if we consider the forward state of the French navy at that time, could do more than act on the defensive. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his report to the National Convention on the 19th of December, speaking of the preparations then making in England, said himself: "*There is nothing in these armaments, which ought to alarm us*, since they "exceed by only four ships of the line the "number which has been commissioned in "the preceding years; since among the fif-

(46) New Annual Register, 1792; Public Papers, p. 61.

"teen

" teen ſhips now in commiſſion, there are " at leaſt ten, which are known by the " name of guardſhips, that is, the oldeſt and " the leaſt ſerviceable in the Engliſh navy; " and laſtly, ſince the King has declared that " theſe armaments would require no addi- " tional taxes, and that they would be de- " frayed by the additional ſum appropriated " to the extinction of the national debt."(47) On the 31ſt of December, the ſame French Miniſter, after ſeveral ſhips of the line had been put in commiſſion, in addition to the four which he had mentioned on the 19th,

(47) " Ces armemens *n'ont rien qui doive nous allarmer*, puiſqu'ils n'excedent que de 4 vaiſſeaux de ligne ceux qui ont eu lieu dans les années précédentes; puiſque ſur 16 vaiſſeaux en armement il y a au moins 10 connus ſous la dénomination de garde-côtes, c'eſt à dire, les plus vieux et les plus détériorés de la marine Anglaiſe; puiſqu'enfin le Roi a déclaré, que ces armemens ne nécéſſiteraint aucun impôt extraordinaire, et qu'il ſuffirait, pour y ſubvenir, des fonds deſtinés à l'amortiſſement annuel de la dette nationale." Moniteur, 21 Dec. 1792.

ſtill

ſtill acknowledged that France had no great reaſon to be alarmed. (48) Indeed he could not with truth have aſſerted the contrary; for he well knew that France had a more conſiderable fleet in readineſs than Great Britain was then preparing, and that great exertions were making for a further augmentation of it. With great injuſtice, therefore, and with equally great inconſiſtency, were complaints made of the naval armament of Great Britain in December, 1792. For even, if the National Convention had betrayed no deſire of conqueſt on the Continent, had ſeized neither on Savoy nor on

(48) His own words were: "préparatifs qui toutefois *ne ſont pas encore trop effrayans*, ſi nous conſidérons que les ordres pour l'armement de 13 vaiſſeaux de ligue n'ont été donnés que *depuis quinze jours*, ſi nous ſongeons à la grande difficulté de completter l'equipage de ces gros vaiſſeaux par le manque de matelots etc." Monit. 3 Janv. 1793. Even on the 12th of January, 1793, Briſſot made a ſimilar acknowledgment, which will be quoted at length in the following chapter.

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the Netherlands, had neither subdued a part of Germany, nor threatened Holland with an invasion, the mere circumstance that France had fitted out a formidable fleet, would have justified an equal armament on the part of Britain; and since the National Convention on the 28th of November, had formally declared itself the enemy of the British Government, the latter was not only justified, but in duty bound, to counteract the machines which were then at work for its destruction. The reproach, therefore, which was made to the British Government on account of the naval armament in December, 1792, deserves, like many other censures, which have been made to it during the present war, to be wholly inverted: and France itself must be reproached, not only with having armed at sea three months before Britain even made a commencement, (49) but with having ordered the armament at a time, when, by the acknow-

(49) See Note 44.

ledgment of the National Convention, the British Government had not transgressed the strictest limits of neutrality. (50)

In this situation of affairs, while the British Government was taking only measures of defence, a war between France and Great Britain might have been still avoided, had it been the will of the National Convention, and the Executive Council. (51)

(50) The introduction to the decree of 13th Jan. 1793, is as follows: "La Convention Nationale informée par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite de ce pays rélativement au caractere de neutralité, *qu'il avait conservée jusqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France*," etc. Moniteur 16 Janv. 1793. By this acknowledgment the National Convention has undesignedly subscribed its own condemnation.

(51) The following is an extract from a letter written by Mr. Miles on 2d January 1793 to Le Brun, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs: "Je vous ai "tracé la route que vous avez à suivre; *et si vous* "*suivez mes conseils, le Cabinet Anglais ne s'avisera*

"*pas*

That it depended entirely on the French Government, whether peace ſhould be pre-

" *pas de vous déclarer la guerre.* Mais ſoyez de " bonne foi; ne me trompez pas; n'écoutez pas ces " petits meſſieurs qui vous entourent, et vous flattent, " et qui aimeraient mieux jouer du plus fin, que de " marcher droit. Rappellez vous toujours, que vous " tenez entre vos mains, par le hazard le plus extra- " ordinaire et le plus bizarre, la deſtinée, pour ainſi " dire, de l'Europe entière, et qu'en vous écartant " des principes que je vous ai tracés dans une lettre " précédente, et que Maret vous a certainement ré- " pétés ſelon les inſtructions que je lui ai données, " vous prononcerez un arrêt de mort contre des mil- " lions peut-être de vos ſemblables. Pouvez-vous, " oſez-vous y penſer ſans frémir? *La paix, je vous* " *le répète, eſt facile à conſerver*; et la paix une fois " aſſurée, voilà la pierre fondamentale poſée de cette " alliance entre nos deux pays, alliance que j'ai tant " déſirée, et que pour l'obtenir je ſuis prêt de ſacrifier " ma vie. La nation Anglaiſe eſt bien diſpoſée vers " la France, et comme la nation compte pour beau- " coup dans ce pays-ci, le gouvernement n'oſera " jamais marcher en ſens contraire: mais de votre " côté il ne faut pas effaroucher ni fatiguer le peuple, " en décriant une Conſtitution à laquelle elle eſt at- " tachée d'une maniere que rien ne peut ébranler. " Voilà cependant l'écueil, ſur lequel je crains que

ſerved or not, has been admitted by French writers, who were not only intimately ac-

" vous n'alliez échouer, et ſans parler de l'indécence
" qu'il y aurait à vouloir s'immiſcer dans les affaires
" intérieures d'une autre nation, il faut convenir
" qu'une démarche ſi peu meſurée ferait auſſi indé-
" cente, qu'injuſte et dangereuſe. Le malheur eſt,
" que vous ſemblez avoir le manie de vous mêler de
" tout; et ſouvenez-vous, mon ami, qu'en ſe mêlant
" de tout, on gâte tout. Ecoutez-moi encore un
" fois et une fois pour tout; *ne rendez pas la guerre*
" *néceſſaire, ni commi meſure de precaution, ni par né-*
" *ceſſité, pour repouſſer une agreſſion de votre part, et*
" *vous ne l'aurez pas*; comptez là deſſus et je répon-
" drai du reſte. J'entrevois même des diſpoſitions
" très favorables *en faveur de la paix:* ne forcez donc
" pas Mr. Pitt, par votre imprudence, à ſe déclarer
" contre vous." Authentic Correſpondence, etc.
Appendix, p. 94—97. On the falſe report, which was propagated with great induſtry, that Mr. Pitt had then intermeddled in the internal affairs of France, in order to effect a counter-revolution, Mr. Miles had already written to Le Brun on the 18th Dec. 1792, as follows: " Le rapport également dénué de tout fonde-
" ment que Mr. Pitt était l'ennemi juré de la revo-
" lution, fut reçu avec cette facilité aveugle, qui
" donne toujours aux menſonges la victoire ſur la
" vérité. J'oſe vous renvoyer à toutes les déclara-
" tions

quainted with the ſtate of politics at that time, but were themſelves in high and official employments. I will quote at the bottom of the page (52) only a few paſſages

"tions publiques et reconnues du Miniſtre Anglais, "depuis le commencement de la revolution, pour "vous convaincre, qu'il s'eſt fait un devoir de ne "point ſe mêler des affaires intérieures de votre "gouvernement. Je crois qu'il a toujours rejetté "avec fermeté toutes les propoſitions d'attaques qui "lui ont été faites contre les Français, et qu'il n'a "jamais voulu s'engager en aucun projet de contre-"revolution; s'il s'eſt fait un devoir de ne jamais ſe "mêler de vos affaires, il ſe fait auſſi une gloire, "d'être reſté attaché à ſes principes ſages et équi-"tables." Ib. p. 75.

(52) "La Clos, qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde, propoſait qu'on le fit partir avec quinze mille hommes et quinze vaiſſeaux de guerre, ce qui ſuppoſait néceſſairement la guerre avec les Anglais et les Hollandais, guerre qui n'était point déclarée, *et qu'il eût été très-facile et très-néceſſaire d'éviter.*" Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 105, ed. 2de. "Dans cette poſition on aurait pu négocier une paix avantageuſe. L'Empire et le Corps Helvétique n'auraient certainement pas rompu la neutralité que ce

from the writings of Dumouriez and Briſſot, which remove the queſtion beyond the poſſibility of doubt. That the views of Mr. Pitt were pacific, and that he really wiſhed to avoid a war with France, is a fact, which even his enemies have been obliged to admit; for Kerſaint, a leading man in the National Convention, and who was moreover decidedly in favour of a war with England,

dernier peuple a conſervée juſqu' à préſent. *La Holland et l'Angleterre ne ſeraient pas non plus déclarées.* L'Europe ſerait en paix, et la nation Françaiſe n'aurait pas comblé tous ſes crimes par le meurtre de la famille royale, par le deſtruction de la religion et des lois, et par une anarchie barbare," Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 251.—" Cette guerre (avec l'Autriche) promettait les plus heureux ſuccès; la chûte de la maiſon d'Autriche, la liberté des Pays-Bas devait en être l'infaillible conſéquence, *ſi l'on avait eu la prudence d'éviter une guerre maritime.*" Briſſot à ſes Commettans, p. 68. Briſſot wrote this in May, 1793; and his acknowledgment, that France might have avoided the war with England, is the more worthy of notice, as he himſelf, only a few months before, had been one of the principal adviſers of the declaration of it.

entered,

entered, on 1ſt January, 1793, into a very minute examination of the views and intereſts both of the miniſterial and the oppoſition party in England, and thence deduced the following concluſion: "*Pitt, therefore,* "*does not wiſh for war.*"(53) It was, in-

(53) His own words were: "Pitt ne veut pas donc la guerre." Moniteur, 3 Jan. 1793. Yet this very Kerſaint ſaid, in a ſubſequent part of his ſpeech: C'eſt ſur la ruine de la Tour de Londres que vous devez ſigner, avec *le peuple Anglais* détrompé, le traité qui réglera les deſtins des nations." The pacific views of the Britiſh Cabinet, and the hoſtile views of the French Government were acknowledged, therefore, without reſerve, at one and the ſame time. Carra, likewiſe, who was not only a violent but even virulent adverſary of the Britiſh Adminiſtration, ſaid, in his ſpeech of the 2d January, 1793: "Ne jugez donc point de ce que vous devez craindre par les préparatifs de l'Angleterre, et la comédie qui s'eſt jouée dans le parlement de concert avec la cour, *et croyez que l'intention de la cour n'eſt réellement pas de nous faire la guerre,* mais ſeulement d'intimider la Convention Nationale." Moniteur, 4 Jan. 1793. That the Britiſh Government wiſhed to deter the National Convention from the execution of its ambitious projects, could

deed, impoſſible that he ſhould: for he muſt have foreſeen that the execution of his favourite projects, the diminution of the national debt, the abolition of taxes, and the promotion of the general welfare of Great Britain, would be impeded by the expences reſulting from a war with France. No man can wiſh to be diſturbed in his darling occupation, no man can deſire to be prevented from finiſhing a work, which he himſelf beholds with admiration; nor is it poſſible to derive gratification from deſtroying the fruits of one's own ingenuity and labour. Laſtly, the armament itſelf, which was ſo arranged, that the expences of it ſhould be defrayed by the exceſs of the revenue above the ordinary

hardly be thought blameable, even by the French themſelves. On the 12th of January, 1793, Briſſot alſo, in a ſpeech which is full of ſophiſtry and contradictions, ſaid: "Je n'étendrai pas plus loin ces réflections qui doivent vous prouver, *que vous ne devez pas craindre de voir le Cabinet d'Angleterre ſe joindre à vos ennemis.*" Moniteur, 15th Jan. 1793.

expenditure,

expenditure, without either loan or taxes, ſhews how firmly he held, and how unwilling he was to part with his adopted plan. But the National Convention wreſted it from his hands; and, as will appear from the following chapter, left him no other choice than either to prepare for a ſerious combat, or to lay his country at the feet of France. (54)

(54) Chronological order would require, that a few words ſhould be ſaid here in regard to the well known Mr. Maret, who was in London at the beginning of December, 1792. But as the thirteenth chapter will be wholly devoted to the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France, the ſtory, that Mr. Maret was at this time authorized by the French Executive Council, to treat with the Britiſh Miniſters, will be there examined, and confuted.

CHAP. XII.

Decree of the 15*th December,* 1792, *and the Interpretation of it by the Executive Council. New Exhortation to all Nations, who were inclined to Insurrection. Menace in the National Convention, of an Appeal from the Government to the People of Great Britain, with Brissot's Interpretation of it. Barailon's Proposal, to except Great Britain from the Decree of the* 19*th of November, rejected by the National Convention. Circular Letter of the Marine Minister, Monge, to the Inhabitants of the French Sea Ports, to rouse them to a War with Great Britain, and to attempt the Conquest of it. Attack on a British Ship of War before the Harbour of Brest. Mission of Mr. Genet to the United*

United States of America, with Propoſals of an Alliance with France againſt Great Britain. Order iſſued by the French Executive Council to General Miranda, on the 10*th of January,* 1793, *to invade Dutch Flanders and the Province of Zealand, at furtheſt, within twelve Days. Armament of thirty Ships of the Line and twenty Frigates, in Addition to the twenty-two Ships of the Line and thirty-two Frigates already in Commiſſion, in Order to act againſt Great Britain.*

WHILE the Britiſh Government was engaged in taking meaſures of defence, in conſequence of the danger with which it was already threatened, the National Convention ſtill continued its hoſtile projects, and gradually converted the probability, that it was determined to involve Great Britain, as well as Holland, in a war with France, into abſolute certainty.

By

By the decree of the 19th of November, and the conduct of the National Convention on the 28th of the ſame month, its ſentiments relative to Great Britain had been already laid open to public view: but as various perſons, either through ignorance, or with the view of throwing ridicule on the uneaſineſs expreſſed by the Britiſh Cabinet, had repreſented that decree as an empty gaſconade, and ſince this notion, had it become prevalent, might have excited in the minds of many, who were inclined to inſurrection, a diſtruſt in the promiſed aſſiſtance of France, the National Convention judged it neceſſary, by a new decree of the ſame kind, to ſatisfy the world, that its intentions of overturning the neighbouring governments were really ſerious. On the 15th of December, therefore, a decree was made, which was prefaced by the following introduction: "The "National Convention, after having heard "the report of the united finance, military, "and

" and diplomatic committees, *faithful to the* " *principles of the ſovereignty of the people,* " *which does not permit them to acknowledge* " *any inſtitution that militates againſt it,* (1) " and willing to fix the regulations to be " obſerved by the generals of the armies of " the republic, in thoſe countries to which " they may carry their arms, decrees as fol- " lows." (2)

(1) Thus the National Convention virtually declared, that it acknowledged no kingly, and, conſequently, not the Britiſh Government; for kingly government of every deſcription had been repeatedly reprobated, as an inſtitution inconſiſtent with the ſovereignty of the people.

(2) Séance du 15 Décembre. " La Convention Na- " tionale, après avoir entendu le rapport de ſes comités " de finance, de la guerre, et diplomatique, réunis, " fidele aux principes de la ſouveraineté des peuples, " *qui ne lui permet pas de reconnaitre aucune inſtitution* " *qui y porte atteinte*, et voulant fixer les régles à ſuivre " par les Généraux des armées de la république dans " les pays où ils portent les armes, décréte ce qui " ſuit." Moniteur, 17 Dec. 1792.

The decree itself consists of eleven articles, and contains instructions to be observed by the French generals and commissaries, in every country into which the French arms might be able to penetrate. The Executive Council, that the purport of this decree might not be mistaken, accompanied it moreover with a commentary: and, as both the one and the other are worthy of notice, it will be necessary to quote a few passages from each. (3) The first article begins thus:

(3) The text of the decree, together with the commentary, is printed in Chauffard's Mémoires Historiques et Politiques, p. 180—228. The text itself is printed in Italic, the commentary in Roman characters, in order to distinguish them: the whole is signed by the six ministers who formed the Executive Council, Le Brun, Roland, Claviere, Monge, Garat, Pache: and commentary and text are there dated 8th January, 1793. Of this celebrated decree there are various editions, which do not all agree, the reason of which is, that it received, on the 17th and 22d of December, some alterations and additions, whence it is called, in Chauffard's particular instructions, dated 31st December, " Le Décret de la Convention Nationale des

" In thoſe countries, which are, *or ſhall be* " (4) occupied by the armies of the French " Republic, the generals ſhall immediately " proclaim, in the name of the French Na- " tion, the ſovereignty of the people, and " *the abolition of all conſtituted authorities,* " &c."(5) Here we have a poſitive and de-

des 15, 17, et 22 Décembre." (Chauſſard, p. 156). Hence, likewiſe, in the Moniteur, 17th December, the two laſt articles are not contained. Now, as that text of the decree in queſtion, which was ſigned by the Executive Council, and delivered to the commiſſaries for the Netherlands, of whom Chauſſard was one, muſt be regarded as the authentic text, I have ſtrictly adhered to it.

(4) This expreſſion ſhews, that the decree was applicable to all countries, and conſequently to Great Britain.

(5) " Dans les pays qui ſont, *ou qui ſeront occupés* " par les armées de la République, les généraux pro- " clameront ſur le champ, au nom de la Nation Fran- " çaiſe, la ſouveraineté du peuple, *la ſuppreſſion de* " *toutes les autorités établies,* &c." Chauſſard, p. 187.

cisive

cisive declaration, that the National Convention was resolved to overturn the constitution of every country, which had either folly enough to receive, or not force enough to repel, a French army: (6) but the Executive Council, in order to give it more energy, added in the commentary: "It is necessary that not even the *shadow* of these authorities remain."(7) The means, likewise, by which even the shadow of the ancient authorities should be made to vanish, were assigned by the Executive Council: and these means consisted in the following order to their commissaries: "They shall not only "encourage the writings destined to this in-"struction (namely, the instruction of the "people), the patriotic societies, and all the

(6) In this respect, every man must confess that the modern rulers of France have kept their word.

(7) Il ne faut pas que *l'ombre même* de ces autorités subsiste." Chaussard, p. 189.

"establish-

" establishments consecrated to the propa-
" gation of liberty, (8) but they themselves
" shall likewise have immediate communi-
" cation with the people: they shall pre-
" vent, by frequent explanations, the false
" interpretations, (9) the false reports, and
" all the falsehoods by which evil-minded
" persons may endeavour to lead astray the
" public opinion. In short, it is with the
" view of assisting the commissaries in this

(8) It is well known that, in England particularly, this encouragement was given in every imaginable mode. But in England there was already as much liberty as any rational man could wish: and it was this rational liberty, this liberty founded on law, that the National Convention, under the pretence of promoting it, wished to destroy, that free-born Britons might become the slaves of French tyrants.

(9) No interpretation could place the conduct of the French in a more unfavourable light than the true one: for that must certainly be considered as the true interpretation which the Executive Council itself gave. The bitterest enemies of France, therefore, had no need of false interpretations.

" important

" important part of their ministry, that the " Council has thought proper to associate " with them a certain number of agents, " more particularly destined to these instruc- " tive communications with the inhabi- " tants of the countries. Further, *in the* " *different countries, to which they shall be* " *sent*, (10) shall be transmitted to them lists

(10) As the above-quoted expression, " qui *seront* occupés," proves the universality of the decree, so this expression (*divers* pays où ils *seront* envoyés) proves the universality of the commentary, and shews, that though it was first used in Belgia, it was by no means designed for that country alone. Further, throughout the whole decree no particular mention is made of that country under any name whatsoever; and all the expressions are of such a kind, that they are equally applicable to every country. In the particular instructions given to Chauffard was said likewise, " *tous* les peuples chez lesquels la république Française a porté, *et portera ses armes.*" Chauffard, p. 157. Lastly, Chauffard himself, p. 25, has declared in positive terms, " Les instructions étaient *générales.*" —This note deserves the attention of those gentlemen who were so fond of applying to the British Ministers, at the period in question, the title of *alarmists.*

" of thoſe citizens, who are known for their " patriotic ſentiments, and who are the moſt " capable of co-operating in the miſſion of " the commiſſaries."(11)

In the firſt article of this decree was further promiſed to all nations who ſhould receive a French army, " the ſuppreſſion of all

(11) " Non ſeulement ils encourageront les écrits " déſtinés à cette inſtruction, les ſociétés patriotiques " et tous les établiſſemens conſacrés à la propagation " de la liberté, mais encore ils communiqueront eux-" mêmes avec le peuple ; ils préviendront par des ex-" plications fréquentes les fauſſes interprétations, les " faux bruits, et tous les menſonges par leſquels les " malveillans chercheraient à égarer l'opinion. Enfin " c'eſt pour ſeconder les commiſſaires dans cette partie " importante de leur miniſtère, que le Conſeil a cru " devoir leur adjoindre un certain nombre d'agens deſ-" tinés plus particulièrement à ces communications in-" ſtructives avec les habitans de ces pays. Il leur ſera " en outre remis des liſtes des citoyens *des divers pays* " *où ils ſeront envoyés*, connus pour leurs ſentimens " patriotiques, et les plus capables de concourir à la " miſſion des commiſſaires." Chauſſard, p. 191.

taxes;" (12) and in the second article was promised, "peace, aid, fraternity, liberty and

(12) Immediately after the words "la suppression de toutes les autorités établies," quoted in Note 5, was added, "des impôts ou contributions existans." By such alluring promises, and by assurances of exemption from all taxes, the National Convention hoped to seduce the ignorant and the unwary to its own interest, and to encourage them to rebel against their governments. But the artifice was so gross, that it is really astonishing that so many persons have been credulous enough to enter into the snare, especially as the decree itself carried with it its own antidote. For in the fourth article it is said: "Les généraux met-"tront de suite *sous la sauvegarde et protection de la* "*république Française* tous les biens meubles et im-"meubles appartenant au fisc, au prince, à ses fau-"teurs, adhérens, et satellites volontaires, aux éta-"blissemens publics, au corps et communautés laïques "et ecclésiastiques." Chaussard, p. 196. The expression "to put under the safeguard of the French republic" needs no explanation. Further, it was said in the seventh article: "Le Conseil Exécutif nom-"mera aussi des commissaires pour se concerter avec "les Généraux et l'Administration Provisoire nommée "par le peuple, sur les mesures à prendre pour la dé-"fence commune, et *sur les moyens à employer pour se* "*procurer les habillemens et subsistances nécessaires aux*

"*armées,*

equality." (13) So far the decree has a very fine appearance: and one ſhould ſuppoſe, that it was the will of the National Convention to fix the ſovereignty of the people in all countries on ſo firm a baſis, that they ſhould at all times, and in all reſpects, enjoy the full power of acting according to their own fancy. It is true, that the firſt and ſecond articles of this decree were equivalent to a declaration of war againſt all exiſting governments: but then they *ſeemed* at leaſt, like the decree of the 19th of November, to favour the ſubjects of each country, whom the generous governors of France were willing to take under their high protection. The decree of the 19th of November had

" *armées, et pour acquitter les dépenſes qu'elles ont faites,*
" *ou feront*, pendant leur séjour ſur ſon territoire."
Chauſſard, p. 207.

(13) " Ils (les généraux) annonceront au peuple " qu'ils lui apportent paix, ſecours, fraternité, liberté " et égalité." Chauſſard, p. 193.

even left to every nation the choice of rebelling against its government, or not, a choice which could not be refused, without manifestly infringing on the *sovereignty* of the people. But on the 15th of December, the revolutionary zeal of the National Convention arose to such an height, that they deprived at once the *sovereign* people of all choice in regard to insurrection, and in the eleventh article of the decree in question, made the following declaration: "The "French nation declares, *that it will treat* "*as an enemy* that people which, refusing or "renouncing liberty and equality, should "chuse to preserve, or recall, or treat with "its Prince and privileged orders." (14) Here we have a formal declaration of war, not only against every existing government,

(14) "La nation Française déclare, *qu'elle traitera* "*comme ennemi* le peuple qui, refusant la liberté et "l'égalité, ou y renonçant voudrait conserver, rappel- "ler ou traiter avec le Prince et les castes privilé- "giés." Chauffard, p. 225.

but

but likewiſe againſt every *people* that did not chooſe to change their political conſtitution. But the great majority of the people of Britain were warmly attached to their preſent form of government, and by no means wiſhed for a revolution: conſequently the eleventh article of the decree of December 15th, contained a declaration of war againſt the *people*, as well as againſt the King of Great Britain. Nothing can be more clear than this article: but though it was not wanting in perſpicuity, the Executive Council judged it neceſſary, by the following commentary, to give it a greater degree of energy: " It is evident, that a people ſo " enamoured of its chains, (15) and ſo ob-

(15) But if any nation was really enamoured of its chains, what right had the rulers of France to rob it of the object of its admiration? And what right had they to determine, in the name of any nation, the queſtion, whether the bands which united it in civil ſociety were to be termed chains, or not? This was a queſtion which every nation had probably a right

" stinately attached to its state of brutish-
" ness as to refuse the restoration of its
" rights, is the accomplice, not only of its
" own despots, but even of all the crowned
" usurpers who divide the domain of the
" earth and of men; (16) that such a servile
" people is the declared enemy, not only of
" the French republic, but even of all other
" nations, and therefore, that the distinction

to determine for itself, without calling in the aid of French arbitration. If it be further asked, in what the liberty consists, which these gentlemen every where substitute in the place of what they call slavery, the answer can be most easily given by the Dutch and the Swiss. These unhappy people would answer, if they dared to speak: " We now enjoy the liberty of " emptying our purses, of abandoning our trade and " manufactures, of sacrificing our privileges, of seeing " the true lovers of our country murdered or banished, " of returning thanks for the gracious chastisement " inflicted on us, and of applying to our executioners " the appellation of deliverers."

(16) No crowned head on earth enjoys this privilege in an equal degree with the five uncrowned lords of France.

" which

"which we have ſo juſtly eſtabliſhed be-"tween government and people, ought not "to be obſerved, in favour of a people of "this deſcription; (17) in ſhort, that the "right of natural defence, the duty of in-"ſuring the preſervation of our liberty and "the ſucceſs of our arms, (18) the gene-

(17) Unhappy people, that muſt be treated with all the rigours of war, for no other reaſon, than becauſe it is contented with its government! The ſource of its happineſs ſhall be dried up, *becauſe* it thence derived its happineſs! Such are the bleſſings beſtowed by the Great Nation. Well, therefore, did Dumouriez ſay: "C'eſt le 15 Dec. que fut donné le fameux dé-"cret, qui prouvait aux Belges, *et à tous les peuples,* "qui avaient appellés les Français ou qui les avaient "reçus, que la Convention n'envoyait les armées "chez eux, *que pour les ſpolier et les tyranniſer.*" Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 373. He even proteſted againſt the decree, as he himſelf relates, Mémoires, tom. i. pref. p. 15, though without effect: for, as he further relates, p. 101, "Le décret du 15 Décembre, "bien loin d'être déſapprouvé dans le Conſeil, *était appuyée par tous les membres.*"

(18) That is in plain Engliſh, "the promotion of our plans of conqueſt and aggrandizement."

"ral intereſt of reſtoring peace to Europe, "*which it cannot obtain but by the annihila-* "*tion of the deſpots and their ſatellites* (19) "all conſpire in inducing us *to treat ſuch a* "*people according to the rigour of war and of* "*conqueſt.*" (20)

(19) Is not this a manifeſt declaration, that the rulers of France were reſolved not to lay down their arms, till all the governments of Europe were gradually overturned? And have they not acted, to the preſent hour, agreeably to that reſolution?

(20) "Il eſt évident qu'un peuple aſſez amoureux "de ſes fers, aſſez entêté de ſon abrutiſſement pour "refuſer la réſtauration de tous ſes droits, eſt le com-"plice, non ſeulement de ſes propres deſpotes, mais "même de tous les uſurpateurs couronné, qui ſe par-"tagent le domaine de la terre et des hommes; que "ce peuple ſervile eſt l'ennemi déclaré non ſeule-"ment de la république Françaiſe, mais même de "toutes les autre nations: qu'ainſi la diſtinction ſi "juſtement établie par nous entre les gouvernemens "et les peuples, ne doit point être obſervé en faveur "de celui-ci; qu'en un mot le droit de la défenſe na-"turelle, le devoir d'aſſurer la conſervation de notre "liberté et le ſuccès de nos armes, l'intérêt univerſel "de rendre à l'Europe une paix, *qu'elle ne peut obtenir*

"*que*

It was further ordered, on the 15th of December, that the French Generals, on entering any country, at the ſame time that they publiſhed the decree, ſhould publiſh likewiſe a proclamation, which began in the following manner: "The French people "to the ...... people. (21) Brethren and "friends, we have conquered our liberty, "and we will maintain it. Our union and "our force are our guarantees. We offer "you the enjoyment of this ineſtimable "bleſſing, which has always belonged to "you, but of which you have been criminally deprived by your opppreſſors. *We "are come to expel your tyrants.*" (22)

"*que par l'anéantiſſement des deſpotes et de leurs ſatellites,* "tout nous fait une loi, *de traiter un tel peuple ſuivant "la rigueur de la guerre et de la conquête.*" Chauſſard, p. 225.

(21) A vacant ſpace was left, which was to be filled up with the name of each people, where the French generals ſhould come. This is an additional proof of the univerſality of the decree. See the Notes 4, 10.

(22) "Le peuple Français au peuple ..... Freres

That in all these measures the National Convention had its eye particularly fixed on Great Britain and Holland, is too obvious to need a proof: but should any one be really disposed to entertain a doubt on this subject, the following passage, in the opinion delivered and published by Chauffard (23) *on the decree in question,* will probably remove it. "Without doubt it was the interest of "France to raise, to conquer the commerce "of the Belgic provinces, swayed and neu-"tralised by that of Holland, thence to alarm "and menace the United Provinces, to plant "our assignats in their very counting houses,

"et amis, nous avons conquis la liberté et nous la "maintiendrons. Notre union et notre force en sont "les garans. Nous vous offrons de faire jouir de ce "bien inestimable, qui vous a toujours appartenu et "que vos oppresseurs n'ont pu vous ravir sans crime. "*Nous sommes venus, pour chasser vos tyrans.*" Moniteur, 18 Dec. 1792.

(23) Mémoires Historiques et politiques, p. 11—30.

"*there*

" *there to ruin the bank of England,* (24) and, " in ſhort, to complete the revolution of the " money ſyſtem. It was of conſequence to " France to engroſs, as it were, the vaſt " workhouſes of trade, theſe manufactures " of national proſperity."(25) Such were

(24) Yet complaints were made about the aſſignat bill!

(25) " Sans doute il importait à la France de rele- " ver, de conquérir le commerce des provinces Bel- " giques, dominé, neutraliſé par celui de la Hollande; " et de-là d'inquiéter, de ménacer les Provinces Unies, " d'implanter juſques ſur leurs comptoirs l'aſſignat, *d'y* " *ruiner la banque de Londres*, et, enfin, d'achever la " révolution du ſyſtême monétaire. Il importait à la " France d'accaparer, pour ainſi dire, ces vaſtes ate- " liers de commerce, ces manufactures de proſpérité " nationale." Chauſſard, p. 17. And in a note to the words " d'y ruiner la banque de Londres," which is printed in the Appendix, p. 417, he ſays: " Si le *pro-* " *jet de pouſſer les armes de la république, juſqu'à Am-* " *ſterdam* avait eu lieu, il aurait été facile de s'empa- " rer de la plus grande partie des effets ſur la banque " de Londres. La banque était ébranlée, ſi on lui eût " préſenté à la fois tous ces effets dont Amſterdam eſt

" le

the remarks made by the French Commissary Chauffard on the decree of the 15th of December: and they sufficiently prove, that

"le centre et le pivot." It may be observed, in general, that the leading men at that time in France made so little a secret of their designs against Holland, and consequently against England, (for, as we have just seen, the ruin of the latter was to be effected by the ruin of the former), that Cambon, in the Committee of General Defence, said openly to Abena and Van Staphorst, two deputies of the Dutch patriots: "Vous n'avez point de biens ecclésiastiques à nous offrir, pour nous indemniser: '*c'est* "*une révolution de porte feuilles*, qu'il faudra faire." Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 88. This was uttered in the true spirit of the National Convention: for wherever estates of nobility and clergy have been wanting, the property of merchants and of all other men, who had any thing to lose, has supplied their place, as Boyer Fonfrede said at the time, when the proposal, to respect the Amsterdam merchant ships, was rejected under the pretence of their belonging to aristocrats: "La masse des Hollandais est riche, elle "n'est donc pas amis de nos principes, et en admettant quelques exceptions, *si vous y avez des amis*, "*ils doivent être seulement dans la classe des sans-culottes*." Moniteur, 5th Feb. 1793.

at

at leaſt one of the tendencies of this decree was the deſtruction of Great Britain.

But as the meaſures of precaution, which the Britiſh Cabinet had already begun to take, were impediments to the execution of this grand deſign, it was judged neceſſary to have again recourſe to the favourite maxim, which has rendered ſo much ſervice to modern France: "the governed muſt be excited to rebel againſt their governors." For this purpoſe, the Executive Council, according to Le Brun's own report to the National Convention, on the 19th of December, gave *expreſs order* to the Miniſter, Chauvelin, to "embrace every opportunity of aſſuring the "Engliſh *Nation* that, notwithſtanding the "ill humour of its *Government*, (26) the

(26) The Engliſh Government, therefore, after the National Convention had openly avowed its intention of overturning the conſtitution, ſhould have remained in good humour!

"French

"French people desired nothing more ar-"dently than to merit *its* (the English Na-"tion's) esteem."(27) At the same time, Le Brun, who was himself member of the Executive Council, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave notice in this report to the National Convention, that Mr. Chauvelin, in

(27) "Le Conseil exécutif provisoire . . . . . a con-"tinué d'entretenir à Londres un Ministre de la Ré-"publique Françaife ; et il l'a *expressement* chargé de "saisir toutes les occasions, pour assurer *la Nation* "*Anglaise*, que malgré *la mauvaise humeur de son* "*Gouvernement*, le peuple Français ne désire rien plus "ardemment, que de mériter *son estime*, et de con-"server la bonne harmione et l'amitié qui doivent à "jamais unir deux *nations* généreuses et libres. La "Convention Nationale a reçu à diverses reprises des "témoignages éclatans de le réciprocité de cette bien-"veillance, et de la part sincere, que le *peuple* Anglais "prenait aux succès de nos armes et au triomphe de "la liberté Française. Mais ces mêmes événemens "glorieux agissaient dans un sens très opposé sur le "Ministere de Saint James." Moniteur, 21 Décem-ber, 1792. That the expression "son estime" ap-plies not to the government, but to the people of England, is evident from the context.

case

caſe the armament, which, by Le Brun's own acknowledgment, in the very ſame report, had nothing which ought to cauſe an alarm, (28) ſhould be continued, was ordered to declare, "*that a ſolemn appeal would be made to the Engliſh Nation.*"(29) And at the utterance of theſe words, the National Convention applauded. (30) But what was truly ridiculous, and would really excite a

(28) "Il en réſulte juſqu'ici que ces armemens "n'ont rien *que doive nous allarmer*, puiſqu' il n'ex-"cédent que de *quatre* vaiſſeaux de ligne ceux qui "ont eu lieu dans les années précédentes." Ib. It has been already proved in the preceding chapter, that even before Great Britain *began* to arm, France had an hundred and two ſhips of war, of which twenty-one were of the line, not only commiſſioned, but actually at ſea.

(29) Le Brun's own words, in his report on the 19th of December, were: "Nous ne manquerions pas de faire *un appel ſolennel à la nation Anglaiſe.*" Ib.

(30) Immediately after the juſt-quoted words, is added in the Moniteur, "On applaudit."

ſmile,

ſmile, if the indignation excited by hypocriſy did not ſuppreſs it, Le Brun introduced them with the aſſertion, "that they would then have exhauſted every explanation which could demonſtrate *the purity of their views, and their reſpect for the independence of other nations.*" (31) This aſſertion is an example of inſolence and hypocriſy, which is hardly to be found but in the annals of republican France: for it was made in the very week in which the National Convention had openly and ſolemnly declared its intention, not only of overturning all kingly governments, but of treating *whole nations* as enemies, which ſhould refuſe to take up arms againſt their lawful ſovereigns. Nor did Briſſot diſplay leſs inſolence and hypocriſy in his remarks on the menaced appeal: for in his report to the National Convention, on the 12th of January,

(31) "Comme alors nous aurions épuisé toutes les explications propre à démontrer *la pureté de nos vues et notre reſpect pour l'indépendance des autres puiſſances.*"

January, 1793, after having related, that the Executive Council had signified, on the 27th of December, through the organ of the Minister Chauvelin, "its firm resolution of opening the eyes of the people of England, by an appeal which should be made to them," (32) he proceeded to express his

(32) "Le 27 Décembre le Conseil Exécutif a fait "notifier au Gouvernement Anglais, par l'organe de "notre Ambassadeur, un écrit par lequel il repousse "vigoureusement toutes les inculpations élevées contre "lui, par lequel il se plaint des préparatifs hostiles de "la cour d'Angleterre, et *annonce la ferme résolution "d'ouvrir les yeux du peuple Anglais dans un appel "qu'il lui fera.*" Moniteur, 15 Janv. 1793. To this menace, which, had it been made by a British Minister at Paris, would have been answered by an order to quit the country, if not by order to arrest the person of the British Minister, Lord Grenville replied, on the 31st of December, with equal moderation and dignity. "Quant à ce qui regarde moi et mes collégues, c'est "à sa Majesté que ses ministres doivent le compte de "leur conduite; et je n'ai point de réponse à vous "donner là dessus, non plus qu'au sujet *de l'appel que "vous vous proposez de faire à la nation Anglaise.* "Cette nation, d'après la constitution qui lui assure sa

ſurpriſe that the Engliſh Miniſters were offended at this menace, and regarded it as an incitement to inſurrection, (33) though, as Briſſot added, it was nothing more than "an appeal to the reaſon and juſtice of a "great nation, which was duped by the "tricks of its miniſters, who wiſhed to em- "broil it with a people whoſe cauſe was *its* "*own*, and which had ſworn hatred only to "*tyrants.*" (34) Language thus inſulting

"liberté et ſa proſpérité, et qu'elle ſaura maintenir "contre toute attaque directe ou indirecte, n'aura "jamais avec les puiſſances étrangeres ni relation ni "correſpondance que par l'organe de ſon Roi, d'un "Roi qu'elle chérit et qu'elle reſpecte, et qui n'a "jamais ſéparé un inſtant ſes droits, ſes intérêts, et "ſon bonheur, des droits, des intérêts, et de bonheur "de ſon peuple." Moniteur, 14 Janv. 1793.

(33) In what other light then was it poſſible that they ſhould have regarded it?

(34) "Rappellerai-je cette fauſſe interprétation de "cet appel à la nation Anglaiſe dont le Miniſtre des "Affaires Etrangeres a menacé le Cabinet de Saint- "James,

to the British Cabinet would surely not have been heard in the National Convention, if the Government of France had been desirous of avoiding a rupture: and its falsehood, notwithstanding the veil of sophistry (35) in which it is involved, is so obvious, especially when we consider that the word "tyrant," in the mouth of the French rulers, is equivalent to "king," that the pre-

"James, s'il persistait dans ses projets hostile, appel, "dans lequel ce Cabinet a feint du voir un signe d'in-"surrection, tandis que ces mots signifierent un appel "à la *raison, à la justice d'une grande nation, dupe du "charlatanisme de ses ministres*, qui veuillent la brouil-"ler avec un peuple, dont la cause est *la sienne*, et qui "n'a juré de haine qu'au *tyrans*." Moniteur, 15 Janv. 1793. In a former part of this speech, Brissot had said: "Il importe que la nation Anglaise, qui n'est égarée que par son gouvernement, soit promptement désabusée. C'est par respect pour *la fraternité qui nous unit*, que nous devons lui peindre avec franchise les manœuvres de son gouvernement.

(35) Brissot's sophistry, though it produced a great effect at the time, is now become proverbial.

 tended

tended apology affords a new proof, that the appeal to the people of Great Britain had no other object than to promote the already expected insurrection.

On the 24th of December, five days, therefore, after Le Brun had given notice of the appeal, Mr. Barailon, one of the few temperate members of the National Convention, observed that the decree of the 19th of November had excited uneasiness in the British Government, and in order to remove this uneasiness, he proposed the addition of a clause, by which the decree should be restricted to those countries with which France was actually at war. But the National Convention not only rejected the proposal, but rejected it even without a debate: for the previous question was immediately demanded, and it was determined "that there was no room for deliberation."(36) Now as the

(36) Barailon. "Ce décret a déjà fait beacoup "d'ennemis;

Britiſh Government was particularly mentioned by Mr. Barailon, and the propoſal was made with a view of removing its uneaſineſs, the deciſive rejection of the propoſal was equivalent to a formal declaration, that the National Convention was reſolved to apply the decree to Great Britain.

Nor did eight days elapſe, before a very remarkable application of it to Great Britain was actually made: for on the 31ſt of December the Marine Miniſter, Monge, ſent

" d'ennemis: il les multipliera encore. Le Miniſtere " Anglais en a témoigné ſon mécontentement au " nôtre, qui a été forcé de l'interpréter dans le ſens le " plus raiſonnable. Je demande que dans le décret du " 19 Nov. après ces mots, " la Convention Nationale " déclare, au nom de la Nation Françaiſe, qu'elle ac- " cordera fraternité et ſecours à tous les peuples," on ajoute, " contre les tyrans deſquels elle ſera en " guerre."

La queſtion préalable eſt invoqué contre cet amendement.

Il eſt décrété, *n'y avoir pas lieu à délibérer.* Moniteur, 25 Déc. 1792.

 a circular

a circular letter (37) to the sea-port towns of France, containing the following passage: "The King and his Parliament wish to make "war on us. (38) But will the English *re-* "*publicans* suffer it? These free men already "shew their discontent, and their abhor- "rence of bearing arms against their bre- "thren, the French. Well, then! we will

(37) It is superscribed: "Lettre du Ministre de la Marine aux amis de la liberté et égalité dans les villes maritimes." Paris, 31 Décembre, 1792: and it is printed in the Moniteur, 20th January, 1793. It was not printed immediately, because the French Government wished to wait the effects of it; but before the 20th of January, favourable answers had been transmitted from some of the sea ports. The answer sent by the community of St. Malo on the 17th of January, expressive of their readiness "to co-operate with the "executive power," will be quoted in the fourteenth chapter.

(38) Of this assertion Monge neither did, nor could give a proof; for the circumstance, that a Government puts itself in a posture of defence, when threatened with imminent danger, is no argument that it *wishes* for war.

"fly

" fly to their assistance ; *we will make a de-* " *scent in that island;* (39) *we will hurl* " *thither fifty thousand caps of liberty* ; *we* " *will plant there the sacred tree*, (40) *and* " *stretch out our arms to our brother republi-* " *cans* ; (41) *the tyranny of their government*

(39) A landing in England with a considerable army was even at that time regarded as a matter very easy to be executed : for Kersaint, in his speech of the 1st of January, 1793, said : " Les barques de nos pê- " cheurs (sont) toujours prêtes à y transporter *cent mille* " Français, car c'est par cette expédition que nous " devons terminer cette querelle, et c'est sur la ruine " de la Tour de Londres," etc. Moniteur, 3 Jan. 1793.

(40) Had the sacred tree been planted in Great Britain, and borne the same fruits as it has borne in the Netherlands, in Holland, in Switzerland, in Italy, in Germany to the left of the Rhine, and likewise in France itself, we should have been no great gainers by the exchange of the old British for the new French tree of liberty.

(41) In order to crush them to atoms.

"*shall soon be destroyed. May we all be strongly* "*animated with this thought!*"(42)

Nor was it long before this thought very strongly animated the garrison of Brest: for in the first week of January an attempt was made by the batteries of that port to sink a British sloop, which was cruising before the outward harbour. The attack on this vessel was an act of open hostility, and it was undoubtedly made with the approbation of the French Government, for otherwise

(42) "Le roi et son parlement veulent nous faire la "guerre; les républicains Anglais le souffriront-ils? "Déjà ces hommes libres témoignent leur mécon- "tentement et la répugnance qu'ils ont à porter les "armes contre leurs freres, les Français. Eh bien! "nous volerons à leurs secours; *nous ferons une de-* "*scente dans cette ile; nous y lancerons cinquante mille* "*bonnets de la liberté*; nous y planterons l'arbre sacré, "et nous tendrons les bras à nos freres républicains. "*La tyrannie de leur gouvernement sera bientôt détruit.* "*Que chacun de nous se pénétre fortement de cette idée.*" Moniteur, 20 Janv. 1 miere feuille.

some

ſome apology, or at leaſt ſome explanation would have been given of it. If the commanding officer in the forts at Breſt ſuſpected that the ſloop had been ſent with the view of reconnoitring the Breſt fleet, he might have ſent off a boat with orders to the captain, to quit the road. But to hoiſt, as appears from the account given in the Moniteur, (43) the flag of war over the

(43) The following relation of this affair is printed in the Monit. 23 Janv. 1793. " Plymouth le 5 Janvier. Le Childers étant à croiſer Vendredi à deux heures de l'après-midi devant Breſt, s'avança à trois quarts de mille des batteries de ce port. Il était ſans couleurs. Une des batteries lui tira un coup à boulet, qui paſſa heureuſement par deſſus, ſans lui cauſer aucun dommage. Le Childers alors *arbora pavillon Anglais.* Mais le fort arbora auſſitôt les couleurs nationales, avec un pendant *rouge* ſur l'enſeigne. Les autres forts ſuivirent ſon exemple. Pendant ce tems-là le Childers avait été entraîné par la marée à un demi mille environ de ces forts, et obligé à cauſe du calme d'avoir recours aux rames, pour ne pas arriver trop près. Tout à coup, *les batteries, à un ſignal qui fut fait, commencerent*

French flag, as ſoon as the Britiſh captain had hoiſted the Britiſh flag, and not merely to fire a ſingle gun, as a ſignal for departure, but to make a croſs fire from ſeveral batteries, with the view of ſinking the ſloop, was to treat it, in every reſpect, as the ſhip of an enemy. And if the French Government had been deſirous of avoiding a rupture with Great Britain, it would have at leaſt attempted to make ſome excuſe to the Britiſh Cabinet, which neceſſarily felt itſelf inſulted, as well as the nation at large. But no attempt of this kind was made: and this very neglect afforded a new proof of the ſentiments entertained by the Executive Council and the National Convention.

About this time it was reſolved, to ſend Mr. Genet as Ambaſſador to the United

mencerent ſur lui un feu croiſé, qui l'eût criblé, ſi un vent frais, qui s'éleva, ne l'eût mis à même de ſe dégager.

States

States of America, in order to engage them to enter into a war with Great Britain, in conjunction with France. His instructions (published by Mr. Genet himself in the following month of December) were signed the 3d of January, 1793, to which some additional instructions were annexed on the 17th of that month. (44) So early as the 21st of December, 1792, the Executive Council had given notice to the National Convention, that they had fixed on Mr. Genet to go as Ambassador to the United States of America, with the view "of drawing closer the bands which united the two

(44) I have not been able to procure the edition of Mr. Genet's instructions, which he himself published: but extracts from them, on which we may certainly depend, are given in Mr. Harper's "Observations on the Dispute between the United States and France," printed at Philadelphia in 1797, and reprinted for Stockdale, London, in 1798. For the date of Mr. Genet's instructions, see p. 95 of the fourth London edition.

nations."

nations." (45) Now, when we consider the avowed object of the French Government in regard to Great Britain, this closer drawing of the bands which united France and America, could have no other meaning than the engaging of the latter to concur in the hostile designs of the former: but, should any one really entertain doubts on this subject, the instructions which Mr. Genet received from the Executive Council will certainly remove them. For, after several passages, which have undoubtedly reference to Great Britain, such as, "to punish those

(45) Séance du 21 Décembre. Un Secrétaire fait lecture d'une lettre du Ministre des Affairs Etrangeres ainsi conçue: Citoyen Président, les preuves de talent "et de civisme qu'a données le citoyen Genet dans "les différentes missions, dont il a été chargé, ont déterminé le Conseil Exécutif à récompenser son zèle "en le nommant ministre plénipotentiaire auprès des "Etats Unis d'Amérique. *Il doit travailler à resserrer "les liens, qui unissaient les deux nations.*" Moniteur, 23 Décembre, 1793.

"powers

" powers which ſtill keep up an excluſive " colonial and commercial ſyſtem, by de- " claring that their veſſels ſhall not be re- " ceived in the ports of the contracting " parties," it is expreſsly ſaid, " *we* (the " French) have at this moment a *particular* " *intereſt* in taking ſteps to act *efficaciouſly* " againſt *England* and Spain, if, as every " thing announces, thoſe powers ſhould at- " tack us. In this ſituation of affairs, *we* " *ought to excite, by all poſſible means, the zeal* " *of the Americans, &c.*" Great commercial advantages are then promiſed to the United States, " in expectation that the American " Government will finally *make a common* " *cauſe with us*, to take ſuch ſteps as exi- " gencies may require." (46) According, therefore, to the clear and expreſs words of the inſtructions, the object of Genet's miſ-

(46) All theſe paſſages, with others to the ſame purport, are quoted in Mr. Harper's Obſervations, p. 32, 33.

ſion was to effect an alliance between France and America, in order to act againſt Great Britain. It is true, that this alliance was propoſed under the title of a mere defenſive one: but it is evident, that the words, "if thoſe powers ſhould attack us," were inſerted for no other purpoſe than to preſerve an appearance of juſtice, it being wholly inconſiſtent with diplomatic caution to have ſaid in plain terms, "We have formed the "reſolution to overturn the Britiſh Govern-"ment and Conſtitution; we requeſt you, "therefore, to aſſiſt us in the accompliſh-"ment of this end." But that the French Government, before the 3d of January, 1793, the day on which Mr. Genet's inſtructions were ſigned, really had formed this reſolution, and that, on the other hand, the meaſures which had been taken by the Britiſh Government were nothing more than what was neceſſary for ſelf-defence, has been proved, by documents which no one can call in

queſtion.

queſtion. Conſequently, it was the object of the Executive Council, in ſending Mr. Genet to America, to effect, according to the *letter* of his inſtructions, indeed, only a defenſive, but according to their *ſpirit*, an *offenſive* alliance againſt Great Britain. (47)

We have hitherto ſeen only preparatory ſteps to the execution of the great plan, which conſiſted, firſt in the overthrow of the Britiſh and Dutch Governments, and then in the ſubjugation of the two countries. We have ſeen, that the National

(47) The prudent Waſhington ſoon perceived this, and did not ſuffer himſelf to be drawn into the ſnare: on which Mr. Genet not only made bitter complaints, but endeavoured to act the ſame part toward the American, as his principals at home acted toward the Britiſh Government; that is, he applied the favourite maxim, "the governed muſt be excited againſt their governors." See his Notes to Waſhington and Jefferſon, printed in the New Annual Regiſter, 1793, Public Papers, p. 108, 111, and Harper's Obſervations, p. 9.

Convention,

Convention, on the 28th of November, 1792, had openly declared its ſentiments in regard to the Britiſh Government, that the decree of the 19th of November, which was both confirmed and amplified by that of the 15th of December, had been particularly applied to Great Britain by the reſolution of the National Convention on the 24th of December, that the French Miniſter for Foreign Affairs had menaced the Britiſh Government with an appeal to the people; that another French Miniſter of State had threatened a landing in Great Britain with fifty thouſand caps of liberty, and that theſe menaces were ſupported by a conſiderable fleet, which was already at ſea, even before Great Britain began to arm, not to mention other meaſures, which have been already deſcribed, and the inſolence and contempt with which kingly government of every deſcription was treated in the National Convention. Nor were the hoſtile deſigns of

France

France leſs viſible in regard to Holland. The reſolution to open the Scheldt, and the forcing of a paſſage up to Antwerp, in defiance of the proteſtation of the Dutch Government, were acts of open hoſtility againſt an independent ſtate: and that before the cloſe of 1792, a plan was in agitation for an actual invaſion of Holland, appears from ſeveral expreſſions in the letter written on the 6th of December by the War Miniſter, Pache, to General Dumouriez. (48) The hoſtile deſigns of France in reſpect to

(48) In this letter the following expreſſions occur: "Si l'armée de la Belgique ſe porte *ſur la Hollande*, "et ne paſſe point la Meuſe, etc."—"Les divers motifs ci-deſſus, Général, ont déterminé le Conſeil à "perſiſter dans ſon ancien arrêté: il a délibéré comme "meſure d'urgence, *et qui devoit dévancer l'expédition* "*de la Hollande.*" Correſpondance du Général Dumouriez avec Pache, Miniſter de la Guerre, pendant la campagne de la Belgique en 1792, (Paris, 1793-8) p. 138. Chauſſard likewiſe, p. 278, ſpeaks of "opérations exécutées dans la Flandre, et *projetées* ſur la Hollande."

Holland appear further from the circumstance, that a corps of Dutch patriots, as they were called, to the amount of ten thousand, were taken into the French service, under the name of the Batavian legion; that this corps was stationed on the frontiers of the Dutch territory; that a revolutionary committee of this legion was permitted to correspond with the French party in Holland, in order to promote the expected insurrection, and facilitate the entry of a French army; and lastly, that a French agent was appointed to reside with the revolutionary committee, and communicate an account of its proceedings to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris. (49)

(49) "Les réfugiés Hollandais avaient assemblé un petit *comité révolutionnaire* à Anvers, où était aussi la légion Batave. Ils avaient plus de zèle que de lumières, et quoiqu'ils dépensassent beaucoup d'argent pour entretenir des correspondances avec les diverses provinces de leur république, etc." Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom i. p. 5, ed. 2de.—" Il fut décidé que les refugiés

After all theſe preparatory ſteps, the Executive Council was of opinion, on the 10th of January 1798, that the plan, as far as it related to Holland, was ripe for execution: for *on this very day* orders were ſent to General Miranda, who then commanded the French army in the Netherlands, in the abſence of Dumouriez, *to invade Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand at furtheſt within twelve days.* Dumouriez himſelf was at that time in Paris, concerting meaſures with the Executive Council for the next

réfugiés Hollandais ſe tranſporteraient à Anvers avec un *comité révolutionnaire* formé par eux. Bientôt une légion de *dix mille hommes*, que ces Hollandais avaient levés ſous le nom de légion Batave, eut ordre de ſe porter ſur la même ville, pour faire l'avant-garde de l'armée, en cas qu'on ſe decidât à pénétrer en Hollande. Un *agent du gouvernement* fut placé auprès de ce comité révolutionnaire *pour rendre compte au Miniſtre Lebrun*, chargé des relations étrangeres, des meſures qu'on y prenait." Deſodoards Hiſt. Phil. de la Révolution Françaiſe, tom. ii. p. 1792, ed. 2de. Paris, 1797-8. Dumouriez likewiſe gives the very ſame account. Mem. tom. i. p. 126.

 campaign:

campaign: and, as being commander in chief of the army in the Netherlands, he was commissioned to communicate the order of the Council to General Miranda, which he did in the following terms: (50) "I send you at present *the resolution of the* "*Council*: and as Valence comes to Paris, "and as you command the army in the "mean time, you are charged with the ex- "ecution of the following plan, which you "must arrange with *the most profound secre-* "*cy*. In the first place, General Bourdon- "naye will be dismissed, that he may not "counteract the project which you have to "execute, and all the troops, in French "maritime Flanders will be placed under

(50) Dumouriez's Letter to Miranda is superscribed: "Le Général Dumouriez au Général Miranda, Paris le 10 Janvier: and is printed, p. 3--8 of the following publication, printed at Paris in 1793. Correspondance du Général Miranda avec le Général Dumouriez, et les ministres de la guerre, Pache et Beurnonville, depuis Janvier, 1793.

" your command, that all the parts may be " put in motion by one will. At Bruges " you have General Deflers, who is very " good, to whom you will ſend your in- " ſtructions, and charge him with the diſ- " poſition of the troops in the lower Au- " ſtrian Flanders, while General Paſcal, " commandant at Dunkirk, is intruſted with " the diſpoſition of the troops in the lower " French Flanders. Arrange matters in " ſuch a manner, as to be able, *within twelve* " *days at fartheſt, to approach Zealand, and* " *get poſſeſſion of Dutch Flanders, at the ſame* " *time that you will order your troops to enter* " *the iſland of Zuyd-Beveland, and thence* " *croſs over to the iſle of Walcheren, of which* " *we wiſh to make ourſelves maſters,* before the " Stadtholder has time to retreat thither, and " before it is fortified, and has received a " garriſon. *There is no time to loſe:* and, " though the patriots pretend that the Zea- " landers are prepared, and that in all Zea-

 " land

" land there are not more than fifty-five " companies of infantry, conſiſting each of " only forty men, and no cavalry, and con- " ſequently that this expedition does not re- " quire above three thouſand men, I am of " opinion, that we ſhall want eight batta- " lions of infantry, the Batavian legion, " Moultſon's flotilla, two regiments of ca- " valry, eight twelve-pounders, four howit- " zers, a company of flying artillery, and " ſixteen battalion pieces. You will go to " Antwerp, where you will be joined by the " Dutch patriots, who will bring you their " maps, and ſerve as your guides, as they " themſelves have already acknowledged the " facility of the expedition. *The Miniſter* " *of the Marine gives orders to prepare furnaces* " *and grates in each of the three gun veſſels, in* " *order to fire with red hot balls.* Theſe three " veſſels draw but little water, and will ea- " ſily beat off the frigates by the ſuperiority " of their four-and-twenty pounders, and " their

" their red hot balls."(51) After a few lines relative to a forced loan at Antwerp, by

(51(" Voici à préfent *la réfolution du Confeil:* et comme Valence vient à Paris, comme vous êtes chargé par interim du commandement de l'armée, voici dont vous êtes chargé, et que vous devez arranger dans le plus profond fecret. 1mo. On donne congé au Général Bourdonnaye, pour qu'il n'entrave point ce que vous avez à faire, et on met à votre difpofition toutes les troupes de la Flandre maritime, pour qu'une feule volonté faffe agir toutes les parties. Vous avez à Bruges le Général Deflers, qui eft fort bon, à qui vous enverrez vos ordres et que vous chargerez de la difpofition des troupes fur la baffe Flandre Autrichienne, pendant que vous ferez faire celle de la baffe Flandre Françaife au Général Pafcal, commandant à Dunquerque. Arrangez les troupes de maniere à pouvoir *fous douze jours au plus fe rapprocher de la Zélande, et s'emparer de la Flandre Hollandaife, pendant que vous ferez entrer vos troupes dans l'isle de Zuyd Beveland, et de là dans l'ifle de Walcheren, dont ou veut s'emparer,* avant que le Stadthouder ait le tems de s'y refugier, qu'elle foit fortifiée, et qu'elle ait reçu garnifon. *Il n'eft pas de tems à perdre:* et quoique les patriotes prétendent, que les Zélandais font préparés, qu'il n'y a dans toute la Zélande que cinquante cinq compagnies d'infanterie tout au plus, à quarante hommes chacune,

which the expences of the expedition were to be defrayed, was then added: "Contrive, "likewise, that Deflers assemble at Bruges "four or five thousand infantry, with four "twelve-pounders, two hundred cavalry, "two howitzers, two four pounders for each "battalion, *and advance with the utmost ce-"lerity* to Middlebourg, and thence to the "isle of Cadsand and Biervliet. Send me a

et point de cavalerie, et que par conséquent cette expédition n'exige que 3000 hommes, je crois qu'il faut huit bataillons d'infanterie, la légion Hollandaise, la flotille de Moultson, et deux régimens de cavalerie, huit pieces de douze, quatre obusiers, une compagnie d'artillerie à cheval, et seize pièces de bataillon. Vous irez à Anvers, vous y serez joint par les patriotes Hollandais, qui doivent vous apporter des cartes, et vous guider, ayant reconnu eux-mêmes toutes les facilités de cette expédition. *Le Ministre de la Marine donne ordre de préparer des fourneaux et des grils sur chacune des trois chaloupes canonnières, pour pouvoir tirer à boulets rouges.* Ces trois batimens tirent peu d'eau, et chasseront facilement les frégattes, par la supériorité de leur calibre de vingt-quatre, et par leurs boulets rouges."

"courier,

"courier, to inform me of the difficulty or "facility which may preſent itſelf in the "execution of the plan. This you will "know to a certainty, when you have ſeen "the Dutch patriots, and have examined "their maps and their projects. *The whole "depends on promptitude and ſecrecy.*"(52)

Now, when we conſider that the States General had hitherto obſerved the moſt ſtrict neutrality, that they not only had given no indications of a deſign of attack-

(52) "Arrangez auſſi dans votre plan, que Deflers faſſe à Bruges un raſſemblement de quatre à cinq mille hommes d'infanterie, avec quatre pieces de douze, deux cens hommes de cavalerie, deux obuſiers, deux canons de quatre par bataillon, *et ſe porte avec la plus grande promptitude* à Middlebourg et de là dans l'iſle de Cadſand, et Biervliet. Expédiez moi un courier pour me donner connoiſſance de ce qui ſe rencontrera d'obſtacles, ou de facilités, dans l'exécution de ce plan. C'eſt ce que vous ſaurez poſitivement, quand vous aurez vu les patriotes Hollandais, et que vous aurez examiné leurs cartes et leurs projets. *Tout dépend de la promptitude et du ſecret.*"

ing

ing France, but on the contrary, on the supposition that the neutrality, which they themselves had observed, would secure them from an attack on the part of any other power, had taken no measures to put their garrison towns on the frontiers in a proper state of defence, we must acknowledge that the order of the Executive Council, which was given on the 10th of January, was an act of perfidy, which very little accorded with the boasted magnanimity of the French rulers, or with the declaration at that time too generally believed, that they fought only for their own preservation, and the political liberty of France. It was in fact worse than an *open* declaration: for an open declaration gives the attacked power at least a short notice of the intended hostilities, whereas the *secret* order given by the Executive Council had no other object, than to take a neighbouring country by surprise in the midst of peace. It is true, that the order was not executed immediately, because General Miranda.

randa, as he mentioned in his anſwer of the 15th of January, (53) could not inſtantly

(53) Je crois votre plan bien difficile à exécuter, dans la ſituation de nudité et manque abſolu de magazins, où nos armées ſe trouvent. Correſpondence du Général Miranda, etc. p. 8. On the receipt of this letter the Executive Council came on the 18th of January to the following reſolution, which was communicated to General Dumouriez: "Le Conſeil Exécutif proviſoire, Général, a reçu la lettre que vous lui avez écrite concernant l'opération de la Zélande, avec la copie de celle du Général Miranda. Le Conſeil, après avoir délibéré ſur leur contenu, a arrêté qu'il ſerait ſurcis *de nouveau* à l'expédition projettée ſur la Zélande, et il vous prie de le mander au Général Miranda, en y ajoutant, qu'il déſirerait que ce Général attendît les patriotes Hollandais, qui doivent ſe rendre à Liege, et qu'il prît des meſures pour vérifier les diſpoſitions annoncées des Zélandais et leurs différens rapports. *Le Général Miranda conſervera d'ailleurs la diſpoſition des troupes qui ont été miſes en mouvement pour cette opération*, et qui ſont hors du territoire Français." Ib. p 10. The expreſſion "de nouveau" affords an additional proof, that even before the 10th of January an invaſion of Holland had been in agitation; and laſt period clearly ſhews, that the execution of the order given on that day was not abandoned, but merely *poſtponed.* This is further confirmed by Dumouriez's letter to Miranda of the 23d of January, in which

put his troops in motion on account of the want of magazines; but this circumſtance is of no more importance to our preſent inquiry, than when, after a *public* declaration of war, a general, to whom orders for an attack are ſent by his government, does not find himſelf in a ſituation to comply with them at the inſtant. In our judgment of French politicks, therefore, the whole depends on the time of the order, and not on the time of its execution. Conſequently it muſt be admitted, that the Executive Council, on the 10th of January, 1793, declared itſelf in a ſtate of war with Holland.

But France, by declaring itſelf in a ſtate of war with Holland, virtually declared itſelf in a ſtate of war with England. The common intereſt, and the mutual obligations,

which it is ſaid: "Je vous ai mandé, mon cher Miranda, que j'abandonnai comme vous le projet de Zélande, mais c'eſt une raiſon de plus de pouſſer très-vigoureuſément celui de l'attaque de Maſtricht, Venlo et Nimégue, Ib. p. 14.

which

which then united theſe two countries, (54) made them really *one* nation, in regard to an invaſion on the part of France: and an attack on Holland in January, 1793, was as much an attack on Great Britain, as a declaration of war againſt Holland in the preſent year would be a declaration of hoſtilities againſt France. This was not unknown to the National Convention; and accordingly, when war was *openly* declared three weeks afterwards, it was declared againſt Great Britain and Holland at the ſame time. Briſſot likewiſe acknowledged in his ſpeech of the 1ſt of February, that a declaration of hoſtilities againſt the Britiſh Government alone involved in it a ſimilar declaration againſt that of Holland: (55) conſequently, as the converſe of this propoſition muſt be

(54) See what has been ſaid in the eleventh chapter on this ſubject.

(55) Briſſot's own words were: "En déclarant, que la France eſt en guerre avec le Gouvernement Anglais, c'eſt déclarer qu'elle l'eſt avec le Stadthouder." Monit. 3 Feb. 1793.

equally

equally true with the proposition itself, the interest being common, and the obligations mutual, it follows from Brissot's own concessions, that the order of the 10th of January was equivalent to a declaration of hostilities against Great Britain. Further, that the rulers of France not only had their eyes constantly fixed on these two countries at the same time, but that it was their design to make the ruin of the one subservient to the ruin of the other, appears both from their speeches and actions. "Assurances, that I received at this time from Paris," says Mr. Miles, (56) speaking of the 18th of January, 1793, "convinced me that the great object of the Executive Council was to throw "this country into an insurrection, and that "the explosion was expected to happen first "in Ireland. *The projected invasion of Holland*, preceded by the opening of the "Scheldt, as a preparatory step to the fall of "Amsterdam, were measures that would

(56) Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 115.

,, not

" not have been attempted, but for the firm " perſuaſion that the people in England " were on the eve of revolt, and that a revo- " lution would inevitably happen the very " inſtant, if not ſooner, that war was de- " clared. The entire conduct of the Con- " vention, and of its Executive Council, the " efforts of private individuals, *all tended to* " *this ſolitary but important object.*" In what manner the conqueſt of Holland was to be made ſubſervient to the deſtruction of England, may be ſeen in two paſſages of Chauſſard's Memoirs. The one, by which it appears that the bank of England was to be ruined by certain finance operations in Holland, has been already quoted in this chapter. (57) The other paſſage, which Chauſſard has taken from a ſpeech delivered in the National Convention, ſhews not only that the members of the Convention re-garded the fall of Holland as a preparatory ſtep to the fall of England, but that they

(57) Note 25.

were well aware, their views were not unknown to the English Government. For the orator, ſpeaking of England and Pruſſia, ſaid: "Theſe two powers well know that "France has the greateſt intereſt to ſubſti- "tute a popular and repreſentative govern- "ment to the ariſtocratic and degenerate "one, that actually exiſts in Holland: *that,* "*with the forces of that country, France would* "*irrevocably deſtroy the commerce of England,* "and, by means of its navy, ſoon command "the Baltic; that nothing more would be "wanting, than a renewal, in that part of "the North, of an alliance of ſituation then "become neceſſary; *and, that after an inti-* "*mate Union of France and Holland, the ſu-* "*premacy of the Engliſh commerce in the two* "*Indies would rapidly diſappear.*"(58)

(58) "Ces deux puiſſances ſavent très-bien que la France a la plus grande intérêt à ſubſtituer un gouvernement populaire et répréſentatif au gouvernement ariſtocratique actuel et dégénéré de la Hollande; *qu' avec les forces de ce pays, la France écraſerait ſans retour le commerce de l'Angleterre,* et qu'avec ſes forces navales

elle

Under these circumstances it would have been perfectly justifiable to have declared war against France in the middle of January, 1793. The existence of the British empire was now at stake: for not only had the plan been laid for its destruction, but the wheels of the machine, by which its destruction was to be effected, were already in motion. It was not merely the ruin of an ally, the order for whose political annihilation had been signed on the 10th of January: It was not merely the loss of a balance of power, or the effects of an aggrandizement, which might be dangerous to Britain at a future period; it was the immediate downfall of Britain itself, of its constitution, its laws, its liberty, its commerce, which was now in agitation, and in agitation by an

elle dominerait bientôt dans la Baltique; qu'il ne faudrait que renouer dans cette partie du Nord une alliance de situation, dès-lors rendue nécessaire; *et qu' après l'intime union de la France et de la Hollande, la suprématie du commerce Anglais dans les deux Indes disparaîtrait rapidement.*" Chaussard, p. 277.

 enterprising,

enterprising, a restless, and implacable foe. The measure of iniquity was already full; yet the British Government, desirous of maintaining peace to the very last, still waited with patience till the measure was not only full, but overflowed. That Ministers, therefore, *precipitated* their country in a war with France, is an opinion, which nothing but party malevolence could suggest.

Lastly, within three days after the order was signed for the invasion of Holland, the National Convention decreed, that in addition to the twenty-two ships of the line, and the thirty-two frigates, which were already in actual service, thirty ships of the line and twenty frigates should be instantly put in commission, beside forty-five ships of the line and frigates, which were ordered to be built with the utmost dispatch. (59) Now

(59) The two first articles of the decree of the 13th January, 1793, are as follow:

1. Le Ministre de la Marine donnera incontinent des

it is impossible that merely self-defence could have been the object of this additional armament, which enabled France to operate in a very short time with fifty two ships of the line, and an equal number of frigates, not to mention the ships of inferior force, which amounted to more than fifty, even in the preceding month of September. (60) For, on the 13th of January, 1793, France had a greater number of ships of the line, and frigates, in actual service, than the British Cabinet had at that time even ordered to be put in commission: (61) nor had these or-

des ordres dans tous les ports pour armer 30 vaisseaux de guerre, at 20 frégattes, indépendamment de 22 vaisseaux de ligne et 32 frégattes *déjà armées*; ce qui portera l'armée navale à 52 vaisseaux de ligne et 52 frégattes. Les vivres seront ordonnés on conséquence.

2. Il sera mis incéssamment en construction 25 vaisseaux de ligne, 5 de cent canons, 6 de quatre vingt, 14 de soixante quatorze; et 20 frégattes. Moniteur, 16 Janv. 1793.

(60) See Chay. x. Note 5.

(61) In the very same number of the Moniteur, in which the decree of the 13th of January is printed, by which it appears, that the French ships of the line,

 and

ders been given till three months after the French had begun to arm, and till after the National Convention had publicly declared its design of overturning the British Constitution, whereas the French naval armament was commenced at a time when, by the avowal of the Convention itself on the very day on which the additional armament was ordered, the British Government had in no respect violated the laws of neutrality toward France. (62) Further, not only Le Brun, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had, on the 31st, as well as on the 19th of De-

and frigates already in commission, amounted to *fifty four*, is given a list of the British ships of the line and frigates, which were either already commissioned, or had been ordered to be put in commission; and their whole number amounted only to *forty-five*.

(62) The introduction to the decree of the 13th of January, 1793, ran thus: " La Convention Nationale informée par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite rélativement au caractere de neutralité, qu'il avait conservée *jusqu'ici* touchant les affaires de la France, &c." Moniteur, 16 Jan. 1793.

cember, represented the British armament, as a matter at which France had no reason to be alarmed, (63) but what deserves particularly to be noticed, Brissot, *on the day which preceded the order for the additional French armament,* delivered a report to the National Convention, in the name of the marine and diplomatic committees, relative to the British armament, in which there occurred the following passage. " *Can we sup-* " *pose that these demonstrations of war are se-* " *rious,* when we see that the English Mi- " nistry carry on the negotiations with those " very agents whose official character they " affect not to acknowledge; *when we see* " *that they have ordered only the same number* " *of men and of ships, which were ordered in* " *the pretended armaments against Spain and* " *Russia, and particularly when we see that* " *they abstain from the terrible expedient of* " *impressing, without which it is impossible to*

(63) See Chap. xi. Notes 47-48.

" *man*

"*man a fleet of any confiderable force?* (64) Nor could the Marine and Diplomatic Committees have fpoken to a different purport: for they were confcious that only nine thoufand feamen had been voted by the Britifh Parliament, in addition to the peace eftablifhment. (65) It is clear, therefore, that the additional French armament, which was ordered on the 13th of January, had not merely felf-defence for its object: and it is equally clear, when we reflect on the conduct of the National Convention, as de-

(64) *Peut-on croire que ces démonftrations de guerre foient férieufes*, quand on voit le Minifte̊re Anglais continuer les négotiations mêmes avec les agens, dont il feint de ne pas reconnaître le caractere; *quand on voit n'ordonner que l'addition du même nombre d'hommes et de vaiffeaux, qu'il ordonna dans les préparatifs fimulés contre l'Efpagne et la Ruffie, et s'abftenir fur tout de ce terrible moyen de la preffe, fans lequel il lui eft impoffible d'équipper même une flotte peu confidérable.*" Moniteur, 16 Janv. 1793.

(65) No further addition was made till ten days after the French had declared war. See the fupplies granted by Parliament for the year 1793, printed in the New Annual Regifter, Public Papers, p. 121.

ſcribed in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the preſent work; that it was deſtined to act offenſively againſt Great Britain. (66)

(66) The important and deciſive facts recorded in this chapter, which place the ſentiments and conduct of the French Government in the cleareſt point of view, are *wholly omitted* by a celebrated Oppoſition writer, whoſe pamphlet, in the year 1797, met with a very unuſual ſale. The ſame pamphlet contains likewiſe *not a ſyllable* of what has been related in the latter part of the ſeventh chapter, where the hoſtile views of the republican rulers of France have been proved from their own declarations: nor does it take notice of the conduct of the National Convention on the 28th of November, with many other acts recorded in the tenth chapter, which ſhew a decided reſolution to overturn the Britiſh Government and Conſtitution. In like manner, the facts related in the firſt, ſecond, fourth and fifth chapters, which prove beyond a doubt the pacific ſentiments of the Britiſh Cabinet, as alſo the numerous acknowledgments made on this very ſubject by the French themſelves, with their conceſſions, that the Britiſh Cabinet had obſerved the ſtricteſt neutrality, and that a war with Great Britain might have been avoided, if they had choſen it; all which acknowledgments and conceſſions have been quoted at large in the fifth, ſixth, eighth, ninth and eleventh chapters of the preſent work, are in the ſaid pamphlet the

The French Government, however, attempted, by various explanations, to give its actions a colour of justice, and to alleviate the uneasiness expressed by the British Cabinet. We will examine, therefore, in the following chapter, in which the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France shall be fully considered, whether the explanations given by the French Government were of such a kind that the British Cabinet could depend on them, or whether they were not designed merely to amuse the Ministers, and to impose on the nation, till the plan of the Convention was as ripe for execution against Great Britain, as we have already seen that it was against Holland.

passed over in total silence. Nor is the reader even informed there, that the public declaration of hostilities proceeded from the part of France.—Yet it is called, on the title-page, a view of the *causes* of the war!

END OF VOL. I.

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